File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2000/bhaskar.0006, message 48


Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2000 11:59:33 +0100
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Realism and latent theology


Hi Nick, all

I agree entirely that it is vital for CR as an
emancipatory/transformative movement in philosophy and science to
identify the conceptual slippages (rather than mere terminological
similarities) within Roy's work pointing in the direction of idealist
etc theology (New Age Etc, or TDCR). 

However, there is perhaps a danger of exaggerating the slippages and
writing off as a consequence some of the many things of value in (D)CR.
Roy is explicit that TDCR is only *one* of *many possible* developments
of (D)CR (a 'necessary' development in terms of dialectical logic, but
only one of many possible necessary developments.) I think critical
realists should capitalize on this - Roy himself says New Age Etc was by
no means the only way to go. Presumably the system could equally be
developed (or at any rate fleshed out internally) in a spirit of
underlabouring as a philosophical ontology for science (and indeed Roy
says he's going to do this...)

One should also ask whether TDCR *is* developmentally consistent with
(D)CR. I think there are strong grounds for supposing that it is not. I
guess this is the other side of the coin of your position, Nick: to
argue that there are conceptual slippages leading to TDCR is to argue
that the latter is not really developmentally consistent... But I wonder
whether 'latent theology' as such is *necessarily* unfortunate from the
point of view of CR as an emancipatory movement.

There can be no objection, I think, to Roy's doing theological
philosophy as such (though I wish he had clearly spelled out the
difference between what he is doing now and his previous position, that
the results of transcendental deductions, to hold good, must ultimately
be grounded empirically by science), or to his attempting a snythesis of
the scientific and religious world outlooks. Indeed, it could be argued
that the forging of such a synthesis is an essential precondition for
the growth of a mass movement adequate to addressing the global crises
of sustainability and poverty. From this perspective, there is nothing
necessarily wrong with 'latent theology', and indeed CR has commonly
been thought of as an umbrella movement religiously as well as
politically.

However, I think it could be shown that the particular synthesis
initiated by TDCR is susceptible to explanatory as well as immanent
critique and is at the expense both of science and of several of the
great world religions.

Mervyn Hartwig


Nick Hostettler <NH8-AT-soas.ac.uk> writes
>Dear all,
>
>Problems in philosophy are problems of meanings, as distinct 
>from words. Words are powerful, but only because of what they can 
>mean to heart and mind. 
>
>Jan wrote: 
> 
>> well i've just finished the little jewel, and soo ... finally
>> his (RB's) godstuff exploded, it had to happen i guess;
>> i mean, when a philoshoper claims that "everything is real"
>> it's not surprising that the divine will surface sooner or later.
>> 
>> personally i don't see a discontinuity, what was latent has
>> become manifest in this book, i've always sensed an oriental
>> orginallity and clarity in his writings [his hinduist pantheon,
>> his buddhist dialectics] but i never dared to ventilate this here
>> in this forum ;-), but
>> 
>> e.g. if you take a more 'holistic' look at the defining concepts
>> (pre-EW) Bhaskar uses when he deals with ID entities and
>> dispositions [viz.: transfactuality, endurance, causality, sub-
>> stancy, relationality, structure, emergence, natural necessity,
>> possibility, perceptibility, intelligibility and so on] it is easely
>> recognized that these notions are (were) frequently used in
>> (previous) onto-theological contexts to denote some property
>> of some divinity; and imo it's a small step from "Eu-daimon-ia"
>> to the "Divine" [daimon] or maybe better, it's implicit in it !
>
>These comments and others about the latency of theology in
>Roy's philosophy raise the spectre of the worst of all possible
>repurcussions of Roy's latest book: FETW appears as a
>justification for the dismissal of the entire philosophy of
>critical realism. For if the publication of FETW can be seen as
>rubbishing the language of philosophical realism in DPF, then
>it must also be seen as rubbishing all of the previous work on
>scientific realism, in RTS, and sociological naturalism, in PON
>and SRHE.
>
>To protect philosophical realism, these arguments about language 
>need to be handled with care. 
>
>There is, though, a good argument to be made that 'it's implicit
>in it'. Such an argument, however, does not rest on the fact
>that the language of realism, new age and theology overlap.
>Terminological similarities are not even reason enough to see
>any affinity between philosophies. Concepts, not terms,
>distinguish or unify philosphies. What needs to be traced
>within Roy's work is the specifically conceptual slippage from
>the realist ontology into the idealist, irrealist, theology.
>Conceptual, not terminological, similarities and dissimilarities
>are what count. Terminological similarities are important
>though, for they can make such slippages all the easier. But
>they are not the meat of the matter: they are form rather than
>content; actuality rather than reality.
>
>There is no motor operating at the level of form (terms) to
>explain the slippage at the level of content (meaning) in Roy's
>work. There is no linguistic drive from ontology to theology.
>Rather, there are shifting and competing logics of content.
>Slippages from one logic to another can operate through terms,
>lending some individual terms a deep seated ambiguity. These
>terms acquire symptomatic ambiguities which point to the
>contradictions at the level of meaning. Such terms operate like
>bridgeheads between distinct realms of meaning: they obscure
>the boundaries between realms and permit an easy traffic between
>them. There are other terms, Trojan horses, which appear to
>belong to one universe or both, but really only belong in one,
>the one into which we slip as we cross bridgeheads. With the
>possible exception of 'Eudaimonia', none of the philosophical 
>terms mentioned above are Trojan horses, though all could 
>operate as bridgeheads.
>
>If the argument against the latest work is pitched largely in
>terms of the dangers and implications of terminology, the
>achievements of *Dialectic* and the rest of the ouevre are
>written off. Indeed, the effect of the terminological argument
>is that ontology must be simply absorbed into theology. If the
>argument from terminology gains any wider currency the effect
>will be that critical realism is junked wholesale as
>metaphysical claptrap. The content does depend on the 
>form, so junking the form means junking the content. The 
>argument from terminology is an actualist justification of the 
>positivistic refusal and dismissal of metaphysics.
>
>The gains of *Dialectic*, the 1M-4D realist schema and its
>partner, the critique of irrealism in philosophy; aspects of the
>social ontology; a host of other philosophical insights and
>arguments, especially in the figure of dialectical
>universalisation. These are immense gains. These are real gains,
>of tremendous value in our attempts to come to some superior
>understanding of capitalist modernity. These gains need to be
>protected from mis-stating and overstating the dangers of doing
>philosophical ontology.
>
>The immanence of theology in Roy's philosophy, both critical and
>dialectical critical realism, needs to be traced to the
>formulation of those concepts which act as bridgeheads, or
>simply as Trojan horses. These terms signify some of the
>dominant concepts in *Dialectic*, vis: the status of 'absence'
>as ontologically dominant, rather than as properly relational;
>the role ascribed to the absence and actualisation of alethia
>as an autonomous motive force in social being (i.e. as a cause
>of conceptual change rather than as its condition of
>possibility); they indicate the failure to sociologically 
>reconcretise the abstract, de- historicised, conception of 
>science in RTS; they embody problems in the social ontology of 
>PON; they are redolent of the persistent emphasis on an 
>ahistorical, abstract notion of individual autonomy, especially 
>in SRHE. 
>
>*Dialectic* provides some (by no means all) valuable conceptual
>resources for addressing all of these issues. We need to
>sustain the impetus towards a realist social ontology of
>capitalist modernity, and Roy's concepts, as distinct from his
>terminology, are still required to accomplish this.
>
>Nick Hostettler. 
>
>---------------------------------
>Nick Hostettler,
>Department of Political Studies,
>SOAS (University of London),
>Thornaugh Street,
>Russell Square,
>London WC1H 0XG
>---------------------------------
>
>
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-- 
Mervyn Hartwig
13 Spenser Road
Herne Hill
London SE24 ONS
United Kingdom
Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk


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