File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2000/bhaskar.0006, message 66


Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2000 13:35:09 -0500 (CDT)
From: viren viven murthy <vvmurthy-AT-midway.uchicago.edu>
Subject: Re: BHA: one last try


Hi Collin, Ruth and Marshal,

I hate to continue this debate after you have called a truce, but I still
have a question concerning the relationship between the intransitive and
transitive objects/realms.  

If I understand Collin's comments correctly, we can understand the
difference between transitive and intransitive as depending at least
partially on a perspectival switch.  Ruths ideas of some object x may be
trasitive with respect to the object, but they can become the intransitive
object of our inquiry.  I may misunderstand Bhaskar, but I would translate
this as simply "Ruth's thoughts exist independently of our inquiry and
hence we can be mistaken about them."  

Now this type of switching works only up to a point.  There are some
things that will stay intransitive, such as the actual "object" itself. Is
this what Bhaskar means by intransitive realm?  We can only know it in
thought, but Bhaskar's point is that we should not reduce the object to
thought.  Strictly speaking, it would seem that the minute that some x
becomes an object, it is in the transitive realm, since, we must conceive
of the object under certain categories. So it seems that something can be
an intransitive object in the transitive realm.  In fact, would it be false
to say that there are "objects" in the transitive realm?  If not, how
would we define such objects?

Best,

Viren

On Mon, 5 Jun 2000, Colin Wight wrote:

> Hi
> 
> One last try.
> 
> What does "anything existentially intransitive" mean. Well since
> intransitive is a term introduced ralative to any putative observer who
> then build transitive objects of the "anything existentially intranistive"
> then there is simply no problem. The concepts of signifier, signified and
> referent are intransitive to any scientists that wishes to understand them.
> You are the renegade most certainly Ruth because you keep lapsing into the
> epistemic fallacy.
> 
> Why, for example, do you not consider RB's concept of teh signifier,
> signified andc referent "existentially intransitive" to anyone who would
> speak of them, including I might add RB. 
> 
> 
> 
> >3. It cannot be the case that, for RB, everything that exists is, or
> >potentially is, existentially intransitive.  Some things must, by contrast,
> >be existentially TRANSITIVE (i.e., existentially transitive relative to our
> >conceptual practices).  This is so because otherwise the very distinction
> >would be unintelligible.
> 
> Exactly, so anything which exists can become an object of inquiry. Not only
> material things exist. Really, Ruth, trust me on this, you are fussing at a
> problem which is not a problem.
> 
> >
> >4. So some things that exist are "existentially transitive."  (Again:
> >"existentially transitive relative to human consciousness.)  
> 
> No, No, No. Again no. ONLY TO THAT HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS THAT WOULD WISH TO
> COME TO KNOW THEM.
> 
> here is no
> >shame, no lessening of ontological status, in being existentially
> >transitive.  Lots of things that exist are existentially transitive.
> 
> Yes, Newton's theory of gravity, but if such a theory exists and is not
> just in my head then it is "existentially intransitive" and as such can be
> the intransitive object of our inquiries.
> 
> Your posts are intransitive to me and to you. We have interpretations of
> your posts but nothing stops us permanently constucting transitive objects
> of previoulsy transitive objects and treating those previoulsy transitive
> objects as intransitive.
> 
>    It implies that a thing will
> >fall into either one or the other of the subsequent sub-classes, but it does
> >not tell us which one. 
> 
> No it doesn't you are getting hung up on a pseduo problem that the terms
> transitive and intransitive were developed to help you get around; where is
> Wittgenstein and that bloody fly when you need them most?
> >
> >6. A given thing that exists does not go from being properly thought of as
> >existentially INtransitive to being properly thought of existentially
> >TRANSITIVE unless it can be shown that our previous beliefs about the thing
> >were mistaken, and that the thing in question is in fact existentially
> >contingent on human consciousness, when we had thought that it was not.
> 
> NO< NO NO>>>AGAIN NO. Things dependent upon human consciousness can be
> intransitive objects to those forms of human consciousness that would wish
> to know them. Christ (sic), even my own beliefs at the neggining of this
> post are now intransitive to me, if I begin to refer to them; referential
> detachment.
> 
> >Conversely, a given thing that exists does not go from being properly
> >thought of as existentially transitive (relative to human beliefs) to being
> >properly thought of as existentially INtransitive (relative to human
> >beliefs) unless it can be shown that that the thing in question is in fact
> >NOT linked, existentially, to human consciousness, when we had thought that
> >it was.
> 
> This is all sooooo wrong Ruth. 
> 
> >
> >7. From the perspective of a *materialist* metaphysics, philosophical
> >concepts are paradigmatically "existentially transitive" relative to human
> >consciousness. While one may study them, "act" theoretically on them, etc.,
> >they will not therby become properly thought of as "INTRANSITIVE" objects.
> >This, again, requires rather they can be shown to in fact be existentially
> >self-subsistent relative to human consciousness.  
> 
> NO, again no. You are aquainting the intransitive with the material, tthis
> is not it at all....
> 
> >
> >8. Remember that even the most liberal definition of the intransitive
> >dimension specifies that it includes not "anything," but "anything
> >existentially intransitive."  The view that philosophical concepts meet this
> >criteria, that they are existentially self-subsistent (i.e., intransitive
> >relative to human consciousness) is the definition of what can be called
> >objective idealism. 
> 
> No it is not. I do not create your beliefs Ruth, you did. But when you
> refer to your previouls beliefs you do not create them in the thinking of
> them, even though your original thinking did indeed create them. No
> Idealism occurs. Your beliefs of 2 hrs ago are "existentially intransitive"
> to our attempts to grasp them; they are totally independent of the thought
> that attempts to grasp them. And the ssame occurs with history to. It
> doesn't exist literallt NOW, but it did exist then and leaves traces, and
> it can be an object of inquiry for us. There is no natutal science/social
> science split here. this is the real strength of CR and to miss it is to
> misunderstand. 
> 
> >
> >It's not even all that important of a point, really, but this is why, Colin,
> >I think that our difference of interpretation is one that makes a
> >difference. 
> 
> Oh, no, Ruth, it is not only important it is fundamental, that' the problem.
> 
>  I actually like how your approach enforces a relational way of
> >thinking.  I'm not even particularly opposed to it; I just don't think that
> >it's accurate to attribute it to Bhaskar. 
> 
> We can go through the texts if you like but the previous quotes should have
> dispelled any confusion on your behalf.
>  
> >
> >But I'm willing to go back to agreeing to disagree!
> 
> Well, it's not a matter of disgareeing here. I'm prepared on this issue to
> simply say you are wrong! :-)>
> 
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> 
> >r.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >
> >
> ============================================> 
> 
> Dr. Colin Wight
> Department of International Politics
> University of Wales, Aberystwyth
> Wales
> SY23 3DA
> Tel: (01970) 621769 
> 
> 
>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> 



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