File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2000/bhaskar.0007, message 57


Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2000 00:27:10 +0100
From: Colin Wight <Colin.Wight-AT-aber.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: Theology and critical realist praxis


OK a few last comments in what will probably be a vain attempt to clear the
fog.

MERVYN: The role of dialectic. Absolutely agreed. Theory choice, as I have
consistently argued, can only be settled by a process of practice, which as
Doug has nicely argued will involve a dialectical process between (at
least), the intransitive and intranistive realm. This is a dialectic which
cannot be played out in advance. Incidentally, as an aside to Tobin, the
intransitive is not reducible to the empirical.

MERVYN: On maths. Yes I agree they work. That's the point. I don't want to
get into whether we can be realists about maths entities. However, two cows
can be observed (empirically verified); two of any empirical objects can be
observed (probably - sorry Tobin!); the number two cannot. Does this rule
out the number two? Not for me.

TOBIN: well without wanting to raise your hackles even further I am afraid
that the following formulation is simply advocating a form of empiricism:

 If we admit such things as "non-empirical evidence," I
>don't see how we can shut the door to *any* sort of utter speculation, even
>the most perverse, that calls itself critical realism.


This is empiricism pure and simple: the only valid evidence is empirical
evidence. It makes CR appeals to non-empirical elements based on RATIONAL
deductions invalid. It is exactly the kind of formulation that drove
positivism (used in its technical sense not as an insult). 

More than this your attempts to address my Case 1 and 2 are paradigmatic
examples of the inevitabilty of going concrete. However, I consider,
rational arguments good evidence, as do most scientists. What evidence, do
you give, for example, in your love argument? You give a rational one based
upon the behaviour of the individuals involved, and you give an irrational
one based upon the same behaviour. If we were only looking at evidence
defined as the "empirical" then we would all be behaviourists, but we are
not; thankfully. I agree with Hans, you are pushing too far the other way;
all I might add in an attack on a position which has been entertained by
no-one except as a philosophical possibility.

Let me just sum up. 

1.	The empirical is not at all denied; accept for reasons of fallibilsim as
a possibility.
2.	The empirical, nor any other criteria, is not accorded priority.
3.	Theory choice can only be decided through practice; there is no
algorithm of theory choice.
4.	Nobody seems to disagree with this: although Tobin does seem to suggest
that only empirical evidence is valid; or even worse that only empirical
evidence is evidence.
5. 	What are the criteria for theory choice? :Ah well, that's a cheeky one;
and since it has been universally accepted that even empirical evidence
will require interpretation a difficult one also. None of which goes
anywhere near addressing some of the more problematic Kuhnian/Laudanian/van
Frassenian/Quineian arguments that could be mustered to even further
problematise a coommitment to the empirical. Which, of course, is not to
say that I buy these arguments; the issue is one of being a little less
certain that they can easily dismissed so as to allow the empirical to play
its role as master criteria that trumps all others. If only; if only theory
choice were that easy (a comment that will no doubt reap insults on my head!).


DOUG: Obvioulsy I agree with much of what you say, my only quibble is on
the tautology. It seems to me that if you (not particulalry you but anyone
who functions as a "you") say that all empirical sciences have empirical
objects this is an empty tautology. Question is, are there non-empirical
sciences? Well, I've not made a strong case for this either way. i have
suggested that Maths and theoretical Physics may fall into this category.
However, since I still think that probably all knowledge claims will have
an empirical referent I am simply probing the boundaries of possibility.

Final comment: In science empirical evidence is not the only form of
evidence and science has non-empirical referents.

The end.....I'm off on holiday. Am I turning postmodern, or is CR turning
positivist? Is the mediation an impossible project?

Cheers,



============================================

Dr. Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Wales
SY23 3DA
Tel: (01970) 621769 


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