File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2000/bhaskar.0007, message 7


Date: Sun, 02 Jul 2000 17:22:54 +0100
From: Colin Wight <Colin.Wight-AT-aber.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Everything


Hi mervyn,

Surreal man! Glad to give you a chuckle. The point about the owl seeing
everything clearly even the black cow, was i had thought exactly the point.
But then of course, we all know that empirical data require interpretation,
so I forgive you.

>
>Also, you (and Doug) say there are no general rules for theory choice,
>it all depends on the specific object domain. I (and Jonathan and Roy)
>say that 'choose the explanatorily most powerful theory (in terms of the
>range of phenomena it can explain)' 

Once upon a time (this is not a fairy story) explanatory power as defined
seemed to me to be a hopeful tack. But I am afraid I lapsed long ago (an
admission on the lines of "My names Colin and I'm a lapsed....add as
required".

The problem is that explanatory power defined in terms of the range of
phenomena, doesn't even come close to addressing three basic concerns. One,
it a purely quantitative measure. But what if, as in many cases (most
probably) theory X can explain T1..T5, and theory Y can exaplain T1, T2,
T4, T5, T6? What if T3 is the most significant in terms of what? Well now
the explanatory objectives come into play. Most importantly though it
completely misses that what is often most a dispute in science is exactly a
dispute about which theory can explain what.

My concern is that putting the tranistive dimesnion to real work and
epistemological relativism makes problematic all such formulations
precisely because what constitutes an explanation is always contentious
(see the AIDS example, which you simply read off as an easy case with
Mbeki, obviously wrong. Well, I might agree but I don't see how appealing
to explanatory power helps, because for Mbeki, Western explanantions of
AIDS are simply wrong). So explanatory power is simply one more tool in the
box. useful, yes. The master key? No.



>I can't agree that "what epistemological criteria we use will be
>specific to the specific causal mechanism at hand". Not *just* specific,
>otherwise not even recognisable as 'epistemological'. 

Sorry Mervyn, I don't get this. Why not recognisable? 

Like the pomos you
>are one-sidedly (undialectically) emphasizing difference, and haven't
>answered my point about non-positivist naturalism which also highlights
>what the various object domains have in common. 

A compliment indeed.

I thought I had but you rejected it on the basis of my supposed conflation
of a scientific and philosoophical ontology. For CR there are two
conditions of possibility for science (intransitive objects/transitive
objects). If these condition hold then science is possible. But given that
there are different object domains then the specific form of each science
will differ according to the object domain. So Bhaskar's non-positivist
naturalism is a very thin version of science at best. If people are unhappy
with this and want a more formally complete account, then build it, but it
is not in CR.

Tobin's point about the
>materiality of effects is also very relevant here. Roy makes the point
>somewhere that we ascribe reality in terms of material effects because
>we are creatures with material bodies, ie there's a universal dimension
>to our epistemologizing. 

Yes, yes, yes, yes , yes. But this is a rational argument re causal powers.
One I totally accept. But it is not empirical, and if you rely on empirical
criteria for this utterly rational position, Hume is waiting round the corner.

There is continuity and sameness in the
>practice of science as well as discontinuity and difference, otherwise
>there are no grounds for using the concept of science.

Have I suggested otherwise? There is I think a lot of (ir)rational
stretiching of my argument here. For example becuase I am prepared to admit
that aesthetic criteria into my toolbox, Tobin then infers that i advocate
the possibility of these overriding empirical ones whenever. What can I say!

Cheers,


============================================

Dr. Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Wales
SY23 3DA
Tel: (01970) 621769 


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