Date: Sun, 02 Jul 2000 17:22:54 +0100 From: Colin Wight <Colin.Wight-AT-aber.ac.uk> Subject: Re: BHA: Everything Hi mervyn, Surreal man! Glad to give you a chuckle. The point about the owl seeing everything clearly even the black cow, was i had thought exactly the point. But then of course, we all know that empirical data require interpretation, so I forgive you. > >Also, you (and Doug) say there are no general rules for theory choice, >it all depends on the specific object domain. I (and Jonathan and Roy) >say that 'choose the explanatorily most powerful theory (in terms of the >range of phenomena it can explain)' Once upon a time (this is not a fairy story) explanatory power as defined seemed to me to be a hopeful tack. But I am afraid I lapsed long ago (an admission on the lines of "My names Colin and I'm a lapsed....add as required". The problem is that explanatory power defined in terms of the range of phenomena, doesn't even come close to addressing three basic concerns. One, it a purely quantitative measure. But what if, as in many cases (most probably) theory X can explain T1..T5, and theory Y can exaplain T1, T2, T4, T5, T6? What if T3 is the most significant in terms of what? Well now the explanatory objectives come into play. Most importantly though it completely misses that what is often most a dispute in science is exactly a dispute about which theory can explain what. My concern is that putting the tranistive dimesnion to real work and epistemological relativism makes problematic all such formulations precisely because what constitutes an explanation is always contentious (see the AIDS example, which you simply read off as an easy case with Mbeki, obviously wrong. Well, I might agree but I don't see how appealing to explanatory power helps, because for Mbeki, Western explanantions of AIDS are simply wrong). So explanatory power is simply one more tool in the box. useful, yes. The master key? No. >I can't agree that "what epistemological criteria we use will be >specific to the specific causal mechanism at hand". Not *just* specific, >otherwise not even recognisable as 'epistemological'. Sorry Mervyn, I don't get this. Why not recognisable? Like the pomos you >are one-sidedly (undialectically) emphasizing difference, and haven't >answered my point about non-positivist naturalism which also highlights >what the various object domains have in common. A compliment indeed. I thought I had but you rejected it on the basis of my supposed conflation of a scientific and philosoophical ontology. For CR there are two conditions of possibility for science (intransitive objects/transitive objects). If these condition hold then science is possible. But given that there are different object domains then the specific form of each science will differ according to the object domain. So Bhaskar's non-positivist naturalism is a very thin version of science at best. If people are unhappy with this and want a more formally complete account, then build it, but it is not in CR. Tobin's point about the >materiality of effects is also very relevant here. Roy makes the point >somewhere that we ascribe reality in terms of material effects because >we are creatures with material bodies, ie there's a universal dimension >to our epistemologizing. Yes, yes, yes, yes , yes. But this is a rational argument re causal powers. One I totally accept. But it is not empirical, and if you rely on empirical criteria for this utterly rational position, Hume is waiting round the corner. There is continuity and sameness in the >practice of science as well as discontinuity and difference, otherwise >there are no grounds for using the concept of science. Have I suggested otherwise? There is I think a lot of (ir)rational stretiching of my argument here. For example becuase I am prepared to admit that aesthetic criteria into my toolbox, Tobin then infers that i advocate the possibility of these overriding empirical ones whenever. What can I say! Cheers, ============================================ Dr. Colin Wight Department of International Politics University of Wales, Aberystwyth Wales SY23 3DA Tel: (01970) 621769 --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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