From: <NH8-AT-soas.ac.uk>
Date:          Fri, 29 Sep 2000 8:54:22 GMT
Subject:       Re: BHA: Back to basics, 2


Dear Ruth, 

How about this? 

Roy uses the term 'ontic fallacy' to refer to reductions of knowing to 
being (the reductive collapse of the relative autonomy of processes of 
knowledge production into other processes).  This means that the ontic 
fallacy belongs to epistemology. He uses 'epistemic fallacy' to refer to 
reductions of being to knowing (the reductive collapse of reality into the 
processes or products of knowledge). So the epistemic fallacy is indeed 
ontological. 

We can think of what Roy was doing here in RTS in terms of the dialectics 
of DPF: thinking distinctions and connections. Ontology and empistemology 
are perspectives within philosophy, distinct but connected. The ontic 
fallacy collapses the distinction from the perspective of epistemology, 
while the epistemic fallacy collapses the distinction from the perspective 
of ontology. 

These categories are also connected. In their irrealist form they are 
necessarily 'complicit contraries' so that any position that is committed 
to one will be, either explicitly or implicitly, committed to the other. 
Ontologies and epistemologies are intextricably entwined. 

So the quotation from Roy suggests that empirical realism in ontology is 
logically combined with empiricism in epistemology. The ontological 
reduction of being to the sensual (the epistemic fallacy of empirical 
realilsm) is combined with the epistemological reduction of knowing to what 
is sensed (the ontic fallacy of empiricism). The depth and processuality of 
being (including the being of knowing) are erased. 

On what you say about Kant. I'm no expert, but we could say that Kant would 
be guilty of the epistemic fallacy if he claimed his categories were the 
world (conceptual idealism). I don't think he does this. Indeed, if I 
understand what Roy is saying, Kant argues that the categories have no 
purchase on reality at all, they belong *only* to knowledge. Kant's 
categories are all in the mind and have no real referents (depth reality is 
noumenal). Roy's categorial realism disputes this. 

Phil could let us know if this was right!

Nick.


>Hi all, 
>
> Okay, given the ROUSING response to my question about Bhaskar's account >
of perception (!), I'm going to go ahead and ask for help on yet another >
point that I *thought* I understood, but am starting to think that I don't.  
>
> It's this:  Bhaskar says empirical realists commit the epistemic fallacy 
>in virtue of being empiricists.  This always seemed fairly straight->
forward to me (and certainly it's easy to see the epistemic fallacy all >
over the place in the kind of post-analytic turn po-mo stuff), but now all 
>of a sudden it seems less so.  The epistemic fallacy names a kind of >
ontological violation, ultimately.  It is an example of flawed reasoning, >
yes, but the reduction of what is to what can be known (let alone to what >
can be known in the way that empiricists say that we know things) is an >
ontological, rather than epistemic, error.  [An analogous case might be the 
>debate over reductionism. On the one hand, the argument is a meta->
theoretical, or epistemological one, about the proper form, terms, >
categories, etc., of analysis (say, e.g., societies or synapses); >
ultimately, however, the argument is about whether emergent phenomena exist 
>or not.] 
>
> So in RTS RB says that it's the *empiricism* of empirical realism, i.e., 
>the theory of knowledge held by its proponents, that is the, or at least >
a, problem. Thus the claim seems to be that it is the move of defining >
knowledge as that which is or can be *experienced* that involves one in >
tacitly propounding an erroneous ontological claim (to the effect that the 
>only things that exist are the things that we can or do experience). 
>
> But I don't see how you get from "Knowledge comes from and cannot exceed 
>sensory experience" to "The only thing that exists is knowledge (defined >
as above)."  The target seems like it should be phenomenalism, not >
empiricism.  
>
> And with Kant, for example, I think it's precisely where he *breaks* with 
>empiricism, and gives us instead transcedental idealism, that he is MOST >
guilty (if his views are wrong) of committing the epistemic fallacy.  
>
> So I'm confused.  Anyone who can help will be contributing to a good >
cause. 
>
> Warmly, Ruth        
>
> 
>
> 
>
>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- 


---------------------------------
Nick Hostettler,
Department of Political Studies,
SOAS (University of London),
Thornaugh Street,
Russell Square,
London WC1H 0XG
---------------------------------


     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---