Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2000 22:12:11 +0100 From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk> Subject: Re: BHA: Hegel, dialectics, Stalin, etc Hi Phil, Hans Phil wrote: >And wasn't it >Lenin's return to Hegel that made the first proletarian revolution possible. Holy mother of Marx, Phil, no! You could perhaps *argue* that it was a necessary *condition*, but you would be stretching it, because while the Bolsheviks very probably wouldn't have made a revolution without Lenin, Lenin might very well have acted just as decisively without the return to Hegel... But you philosophers should read more history. There were many necessary (social - or 'material'!) conditions of possiblity other than Lenin! >You say that "critical realism shouldn't fall back into a pre-Althusserian >paradigm". I'm afraid you'll have to explain that one to me. Could Hans be referring to the *social* production of knowledge by means of knoweldge, rather than by Great Individuals? Mervyn Phil Walden <phillwalden-AT-email.msn.com> writes > >-----Original Message----- >From: Hans Puehretmayer <hans.puehretmayer-AT-univie.ac.at> >To: bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu> >Date: 28 September 2000 09:50 >Subject: Re: BHA: Hegel, dialectics, Stalin, etc > > >Hi Hans! > >Why does Hegel get the blame for philosophical Stalinism? I don't follow >you. It seems just as wrong as blaming Marx for Stalinism. And wasn't it >Lenin's return to Hegel that made the first proletarian revolution possible >. >Hegel's relation to Stalinism seems to be the opposite of what you state. >Of course every text *can* be interpreted in a variety of ways, but some of >these ways are simply perverse (in my opinion). > >On the question of "speculative-mysticist Lukacsianism", again I can't see >why Hegel gets the blame for the speculative-mystical elements in Lukacs's >thought. Lukacs's construction of the proletariat as the subject-object of >history is not the same as Hegel's dialectical philosophical subject, in my >opinion, because Hegel locates his subject much more concretely within >historical relations, so Hegel's schema is much less teleological than >Lukacs's schema. Of course Lukacs was trying to cheer up the troops when he >wrote *History and Class Consciousness* but I think his method suffered as a >result. > >You say that "critical realism shouldn't fall back into a pre-Althusserian >paradigm". I'm afraid you'll have to explain that one to me. Althusser >worked extensively on Hegel for his dissertation, so it seems he did not >share your negative attitude towards Hegel as a thinker. Of course, >famously, Althusser's work lacks dialectics but that seems to me to be a >problem for Althusser and not for Hegel. > >Warm regards, >Phil > >Hans wrote: >>Hi Phil! >> >>one could also say: without Hegel there would have been no philosophical >>Stalinism, no speculative-mysticist Lukcsianism, etc. >>I think, critical realism shouldn't fall back into a prae-Althusserian >>paradigm. >> >>Hans >> >>Phil Walden wrote: >>> >>> Hi Nuala, Mervyn, Gary, and listers >>> >>> Nuala, without Hegel there would have been no Marxism. No dialectical >>> philosophy. None of his work on the status of modern culture. None of >his >>> work on the relation of science to the humanities. None of his work on >the >>> role of the state. None of his work on how we are to understand history. >>> None of his work on what are the possibilities for modern art. In fact, >now >>> you have made me think about it more, wouldn't there have been another >Dark >>> Ages? I should actually not have been talking about retardation, but >about >>> history being thrown back centuries. But I suppose someone (who?) might >>> have followed Kant's lead on dialectics, so it might not have spelled the >>> end of humanity. >>> >>> Mervyn, there are Great Men (and Women) in history and Hegel was one of >>> them. Hegel's category of the world-historical individual was applied to >>> figures from the past who had radically changed the course of history. >>> Speaking from the present, I would apply that category to Hegel in >spades. >>> But the category is not meant to be applied to figures from the present, >and >>> that is what is wrong with FEW. The connection between present and past >has >>> been severed in FEW, and some abstract speculations about human potential >>> are supposed to plug the gap. But the truth is concrete, as someone once >>> said. >>> I don't believe my approach to Hegel is idealist, because his ideas >are >>> an immense material force in contemporary society, and their absence >would >>> have radically altered the course of history. Dialectics allows for the >>> material power of ideas as well as the material power of nature, so I >don't >>> think I am being anti-materialist. >>> Who is the individualist? For me, to take account of and point up >>> Hegel's contribution to thought is to care for the collective interests >of >>> humanity. To say that Hegel was only one person and therefore to vaunt >him >>> is substitutionism, is frankly to introduce bourgeois liberal >egalitarianism >>> into the argument. I am surprised at you Mervyn. >>> >>> Gary, you insist on claiming that Hegel made a self-serving choice about >his >>> relations with the Prussian State, but you provide no evidence. But I >have >>> evidence that he acted in the interests of humanity as a whole - it is in >>> the Terry Pinkard biography to which I referred. There was no 'trahison' >>> about Hegel. >>> I do think a large part of system is precision in the use of >concepts. >>> Hegel had it and Kierkegaard didn't. I also think your claim that >>> Kierkegaard attempted to produce "an absolutely independent body of >thought" >>> is strange. For one thing, what body of thought can be absolutely >>> independent? Surely where Hegel scores and Kierkegaard doesn't, is that >the >>> former tackled the burning questions of philosophy left over by his >>> predecessors whereas the latter was such an avoider of difficult and >>> pressing issues that he topped off his quirky efforts at philosophy with >a >>> flight into mysticism. (Though I do concede that he was progressive in >>> relation to the Danish church). If you are right and Kierkegaard was a >>> system-builder, then every philosopher is a system-builder and the term >>> loses all meaning. I see no systematic connection between the different >>> phases of Kierkegaard's philosophy (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). >The >>> "leap of faith" that Kierkegaard requires of the reader in his religious >>> phase does not seem to follow from anything he has said before. >>> I am sure you are right that Adorno was influenced by Kierkegaard but >I >>> suspect the influence was malign. At one point in Negative Dialectics >>> Adorno says philosophy is clowning and that piece of nonsense strikes me >as >>> eminently Kierkegaardian. But Adorno generally rose above postmodern >irony >>> and indifference. Can the same be said of Kierkegaard? On your point >about >>> aesthetics I plead ignorance. An elaboration from you on how Adorno's >>> 'truth content' is influenced by Kierkegaard's subjective definition of >>> truth would be very welcome. >>> Who are the Gang of Three? >>> >>> Warm regards, >>> Phil >>> >>> --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- >> >> >> >> >> --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- >> > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- -- Mervyn Hartwig 13 Spenser Road Herne Hill London SE24 ONS United Kingdom Tel: 020 7 737 2892 Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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