Date: Sat, 9 Dec 2000 11:45:39 +0000 Subject: BHA: Nietzsche, Anti-Nietzsche and TDCR -- thoughts for Christmas Hi all, A piece by Malcolm Bull in New Left Review 3 May/June 2000 ('Where is the Anti-Nietzsche?') prompts the following reflections on Bhaskar's religious turn and its context. Bull very clearly sets out, inter alia, Nietzsche's [N's] fundamental immoralism and inegalitarianism, together with his utter contempt for ordinary working people, socialists, feminists and Christians. He cites Geoff Waite, *Nietzsche's Corps/e* (1996) to suggest that the twentieth century has witnessed the comprehensive triumph of the Nietzschean radical right social and political project. N has served as 'the revolutionary programmer of ... fascoid-liberal culture and technoculture' which has not only triumphed over actually exising socialism but prides itself on having eliminated the socialist project as such via the Third Way of social democracy (which provides 'the best ideological shell for neo-liberalism today' Perry Anderson). N's teachings aimed, with extraordinary success, 'to re/produce a viable form of willing human slavery appropriate to post/modern conditions [global wage earners and poor], and with it a small number of (male) geniuses equal only among themselves' [the corporate super-rich - read Supermen or Overmen]. We live in the age of the unbridled Uebermensch. N took on board the nihilistic implications for morality of the theory of biological evolution, on the assumption that God is dead, evaluating value in purely biological terms: 'The standpoint of 'value' is the standpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement for complex forms of relative life-duration within the flux of becoming.' (The Will to Power). This view (nihilism) 'places the value of things precisely in the lack of any reality corresponding to these values and in their being merely a symptom of strength on the part of the value-positors.' (ibid.) The only value is the capacity and power to establish values, including the conditions in which this can occur. As I have said in an earlier post, placed in an evolutionary context, Bhaskar's claim that the good is 'ontologically prior' to evil fares well at the intra-specific and especially intra-community level, but can't handle the inter-specific situation, where nature is completely amoral. Unsurprisingly, N makes a great deal of the amorality of the inter-specific situation in The Genealogy of Morals (the eagle and the lamb, etc.) What is the answer to Nietzschean nihilism? It is of little avail pointing to N's performative contradiction in accepting the truth of his own grand narrative if you accept its truth yourself (morality has evolved to promote evolutionary success under conditions in which life has been competitively contested), as I do. Bull, searching for a 'post-Nietzschean anti-Nietzscheanism' ie an answer that operates on N's own premises of the death of God etc., counterposes 'the standpoint of the subhuman' to N's 'superhuman'. - Since 'N's model for the future of intra-specific relations is based on that of inter-specific relations' the way to combat Superman is to rejoin other animals - 'to give up the idea of becoming more than man and think only of becoming something less'. (Because N's Superman is also an artist (an artist-tyrant) -- for receptivity to the aesthetic the capacity for valuation = the exercise of power -- this means also becoming philistines (anti-artists), as Gary will tell you). Bull's counter to Superman is thus in effect Subman (my term; Bull could only be indifferent to the gender connotations here, to object would be to value). Nietzsche thought he had brought the nihilistic dynamic to an end in an ultimate nihilism in which the positive valuation of the 'ecological' conditions for value-positing Supermen to thrive [viz. the modern market] was the last value. But Subman goes one better: the last value is the negation of this ecology of value in a negative (or philistine) ecology which minimizes the possibilities for value positing and so decreases the numbers of Supermen, bringing a welcome respite from their cruel predatoriness and 'opening up new possibilities for subhuman sociality'. In support of this prospect, Bull enlists Durkheim's account of the dynamic of modernisation in *The Division of Labour in Society*, involving as it does 'the totalization of society to its maximal inclusiveness and complexity *and* the corresponding elimination of shared values' (i.e. the dynamic allegedly installs a negative ecology of value). Nietzsche's response to this dynamic was in effect a return to the communal values of Durkheim's 'mechanical solidarity' - but only for the Supermen; only the detotalisation and redivision of society into the community of the strong, on the one hand, and 'a mass of abject, powerless men who have no communal feeling', on the other, could sustain the conditions for value creation. Subman negates this ecology of value by declaring his perfect willingness 'to exchange an exclusive communality for an inclusive and indiscriminate sociality'. He embraces Durkheim's 'organic solidarity' or negative ecology of value, the metaphor for which was an eco-system: just as an eco-system 'can sustain a higher population the greater the diversity of the species within it, so society can accommodate more people if they have less in common and more diversified social roles'. Subman is therefore committed to the totalization of society - to extending its boundaries 'in order to decrease the possibility of value'. This of course means including the great apes and other non- human species within society. The inclusion of so many 'unregenerate philistines' will undermine the capacity of human culture to function as a shared value, inaugurating a thoroughgoing 'philistine ecology' in which chimps run the Louvre, etc.... Apart from the fact that his position seems committed to the truth of Durkheim's account, and other values secreted by it (why is 'indiscriminate sociality' less a value than 'exclusive communality'?), Bull's account seems very vulnerable to antinomial critique. When all is said, it is but the other side of the coin of N's position, a complicit dialectical antagonist which in no way transcends or goes beyond the Nietzsche/Anti-Nietsche antinomy. It seems to me the ultimate in POMO cynicism and nihilism, but it does graphically illustrate what Bhaskar is up against in trying to elaborate a realist ethics. As Bull points out, the usual 'progressive' response to N is to argue that 'the long process of human emancipation has not only been motivated by the desire to promote [emancipatory] values but has also contributed to their ecology'. This, however, says Bull, is a difficult argument to sustain historically and sociologically; and then wheels out Durkheim. Difficult to sustain it may be, but it is at least arguable along secular and evolutionary lines on an intra-specific basis (without rejecting the death of God), and when all is said and done the N/A-N antinomy can only be overcome in practice, and that's up to us... 'Utopianism of the intellect, optimism of the will.' In *From East to West*, Bhaskar is no longer content with such a response (or with its elaboration via the dialectic of desire to freedom in DPF). Nick and Alan have argued, correctly I think, that FEW is fundamentally concerned to bridge the gap between the historically real and the ideally possible by showing that the ideal is necessarily possible. FEW accordingly rejects N's premises and reinstates God - it caps N's grand narrative of biological evolution and the flux of becoming with a grander one which encompasses it, and which is ultimately God's cosmic purpose. This might look to the non-religiously minded as taking the easy way out or as 'pulling global salvation out of the critical realist hat' (Andrew Sayer, cited by Par Engholm, *Alethia* 3:2, p.20), but there is a sense in which it expresses the truth of our situation as a species: we are unlikely to survive ecological catastrophe unless we come to see ourselves, and to act, as part of nature's greater, highly valued whole. Mystics and the religiously minded have historically been far better at seeing this whole than the non-reliously minded, and certainly if global ecological crisis does escalate, people will turn to 'the help of the helpless' in droves; to this extent, Bhaskar may turn out to be far sighted and way ahead of his time. Both approaches, it seems to me, are progressive and can contribute a great deal to each other. Their common enemy at this stage of history is nihilism, whether of the Nietzschean or Anti-Nietzschean (POMO) variety. Mervyn -- Mervyn Hartwig Editor, 'Alethia' Newsletter of the International Association for Critical Realism 13 Spenser Road Herne Hill London SE24 ONS United Kingdom Tel: 020 7 737 2892 Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk ALETHIA is the newsletter of the International Association for Critical Realism [IACR], established in 1997 in association with the Centre for Critical Realism [CCR] to stimulate the discussion, propagation and development of critical realism on an international and interdisciplinary basis. ALETHIA seeks to promote the aims of the IACR by publishing articles, together with book reviews, higher degree thesis abstracts and news, on all aspects of critical realism as a multidisciplinary and emancipatory/transformative movement. It aims to be responsive to the IACR membership and invites discussion and feedback. Contributions from non-members will be considered. ALETHIA will be developed into a refereed journal over the next few years. IACR membership. Yearly membership includes two issues of Alethia (published in April and October) and a 10% discount on CCR Conferences and fee paying seminars. Yearly standard membership is 25 pounds sterling or 45 US dollars, yearly student membership 10 pounds or 18 dollars, five-yearly founder membership 100 pounds or 180 dollars, yearly multi-reader institutional subscription 40 pounds or 65 dollars. Ruth Kowalczyk, Treasurer, IACR, Management Science Department, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster LA1 4YX Tel: + (0)1524 594040 Fax: +(0)1524 594060 Email: <r.kowalczyk-AT-lancaster.ac.uk> Membership forms: http://www.criticalrealism.demon.co.uk/iacr/membership.html CONTENTS of the current issue of ALETHIA (3:2, November 2000): Theme REALISM & TRANSCENDENCE. Feature, Three views of Roy Bhaskar's *From East to West* (Nick Hostettler & Alan Norrie, 'Do You Like Soul Music?'; Jan Straathof, 'Logical Meanderings: West and East'; James Daly, 'Dialectical Enlightenment'). Pär Engholm, 'Realism, Social Theory, and Theoretical Practice' (review article of Andrew Sayer, *Realism and Social Science* Sage 2000). Derek Brereton, 'Ontic Morality and Human Being'. Brad Shipway, 'Critical Realism and Theological Critical Realism: Opportunities for Dialogue?' Doug Porpora, 'Quantum Reality as Unrealised Possibility' (review article of Chris Norris, *Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics*, Routledge 2000). Peter Dickens, 'Marx and the Metabolism between Humanity and Nature' (review article of Paul Burkett, *Marx and Nature: a red and green perspective*, St. Martin’s Press,1999 and John Foster, *Marx’s Ecology: materialism and nature*, Monthly Review Press, 2000.) Dave Taylor, 'Dialectic and Ontology in Critical Realism and Computer Logic'. Peter Hamilton, 'Thank God for Absence'. Kathryn Dean, 'Towards a Eudaimonistic Ethics' (review of Sean Sayers, *Marxism and Human Nature*, Routledge, 1998. Jonathan Joseph, 'Realism, Economics and Eurocentrism' (review of Rajani Kanth, *Against Economics*, Ashgate, 1997. PLUS reports on realist conferences, workshops and other activities. More than 60,000 words of critical realist scholarship and news in all. --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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