Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2001 00:09:57 -0500 (EST)
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca>
Subject: BHA: another go at the DPF intro


Hiya Gary,

Here it is again.  Better luck this time!

Ruth

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>From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca>
>Subject: BHA: another go at the DPF intro
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>Hi guys,
>
>Thanks Andrew, Gary and others for getting going on DPF.  After your post,
>Gary, I re-read the Introduction too.  Sorry for the length of this post.  I
>hope at any rate that it is clear.  (Also, I tried to format the paragraphs
>in a way that would be helpful, but I don't know if that will be retained in
>the delivery process.)
>
>Here's my stab at it:
>
>The Intro is a combination of big-picture stuff (objectives, the outlines of
>analytic frameworks, definitions, etc.) and a more detailed discussion of
>Hegel.  Let's start with the objectives.
>
>I.
>
>Bhaskar sets out the purpose of the book in a couple of different ways.  
>
>The first way that he does it is that he tells us right off the bat that
>he's got three aims:  1) to integrate dialectical categories into critical
>realism, 2) to formulate a general (non-Hegelian) theory of dialectical
>processes and 3) to set out the parameters of a "totalizing critique of
>Western philosophy" -  one which will shed light on the current "crisis of
>socialism."  
>
>The second way that he does it is that he tells us that Parmenides
>introduced into Western philosohy two major metaphysical errors: the
>epistemic fallacy and ontological monovalence ("a purely positive...notion
>of reality").  Bhaskar notes that he has dealt with the first of the errors
>in his earlier works.  Having already addressed the problem of the epistemic
>fallacy (and the actualism to which it is linked), he is now going to turn
>to the problem of ontological monovalence.  To put it differently, having
>revindicated *ontology* in RTS, he is now going to revindicate *negativity*.
>
>On to frameworks and definitions.
>
>II.
>
>A. "Dialectic"
>Bhaskar tells us that a dialectic is a certain kind of process.  Dialectical
>processes have the dynamic, or logic, that they do in virtue of (a) their
>structure and (b) the norms of truth and freedom - which, according to
>Bhaskar, dialectical processes incorporate.  Bhaskar doesn't pursue (b) in
>the Introduction, but with respect to (a), the structure of dialectical
>processes, we are told that a dialectical process is one that involves
>oppositions and interconnections which lead to a transformation of some
>sort.  The substantive components of a dialectical process can be
>conceptual, social or natural.  [Bhaskar of course has names for each of
>these possibilities, as well as for different combinations thereof, e.g.,
>"ontological dialectics," "epistemological dialectics," "relational
>dialectics."]
>
>
>B. "Negativity," or "negation."  
>Bhaskar starts off with three different classes of negation.  Each of the
>second two is a sub-set of the one that precedes it.  The three categories
>are: real negation, transformative negation and radical negation.  "Real"
>negation designates absence.  "Transformative" negation designates ... well,
>"transformation," Bhaskar says; change. "Radical" negation designates
>self-transformation.  Again, each of the second two is a sub-set of the
>previous category.
>
>There are a few things to note here: one, Bhaskar tells us that the
>dialectical *social* process modelled in the TMSA is an example of
>transformative negation - so this is a point of entry for dialectical theory
>into cr; two, Bhaskar says that central to the success of his revindication
>of negativity is the idea that "absence" (and/or "absences" -- he is unclear
>about the distinction between universal and particular) is a proper referent
>- this of course is a major point that he will need to argue for later, and
>not just assert; three, for those who know their continental philosophy,
>Bhaskar comments that his conception of absence, or real negation, is not at
>all like Hegel's notion of "nothing," but that it is a bit like Sartre's
>notion of "negatite."
>
>C. Levels of analysis
>Finally, Bhaskar tells us that the transcendental realism propounded in RTS
>in fact represents only one aspect of the far more comprehensive theory that
>he is now going to advance.  Dialectical critical realism, Bhaskar says,
>operates at four different levels of analysis, each of the first three of
>which, at least, involves the resolution (or so Bhaskar claims) of a
>different philosophical problem.  As noted earlier, the first level of
>analysis, that expressed in the "general theory of science" set out in RTS,
>is a response to the problem of actualism.  The second level of analysis,
>"prefigured" by the TMSA, is a response to the problem of monovalence.  The
>third level of analysis is a response tothe problem of extensionalism.
>Bhaskar does not, in the Introduction, specify the specific problem,
>philosophical or practical, that is associated with the fourth level of
>analysis.  
>
>For some reason (does anyone know the reason?), Bhaskar labels these four
>levels of analysis as follows: "first moment," "second edge," "third level"
>and "fourth dimension."   1M, 2E, 3L and 4D for short.  Again Bhaskar
>emphasizes that these aspects of the theory that he will be advancing do not
>correspond to any divisions or levels of analysis in Hegel's philosophy.
>
>All of this for starters.
>
>I'm going to leave the detailed comparison with Hegel to others, but there
>are a few last general issues worth touching on.
>
>
>III. General Comments on Philosophy, the Philosophy of Science, Science and
>Hegel
> 
>A.
>Just before he turns to Hegel, Bhaskar comments on the relationship between
>the philosophy of science and philosophy more generally.  The question he's
>responding to is "Why should we think that a philosophy of science is of
>anything but the most limited significance?"  Here's what he says: (p. 14-5)
>
>1. "(S)cience provides a hidden `analogical grammar' for the metacritical
>analysis of philosophies." [And then there's a footnote citing Buchdahl, a
>interesting commentator on Kant, among other things -- but nothing further
>on precisely what is meant by notion of "analogical grammar" that is being
>attributed to Buchdahl.  Is anyone familiar with the referenced text,
>*Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science*?]  
>
>2. Working out what the implicit accounts of science are that are carried by
>"philosophical theses of an epistemological kind" can illuminate flaws in
>the latter.              
>
>3. In this work, he is going to treat science as simply one instance of
>"engaged concernful human activity."  [In so doing he understands himself to
>be "taking up the challenge of Heideggarian existential phenomenology."]
>
>4. All of this said, science - and by extension the philosophy of science -
>*is* of only limited import.   That is, scientific knowledge is only one of
>a range of human values.  It is neither the supreme value, nor the value
>according to which the relative weights of others may be judged.  The
>[intransitive] objects of science do not "exhaust reality."  The
>[transitive] objects of science, i.e., the theories that we adopt at any one
>time, "afford only a particular angle or slant on reality, picked out
>precisely for its explanatory scope and power." (p. 15)  
>
>5. Finally, in keeping with the idea that science *is* only of limited
>importance, in a funny inversion of Kant [because Kant too wanted to leave
>room for faith], Bhaskar insists that "what is (and what is not)" cannot be
>identified with "what lies within the bounds of human cognitive competence."
>Note that this is not simply the argument against empiricist phenomenalism
>that we get in RTS.  I.e., it is not about the error of equating "the real"
>with "the empirical," to use the RTS language; rather, it is about the error
>(according to Bhaskar) of equating the real with that which in principle can
>be cognized.  Bhaskar's explicit formulation of this is is quite important
>in my view.  At a minimum, it is a clear indication (if we needed one) of
>how much more open to speculative metaphysics is Bhaskar than was Kant.   
>
>  
>B.
>As I said, maybe someone else can help us with the details of the Hegel
>discussion.  I got two main things from it:  (1) like Adorno, Bhaskar is in
>favor of what he, as did Adorno, calls "negative" dialectics -- an account
>of dialectical processes in which there is no presumption that such
>processes end in closed totalities -- or, more precisely, no presumption
>that they end ultimately in one closed totality; (2) the rational kernel of
>Hegelian dialectics is the sense in which it captures the logic of
>scientific development.
>
>That's what I got, anyway.
>
>Ruth 
>
>
>           
>
>
>
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