Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2001 20:48:14 +0000
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: negativity wins


Howard,

I agree with Tobin's points. 

When you counterpose 'interpretation' to 'cause' aren't you setting up a
reasons/cause dualism? On CR premises, 'interpretation' gives you a
reason for acting and reasons are causes...

I agree that meaning has a necessary material dimension - the
materiality of the sign etc. However, signs can't do their work without
structures (eg the signs I'm making right now can't work without
grammatical structure). And equally, I think, when signs are deployed
(via structures) to delineate structures, whether Factual or Fictional
e.g. the structure water or of Don Quixote's personality, the
theoretical or fictional objects they respectively designate are Real,
ie causally efficacious, even if, as in the case of the Fictional
especially, often somewhat inchoate and sprawling and open to many
interpretations. Ie Don Q is more than a sign or set of signs, his
character has a certain shape or structure which is not reducible to
them (and which is not reducible either to social structure - though
that is involved -, otherwise he would be completely socially
constituted, and 'sociological imperialism' is arguably just as mistaken
re the Fictional as re the Factual world.)

Mervyn


lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes
>Meryvn --
>
>Perhaps we have to leave it at talking past one another.  Anyway, I will be
>away from email for a week.  But I don't need the last word. I look forward
>to your reply.
>
>This last post at least gives clear examples of the category mistake I
>referred to in my last post.  And this in turn has to do with the
>underdevelopment of CR theory with respect to issues of representation and
>ideology.
>
>Here is a different example that I used recently.  Suppose I want someone
>on the other side of a boundary.  I can carry them there.  That is a causal
>transformation of the world.  Or I can threaten them in one way or another.
> Then, if they are persuaded by the threat, they will move over the
>boundary themselves.  Now in common speech we say that the threat "caused"
>the person to move over the boundary.  But that's not really true.  What
>happened is that whatever I did to threaten communicated something to the
>other person.  The other interpreted the world as being a certain way.
>Then, as a result of that interpretation, they engaged themselves causally
>in moving across the boundary.  Sticks and stones will break my bones but
>words will never hurt me.  But words threatening broken bones can catch my
>attention so that I act causally to avoid the threatened consequence.
>Notice in ordinary language we would not usually say "catch my attention"
>in the previous sentence, but we would say "but words threatening broken
>bones cause me to act to avoid the consequence."  But that's not really
>accurate -- words represent, I act based on my interpretation of them.
>
>This is important, incidentally, in commodity exchange.  If I take the
>camera from someone's arm and run, that's a causal transformation of the
>world.  If I ask them to sell me the camera for $500, I induce, I don't cause.
>
>You say, look at the causal influence of Don Quixote on you.  No.  That is
>a category mistake.  Don Quixote represents; I act.  The same with Pierre.
>Nor is the difference between us here about referential detachment and
>intransitivity.  Any representation must be materially embodied in a sign.
>Signs are material things -- sounds, marks on paper, light, electric
>energy, etc.  Don Quixote the sign is materially embodied and intransitive.
> That does not make Don Quixote's personality is a Real mechanism.
>
>As a consequence, this is a real muddle:
>
>>>1) The Real: Mechanisms (ie causal powers, tendencies or dispositions,
>>>grounded or not in structures - the later Bhaskar speaks of 'pure
>>>dispositionality' at rock bottom) - e.g. the structure and powers of Don
>>>Quixote's personality or personality type.
>
>It is a category mistake to say that Don Quixote's personality is a Real
>mechanism with causal powers.  Don Quixote is a sign and the sign can be
>interpreted by someone who acts.  But Don Quixote's personality no more has
>causal powers than the concept of a dog will bite.  Cause is the actual
>material transformation of the world.  Words tranform the world by making
>vibrations in air.  The rest is interpretation.
>
>Now, and this was my reference to Sean Sayers, if you want to get at the
>Real mechanism, the social structure, that generated Don Quixote's
>personality, that is a genuine question, and the difficult task of literary
>science.  What are the Real mechanisms, for example, that account for Lear?
>
>Howard
>
>
>
>
>
>
>At 11:24 PM 2/21/01 +0000, you wrote:
>>Dear Howard,
>>
>>I don't understand why you're so reluctant to accept that there could
>>have been just nothing. It seems perfectly obvious to me, and a valid
>>dialectical argument (accepting 'dialectical detachment' from the
>>initial premise of positive existence) - very different from speculation
>>about the number of angels that could fit on a pin. Absence could be
>>without presence, but not vice versa, therefore beyond the world as we
>>know it (in which absence and presence are at least on a par) absence
>>must be assigned ontological priority.
>>
>>If it's God you're worried about, then paradoxically you should accept
>>the argument, because just nothing would mean no God or anything else.
>>As I understand Bhaskar, God is both absence and presence, the reality
>>of both of which you admit.
>>
>>
>>>I argue this by appealing to our experience:  no phenomenon of our world
>>>suggests an inference to just nothing as a condition of anything.
>>
>>This looks very empiricist to me. If it is, that doesn't in itself make
>>it mistaken, but I think it is, and that that's why we're talking past
>>each other quite a bit.
>>
>>>We can and should entertain the
>>>possibility that "there could have been just nothing" will tell us
>>>something about the world.  But if it does not,
>>
>>Does it not? It tells us that beyond the world as we know it, absence is
>>ontologically prior. Isn't this part of the world? 'Reality is a
>>potentially infinite totality of which we know something but not how
>>much.' Perhaps one of the things Bhaskar is getting at in all this is
>>that in order to find out more, science must assume the existence of a
>>verification-transcendent reality which is absent to current scientific
>>theories and understandings. In this sense not only positivity, but the
>>world as know it (absences, presences and all), is 'a tiny ripple on a
>>sea of negativity'.
>>
>>>Don Quixote never actually moved any really existing windmill in Spain.
>>
>>This non-being has, however, had quite a significant causal impact on
>>the world ever since, including obviously on yourself. Your
>>referentially detaching him in itself, on CR tenets, establishes his
>>existential reality and intransitivity. *Who* did you say never moved
>>any windmills?
>>
>>>But I get
>>>the idea from Chapter 2 of DPF that real non-beings are meant to be
>>>enduring mechanisms and Real.  Correct me if I'm wrong. 
>>
>>I think this is partly wrong. Mechanisms are only ever *relatively*
>>enduring. Pierre's absence from the cafe could be very brief, yet
>>(mediated) have a significant causal impact on the people concerned.
>>
>>Non-being plus being = reality, ontology, what there is. Within reality
>>there are three irreducibly distinct domains, here illustrated with
>>reference to a non-being:
>>
>>1) The Real: Mechanisms (ie causal powers, tendencies or dispositions,
>>grounded or not in structures - the later Bhaskar speaks of 'pure
>>dispositionality' at rock bottom) - e.g. the structure and powers of Don
>>Quixote's personality or personality type.
>>
>>2) The Actual: Events or the activity of mechanisms - e.g. your writing
>>a sentence about Don Quixote.
>>
>>3) The Empirical or (in PE) the Subjective: Experiences of the activity
>>of mechanisms - e.g. your experience of writing a sentence about Don
>>Quixote.
>>
>>However, perhaps you have not fully taken on board that these domains
>>are said to be *overlapping* (see RTS 13, 56, esp the ticks in the
>>table) ie Events and Experiences can be Mechanisms i.e. causal, and
>>Experiences are also Events).
>>
>>
>>>The distinction between representing, ie using one thing to refer to
>>>another, and causing is ontological and terrifically important.  Just as
>>>being is different than representing, causing and being able to cause are
>>>different than representing. 
>>
>>The distinction is important, but it is *within* ontology. There was a
>>fairly recent thread in which Tobin argued the causal efficacy of
>>repesentation and signs far better than I can.
>>
>>Mervyn
>>
>>
>>
>>lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes
>>>
>>>
>>>Sorry Mervyn for the "you said, no I didn't" response.  These are difficult
>>>issues and I"m open to clarification on them.  The question of the
>>>ontological status of laws and what their place is in relation to
>>>mechanisms I think is very difficult.  I wonder if others have had problems
>>>working through these issues.
>>>
>>>1.     You seem to assume that I argue that Bhaskar's argument depends in
>some
>>>way or other on whether a total void ever existed.  This is not a fair
>>>reading of my posts.  I am disagreeing with what you find unproblematic:
>>>that, by dialectical argument, we can establish that there could have been
>>>nothing.
>>>
>>>You miss my argument on the point claiming that my conclusion is mere
>>>assertion.  Now we can discover by logical argument that the sum of the
>>>squares of the sides of a right triangle is equal to the square of the
>>>hypotenuse.  We can also make a logical argument that infinitely many
>>>angels can stand on the point of a pin.  My point is that the argument that
>>>there could have been just nothing is of the second sort.
>>>
>>>I argue this by appealing to our experience:  no phenomenon of our world
>>>suggests an inference to just nothing as a condition of anything.  I look
>>>at a room and I see the space between one wall and another.  I look at the
>>>stars and see the space between them.  I can abstract to the idea of
>>>everything as empty nothing as a logical possibility.  But this is not an
>>>argument about the world.  It does not establish as a real matter that
>>>"there could have been just nothing."  "There could have been no homo
>>>sapiens" I assume was historically a real, not just a logical possibility.
>>>The point of my reference to Marx and the Bhaskar of SRHE 12 ("there is no
>>>philosophy in general") is that there is a point at which logical
>>>possibility is no longer about the world.  We can and should entertain the
>>>possibility that "there could have been just nothing" will tell us
>>>something about the world.  But if it does not, we must conclude, fallibly,
>>>that the argument is of the angels on a pin sort.
>>>
>>>2.     You argue that I place positive and negative existence "on a par."
> What
>>>I say is that "at any one point, one or another aspect of a contradiction
>>>may be primary."
>>>
>>>3.     You say I assume in empiricist fashion the unity of positive and
>>>negative existence and that I assert this is just how reality presents
>>>itself.  I argued pretty clearly in my last post that reality presents
>>>itself to us as positive existence and that our ability to establish being
>>>as a unity of positive and negative existence must be the product of
>>>theoretical work.  I grant you in the first post I did say that "The real
>>>presents itself as a unity of opposites -- as a unity of the positive and
>>>the negative."  I can see that "presents" can be misconstrued here and the
>>>reference to the ontological level you specify as the Real could be missed.
>>> Anyway, I mean that being is Real and is constituted by positive and
>>>negative existence.  I understand this is not obvious, and may be wrong,
>>>but anyway it is not empiricist.    
>>>
>>>4.     You acknowledge that you don't see the problem I raise with
>respect to
>>>ontological stratification.  No doubt I wrote too quickly.  But part of the
>>>problem may be the unproblematic way in which you handle these issues.  For
>>>example, you suggest that "water is one ontological level, the gases
>>>another, the molecules comprising them another, and so on."  Surely this
>>>cannot be right.  This appears to confuse "onts" (DPF 40) as the
>>>"intransitive objects of specific epistemic inquiries" with levels of
>>>ontological stratification.  It is not every reaction in a chemistry lab
>>>that creates a new level of ontology.  That was my problem.  I assumed
>>>hydrogen was an "enduring mechanism" and thus Real, but not actual.  But
>>>then that didn't make sense.  Hydrogen was as actual as it gets and when in
>>>the exercise of its causal powers it generated effects, these were new
>>>enduring mechanisms in no way ontologically different from hydrogen.  So
>>>where was the stratification?  My experience was, anyway, that until I saw
>>>this as a problem I did not really understand the dimensions of the the
>>>problem in the distinction between causal laws and patterns of events.  The
>>>difficulty of dealing ontologically with laws gets reduced to the easy
>>>familiarity we have with mechanisms such as hydrogen and so the problem
>>>doesn't seem as troublesome as it actually is.
>>>
>>>There is more confusion of ontological levels in the following statement:
>>>"Even fictional characters for Bhaskar really exist, i.e. are real
>>>non-being."  Now one can say that fictional characters are real in the more
>>>or less vague sense that you say something is "within ontology."  But I get
>>>the idea from Chapter 2 of DPF that real non-beings are meant to be
>>>enduring mechanisms and Real.  Correct me if I'm wrong.  If fictional
>>>characters are meant to be Real in the sense of enduring mechanisms, then
>>>this is a category mistake.  Sean Sayers in Reality & Reason is very good
>>>on this.  Fictions and errors are caused by real things, without doubt, and
>>>they can always be traced to real things.  But fictions are at the
>>>ontological level of the semiotic, of representation, not of causation.
>>>Don Quixote never actually moved any really existing windmill in Spain.
>>>The distinction between representing, ie using one thing to refer to
>>>another, and causing is ontological and terrifically important.  Just as
>>>being is different than representing, causing and being able to cause are
>>>different than representing.  I think we sometimes forget that.
>>>
>>>Thanks,
>>>
>>>Howard 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>Dear Howard,
>>>>
>>>>Many thanks. Some comments.
>>>>
>>>>1.
>>>>>there is nothing in the argument at DPF 46 that establishes a
>>>>>"total void" (RB's term) as the condition of possibility of anything.  Nor
>>>>>is there anything that establishes the condition of possibility of a total
>>>>>void, except in a purely speculative, logical way. 
>>>>
>>>>The passage actually claims that it is presenting a dialectical argument
>>>>(which of course is a species of transcendental argument), establishing
>>>>the 'conditions of possibility' of 'the conditions of impossibility' of
>>>>'positive existence' - i.e. a total void (there could have been just
>>>>nothing, in which case something would have been impossible). You don't
>>>>really say why this is not a dialectical or transcendental argument,
>>>>just assert that it is 'purely speculative'. (Re what you have to say re
>>>>the premise - 'positive existence - see below.)
>>>>
>>>>Moreover, you don't seem to have fully taken on board, what the footnote
>>>>makes clear, that Bhaskar is not arguing that 'a total void' does or
>>>>ever did exist, just that dialectically it is a possibility that there
>>>>could have been just nothing. He's not arguing that (given that there is
>>>>something) absence is not always relational to presence, only that it's
>>>>ontologically more fundamental (and then only 'outwith the world as we
>>>>know it', not within it); and it's important to remember that the
>>>>passage you cited only presents the fourth argument in a series against
>>>>the contrary view, that *positivity* has ontological primacy.
>>>>'Negativity wins' doesn't mean that there's ultimately just a void, or
>>>>that absence acts on its own.
>>>>
>>>>2. As far as I can see, you *assume* 'the unity of positive and negative
>>>>existence' (by which I take it you mean that neither has primacy, they
>>>>are 'on a par'). What is the argument for this? You said in your
>>>>previous post that is just how reality 'presents itself', but CR rejects
>>>>that sort of empiricism.
>>>>
>>>>3.
>>>>>the premise of positivity taken
>>>>>alone presupposes an ontologically monovalent view of the world.
>>>>
>>>>Precisely. We live in a world dominated by an ontologically monovalent
>>>>outlook. The whole argument of DPF is directed against this. Bhaskar
>>>>therefore, in keeping with the principles of immanent critique, takes as
>>>>his premise what his opponent asserts, and tries to show that it is
>>>>transcendentally impossible. All too few people disagree with this
>>>>premise - you and I do, of course, but that is beside the point.
>>>>
>>>>4. 
>>>>
>>>>>But I would dispute that beings exist in this sense at all.  I think
>beings
>>>>>and being are real, but not actual.  What I mean is this.  Occurrences are
>>>>>what constitute positive existence.  What happens.  This is what is in the
>>>>>present.  The point can be made more strongly:  being only ever appears as
>>>>>what occurs.  Appearance here and now is the only form of manifestation of
>>>>>being.  Being, beings, does/do not present itself/themselves to us in any
>>>>>other way.  This is the actual.  The ontology of the actual is events.
>>>>>What occurs.  This is positive existence.  Positive existence is the
>>>>>phenomenal form of appearance of being.
>>>>[snip]
>>>>
>>>>>the real -- things, "enduring mechanisms," beings
>>>>
>>>>You are here confusing Bhaskar's domain of the Real (Mechanisms) with
>>>>the real, what there is, being/non-being, ontology. The domains of the
>>>>Real, the Actual (Events) and the Empirical (Experiences) are
>>>>distinctions *within* the real, within ontology. For Bhaskar,
>>>>*everything* is real (which you yourself sometimes seem to acknowledge
>>>>eg in your PS where you correctly talk of the ideological or the
>>>>semiotic as 'ontological'). Even fictional characters for Bhaskar really
>>>>exist, i.e. are real non-beings. DCR can thus pay full tribute to the
>>>>power of imagination. - But please, let's not have the the great Santa
>>>>debate all over again! (Just tell the kids that Santa really does
>>>>exist!)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>5.
>>>>>The problem I had a month ago with ontological stratification arose in
>>>>>trying to explain Bhaskar's example of the litmus test.  I wondered what
>>>>>the ontological difference was between the chemical structure of the acid
>>>>>and the litmus paper turned red.  If hydrogen is an enduring mechanism
>>>>>(thus real) and oxygen is an enduring mechanism (thus real) and together
>>>>>they make water, where is the ontological stratification, because water
>>>>>must be real and an enduring mechanism in its own right?  All matter is
>>>>>causally efficacious.  Also, hydrogen, oxygen, water and all other matter
>>>>>are actual in the sense that they appear.  Where are the levels of
>>>structure?
>>>>
>>>>I unfortunately wasn't able to follow the thread on this. From what you
>>>>say here I can't see the problem. In emergence new powers and structures
>>>>are generated when things are brought into different relation with each
>>>>other. So when hydrogen and oxygen are brought into relation in a
>>>>certain proportion the resulting water has different powers (which I
>>>>expect you don't dispute) and a different structure (the new relations
>>>>between the structures of hydrogen and oxygen). So water is one
>>>>ontological level, the gases another, the molecules comprising them
>>>>another, and so on. The litmus paper example seems to confuse the Real
>>>>(mechanisms and structures) and the Actual (events) - there's no
>>>>emergence in this case, just the activity of mechanisms issuing in an
>>>>event.
>>>>
>>>>6.
>>>>>Contradiction is displaced by absence as the motive force of the
>>>>>development of things, and this is really the problem.
>>>>
>>>>Absence is the more fundamental category for Bhaskar, but I don't see
>>>>how it *displaces* contradiction, because on his account absence (and
>>>>absenting) are at the very heart of contradiction, and in turn without
>>>>contradiction there could be no change ie transformative negation, or
>>>>absenting. Perhaps more on this when the present thread has run its
>>>>course...
>>>>
>>>>Mervyn
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>Many thanks, Mervyn, for your thoughtful engagement of the issues.  I'm
>>>>>sorry my response is so long.  I hope the points are clear.  I'm really
>>>>>interested in the third point, which returns to the issue of ontological
>>>>>stratification that I raised some weeks ago.  It seems to me key here.
>>>>>
>>>>>1.     Transcendental arugment.  I do not find justification in the early
>>>pages
>>>>>of SRHE for the assertion that transcendental arguments "by definition . .
>>>>>. assume that logical possibility is not identical with real possibility."
>>>>>Of course it is the disjuncture between logical possibility and real
>>>>>possibility that makes it possible to think critically about the real at
>>>>>all.  Because we can imagine fictions, we can discover things we would not
>>>>>otherwise have known about the world.  But that doesn't mean every fiction
>>>>>has relevance for understanding how things really are.  For philosophy as
>>>>>an underlaborer for science, the premise of SRHE, logical possibility is
>>>>>tethered to real possibility.
>>>>>
>>>>>For example, at SRHE 11 RB writes that "a transcendental enquiry is
>>>>>identified as an enquiry into the conditions of the possibility of phi,
>>>>>where phi is some especially significant, central or pervasive feature of
>>>>>our experience."  Thus while transcendental argument can properly
>establish
>>>>>that negativity is a condition of the possibility of our experience of
>>>>>events, there is nothing in the argument at DPF 46 that establishes a
>>>>>"total void" (RB's term) as the condition of possibility of anything.  Nor
>>>>>is there anything that establishes the condition of possibility of a total
>>>>>void, except in a purely speculative, logical way.  And of course that is
>>>>>my point.  There are limits to the process.  Transcendental reflection
>is a
>>>>>species of retroductive argument (11) and retroductive argument "moves
>from
>>>>>a description of some phenomenon to a description of something which
>>>>>produces it or is a condition for it."  There is no phenomenon in our
>>>>>world, so far as I know, that suggests it was produced by a total void or
>>>>>that a total void is a condition for.
>>>>>
>>>>>Incidentally, it is not my point, as you say, that "from nothing you can
>>>>>only get nothing, not something positive."  I have actually nothing to say
>>>>>about nothing.  (At least until we get to Lear.)  My point is that I know
>>>>>no such universe and nothing in my experience allows for real inferences
>>>>>about what occurs or does not occur, what is possible or not possible,
>>>>>where there is a total void.  So I withdraw my statement that
>>>>>"contradiciton is not essential to 'absolutely nothing'."  I have no
>>>>>warrant for saying anything on the matter.
>>>>>
>>>>>2.     Initial premises.  If you want to start with positive existence
>only,
>>>>>fine.  Then you must necessarily retroduce to the reality of negative
>>>>>existence.  My point is that you cannot jump off to conclusions about a
>>>>>total void from a premise of positive existence alone without introducing
>>>>>the intermediate step of the unity of positive and negative existence.
>The
>>>>>intermediate step is necessary because the premise of positivity taken
>>>>>alone presupposes an ontologically monovalent view of the world.
>>>>>
>>>>>Hegel identifies the error of taking the poles of a contradiction and
>>>>>holding them apart as if they were mutually exclusive.  Is that a problem
>>>>>here?  There is total presence on the one hand and total void on the
>other;
>>>>>but neither of them has any real relevance to the conditions of
>possibility
>>>>>of our world.  Instead the real -- being as real -- is a unity of
>opposites
>>>>>that interpenetrate:  positive and negative existence.  Bhaskar, of
>course,
>>>>>also argues this, and effectively.  I'm not disputing that.  What I
>>>>>challenge is the thread that generates the ontological primacy of the
>>>>>negative.  (Also I'm not saying that negative existence may not be primary
>>>>>in this or that instance.  At any one point, one or another aspect of a
>>>>>contradiction may be primary.  Absence of universal health care, the
>>>>>example Eric uses, certainly seems to be the primary aspect of that
>>>>>contradiction in the US today.  But in another conjuncture, presence
>may be
>>>>>primary.)
>>>>>
>>>>>3.     "Beings exist."  Here is your argument:
>>>>>
>>>>>>>Bhaskar doesn't disagree with your conclusion. But instead of just
>>>>>>>assuming it to be true, takes as his premise what very few would
>>>>>>>dispute: 'beings exist'. The question is whether non-beings do too, and
>>>>>>>if they do, how they relate to beings.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>I don't think whether non-beings exist is the question at all.  I think
>>>>>being is a unity of positive and negative existence.  To say there are
>>>>>beings on the one hand and non-beings on the other makes the mistake I
>>>>>suggested above -- aspects of a contradiction are wrenched out of the
>>>>>contradiction and held apart as mutually exclusive.  "Beings" are reduced
>>>>>to phenomena of positivity, the actual, which they are not; at the same
>>>>>time "non-beings," are introduced as phenomena of the real, which they are
>>>>>not.  So instead of real "being" as an interpenetration of positive and
>>>>>negative existence, we get a mutually exclusive counterposition of the
>>>>>actual and the fictional.
>>>>>
>>>>>When we say beings "exist," there is an ambiguity -- we may mean they are
>>>>>real or we may mean they are actual.  In context you must be taken to use
>>>>>the second meaning because you appeal to what "few would dispute," and
>what
>>>>>most people know are things as they appear, ie the positivity of the
>actual.
>>>>>
>>>>>But I would dispute that beings exist in this sense at all.  I think
>beings
>>>>>and being are real, but not actual.  What I mean is this.  Occurrences are
>>>>>what constitute positive existence.  What happens.  This is what is in the
>>>>>present.  The point can be made more strongly:  being only ever appears as
>>>>>what occurs.  Appearance here and now is the only form of manifestation of
>>>>>being.  Being, beings, does/do not present itself/themselves to us in any
>>>>>other way.  This is the actual.  The ontology of the actual is events.
>>>>>What occurs.  This is positive existence.  Positive existence is the
>>>>>phenomenal form of appearance of being.
>>>>>
>>>>>But what occurs are the actions of things, so we retroduce from
>occurrences
>>>>>to things as a condition of the possibility of events.  Now what we know
>>>>>about things, as Bhaskar argues at DPF 57, is that "finitude" is the most
>>>>>basic kind of "existential contradiction."  Limit is inherent in things.
>>>>>In other words, things are not only what they are, but what they are not.
>>>>>We do not really understand how things are if we grasp them only as they
>>>>>appear in events.  We do not understand the principles according to which
>>>>>they change.  If we had only an acorn and no understanding of how things
>>>>>grow at all, we would have no understanding of the acorn as a generative
>>>>>mechanism.  It is only in retrospect, from reflection on the oak, that we
>>>>>can form a concept of the structure of an acorn holding the key to the
>>>>>principles of its self-development.  Laws, RB writes in RTS (66) are the
>>>>>ways of acting of things, and the ways of acting of things are how they
>>>>>negate themselves.  Negative existence is essential to being.
>>>>>
>>>>>In other words, the real -- things, "enduring mechanisms," beings -- is
>>>>>intrinsically non-empirical because it is not only what occurs but that
>>>>>which governs the development of what occurs.  For "beings exist" to be an
>>>>>accurate statement we must mean "beings are real," and then this is not
>>>>>something "few would dispute."  (The reverse is true.)  Beings are a unity
>>>>>of positive and negative existence and this is ontologically different
>from
>>>>>what occurs.
>>>>>
>>>>>So if we have real being as a unity of positive and negative existence,
>>>>>then where is the universe of non-beings, except in fictional speculation?
>>>>>
>>>>>The problem I had a month ago with ontological stratification arose in
>>>>>trying to explain Bhaskar's example of the litmus test.  I wondered what
>>>>>the ontological difference was between the chemical structure of the acid
>>>>>and the litmus paper turned red.  If hydrogen is an enduring mechanism
>>>>>(thus real) and oxygen is an enduring mechanism (thus real) and together
>>>>>they make water, where is the ontological stratification, because water
>>>>>must be real and an enduring mechanism in its own right?  All matter is
>>>>>causally efficacious.  Also, hydrogen, oxygen, water and all other matter
>>>>>are actual in the sense that they appear.  Where are the levels of
>>>structure?
>>>>>
>>>>>The distinction has to be where RB placed it: between things and events.
>>>>>And we need to lean on this -- the distinction is between being and what
>>>>>occurs.  In other words, things, counterintuitively enough, are
>>>>>non-empirical.  the hydrogen in the test tube is what occurs.  The "being"
>>>>>of hydrogen is the unity of what is and what is not, and we come to know
>>>>>this not by means of microscopes and other instruments of measurement
>>>>>alone, but by retroductive argument taken together with experiment.  We
>can
>>>>>identify the structure of hydrogen.  We cannot taste or touch the laws in
>>>>>accordance with which it (or the acorn) changes.
>>>>>
>>>>>4.     Contradiction.  I think the emphasis on absence in DPF is
>>>terrific.  I
>>>>>have learned an enormous amount from it.  But I disagree that
>contradiction
>>>>>is adequately presented.  The organization of the second chapter shows
>>>>>that.  Contradiction is displaced by absence as the motive force of the
>>>>>development of things, and this is really the problem.
>>>>>
>>>>>Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>>Howard
>>>>>
>>>>>P.S. On reflection the statement above that "Appearance is the only
>form of
>>>>>manifestation of being" needs qualification.  Representation also is a
>form
>>>>>of manifestation of being -- ie by means of a sign we use one thing to
>>>>>refer to another.  Thus we get the separate ontological domain of the
>>>>>ideological (Volosinov) or the semiotic (Nellhaus), what Bhaskar in RTS
>>>>>refers to as the domain of experience.  In fact is is the distinction
>>>>>between postive existence and negative existence, between what a thing is
>>>>>and what it is not, that makes representation possible.  In any event,
>this
>>>>>is a separate thread of development concerning a third level of
>ontological
>>>>>stratification and does not change the argument above, which goes to the
>>>>>distinction betwen the real and the actual.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>>-- 
>>Mervyn Hartwig
>>13 Spenser Road
>>Herne Hill
>>London SE24 ONS
>>United Kingdom
>>Tel: 020 7 737 2892
>>Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk
>>
>>
>>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

-- 
Mervyn Hartwig
13 Spenser Road
Herne Hill
London SE24 ONS
United Kingdom
Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk


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