File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2001/bhaskar.0102, message 176


Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2001 10:40:23 -0500 (EST)
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca>
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: causal criterion of existence


Hi Tobin,

Thanks for that.  Really.  

But, okay, so de-onts are powerful particulars.  And they (all of the
infinite number of "things" that don't exist) exercise the powers that they
do in virtue of what each one is like - their individual "characters"
(mostly relational, you suggest).  

But a few things (at different levels of argument):  First, granting for a
moment this INSANE position (!), shouldn't we say that the basis for
de-onts' powers is different from that of onts' powers?  I.e., since de-onts
are things that don't exist, it is unlikely that the basis for their powers
is material.

Second, if everything that exists AND everything that doesn't exist is a
powerful particular, then what is the status of things that are *not*
powerful particulars?  Or is it that everything that exists and only some of
the things that don't exist that are powerful particulars?  Either way is
potentially a problem, I think.  If everything, existent and non-existent
alike is a powerful particular, then the term doesn't mean much, and the
causal criterion for existence (we need a new word - this category of
"existence" includes things that don't exist) loses its force I think.  On
the other hand, if only SOME de-onts are powerful particulars, then I
suspect that the reason why they are powerful and others are not is going to
lead back to onts; it will be onts that actually determine whether a given
de-ont is or is not a powerful particular.

Which brings me back to my original question:  Jan's list is lovely.  But it
doesn't tell me WHY I should think of the absence of a thing as itself a
thing. It still seems like so much creative re-description, rather than a
compelling case for an ontology that includes an infinite numbers of
non-existent "things," a substantial portion of which aren't even "things"
in the first place, but rather states of affairs, rendered thing-like.  (Or
"de"-thing-like.)  Again, I know that I can, but why SHOULD I think of the
fact that David is downstairs rather than in my study as a thing, called a
de-ont?       
    
Sorry if my continuing cold is making me cranky,
Ruth



     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005