Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 01:27:48 +0000
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: causal criterion of existence


Hi Ruth,

>de-onts
>are things that don't exist,

On the contrary. What is being claimed is that deonts do exist.

>Jan's list is lovely.  But it
>doesn't tell me WHY I should think of the absence of a thing as itself a
>thing. 

None of us in the Devil's party has claimed that absence is a thing. The
reification is all on your part, not ours. This, together with your
emphasis on 'powerful particulars', looks to me like a residue of an
atomistic, positivisitic, billiard-ball ontology.

Mervyn



Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca> writes
>Hi Tobin,
>
>Thanks for that.  Really.  
>
>But, okay, so de-onts are powerful particulars.  And they (all of the
>infinite number of "things" that don't exist) exercise the powers that they
>do in virtue of what each one is like - their individual "characters"
>(mostly relational, you suggest).  
>
>But a few things (at different levels of argument):  First, granting for a
>moment this INSANE position (!), shouldn't we say that the basis for
>de-onts' powers is different from that of onts' powers?  I.e., since de-onts
>are things that don't exist, it is unlikely that the basis for their powers
>is material.
>
>Second, if everything that exists AND everything that doesn't exist is a
>powerful particular, then what is the status of things that are *not*
>powerful particulars?  Or is it that everything that exists and only some of
>the things that don't exist that are powerful particulars?  Either way is
>potentially a problem, I think.  If everything, existent and non-existent
>alike is a powerful particular, then the term doesn't mean much, and the
>causal criterion for existence (we need a new word - this category of
>"existence" includes things that don't exist) loses its force I think.  On
>the other hand, if only SOME de-onts are powerful particulars, then I
>suspect that the reason why they are powerful and others are not is going to
>lead back to onts; it will be onts that actually determine whether a given
>de-ont is or is not a powerful particular.
>
>Which brings me back to my original question:  Jan's list is lovely.  But it
>doesn't tell me WHY I should think of the absence of a thing as itself a
>thing. It still seems like so much creative re-description, rather than a
>compelling case for an ontology that includes an infinite numbers of
>non-existent "things," a substantial portion of which aren't even "things"
>in the first place, but rather states of affairs, rendered thing-like.  (Or
>"de"-thing-like.)  Again, I know that I can, but why SHOULD I think of the
>fact that David is downstairs rather than in my study as a thing, called a
>de-ont?       
>    
>Sorry if my continuing cold is making me cranky,
>Ruth
>
>
>
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-- 
Mervyn Hartwig
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Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk


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