Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2001 10:16:31 -0500 (EST) From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca> Subject: BHA: DPF 2.5 >Return-Path: owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu >X-Authentication-Warning: lists.village.virginia.edu: domo set sender to owner-bhaskar-AT-localhost using -f >Date: Tue, 13 Jul 1999 13:08:46 +1000 >From: Gary MacLennan <g.maclennan-AT-qut.edu.au> >Subject: BHA: Diffraction Post one >X-Sender: maclenna-AT-pop.qut.edu.au >To: bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu >References: <3.0.5.32.19990712151505.00e66880-AT-pop.qut.edu.au> >Sender: owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu >Reply-To: bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu > >On the Materialist Diffraction of Dialectic (DPF, pp 86-102) >One of (probably) two posts. > >'The best school for the dialectic is emigration. The keenest dialecticians >are refugees. They are refugees because of changes and they study nothing >other than changes…If their enemies triumph, they calculate how much the >victory has cost, and they have a sharp eye for the contradictions, The >dialectic, may it always flourish' >(Brecht, cited in Bhaskar, 1993: 241) > > > >Outline of Section > >i) Introduction A This consists of the first paragraph on page 86 >ii) Introduction B. This runs from the paragraph beginning 'The most >significant phases in the development of Marx's thinking…' on p 86 to >'…stratification and process in philosophy too' on page 88. >iii) Part 1 From page 88- 92 >iv) Part 2 From page 92-93 >v) Part 3 from page 93 to 96 >vi) I would suggest that another Part 4 could be thought of as beginning >on page 96 with 'Marx's epistemological materialism presupposes…' to >'…there will always be a conatus for freedom to become.' on page 98 >vii) I would suggest a Part 5 beginning on page 98 with 'Having given some >examples of the broadening…' to help to change it too' on page 100. >viii) That leaves a Part 6 beginning on page 100 with 'It may be apposite >to close this section…' to 'What it presupposes and what it implies will be >documented in C3' on page 102 > >To summarise the editorial changes (!) I have split the introduction into >two and then created six rather than three parts. We should note that only >the Introduction A and parts four, five and six deal with the dialectic. Of >these it is only Part Four that is concerned with diffraction, apart that >is from four sentences on page 92. The greater share of this section is >given over to an account of Marx's criticism of Hegel. I will now take each >of these divisions in turn and comment on them. > >Introduction A > >It is this that really signals what is supposedly the key intention of this >section and also provides us with the clearest account of why he diffracts >the dialectic. So what does he tells us here? Well there are two elements. >a] the use of Marx's materialist criticism of Hegel permits and demands a >new complex dialectic. b] this new diffracted dialectic is needed to accord >with the 'complexities, angularities and nuances of our pluriversal world'. > >Quasi-religious Marxists like myself will immediately detect here the >'dialectics of nature' controversy. The most celebrated moment in this >controversy was the Sartre, & Hyppolite versus Garaudy & Vigier debate: >'Is the dialectic solely a law of history or is it also a law of nature?' >The debate took place in Paris on Dec 7 1961 in front of 6,000 young >people. An astonishing number. Here in Australia you wouldn't get six, not >even with promises of free beer and tickets to the "footie". [Ah, eat your >hearts out all ye would be philosopher-kings!] > >In his discussion of the debate, George Novack outlines three possible >positions on dialectics >1] Dialectics is mystical mumbo-jumbo. No self-respecting >philosopher/intellectual would even contemplate raising the subject. This >is the dominant or establishment view at present. >2] Dialectics is valid in some domains but not in others, especially not in >nature. >3] 'Dialectical materialism deals with the entire universe and its logic >holds good for all the constituent sectors of reality'. In his inimitably >crude fashion, Novack describes the third position as the viewpoint held by >the 'creators of scientific socialism and their authentic disciples' >(Novack, 1978:232). > >As I understand it Dialectical Critical Realism would reject all three >positions and instead advances a position which holds it that the entire >universe is dialectical but this is not the uniform linear dialectic of >Hegel. In other words Bhaskar purchases a universal dialectic but at the >expense of the singular triadic [thesis, antithesis, synthesis] formula >much beloved of us old Marxists. > >I would not underestimate the shock this constitutes for the faithful few. >No longer, it seems do we have the kindly light of the dialectic to lead us >on. No longer can we murmur amidst the seemingly endless triumphs of our >enemies, 'The dialectic will give them according to their deeds, and >according to the wickedness of their endeavours'. Cruelty, thy name is >Bhaskar! > >Of course as David-Hillel Ruben and others long before him pointed out, the >universal dialectic was thoroughly idealist. The full implications of >Hegel's idealism are interesting. Nature like everything else would appear >to be dialectical, but its movements did not belong to nature. Rather they >were the manifestations of the movement of the Idea. Ditto, seemingly, for >the social world (Ruben, 1979: 46-47). So in a sense Hegel did not believe >nature was dialectical. Consequently when the Dialectical Materialist >inversion of the dialectic was performed, it was a double mistake to look >for the dialectical triad in nature. > >The thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad is really a theory of learning. It >was this that led Lucien Goldmann to inform Jean Piaget that he was the >most 'authentic' of contemporary dialecticians. The latter was, as he >later related, 'terrified' for he had not read a single word of Marx. >(Piaget, 1976: 126-7). >To sum up Introduction A, the materialist critique of Hegel's dialectic >allows a new dialectic, which however is multiply diffracted, i.e. it takes >a great variety of forms. > > >Introduction B >This part deals with the controversial matter of Marx's relationship to the >Hegelian dialectic. Bhaskar outlines three phases of the relationship >1. 1843-44. The early attack on the mystified logic of Hegel and the >idealist concept of labour >2. 1840s. The general attack on philosophy >3. 1857-58. A more positive re-evaluation of Hegel. > >Bhaskar sums up the relationship thus: Marx remained critical of Hegel's >dialectic; but he believed he was using a dialectic related to Hegel's. > >There follows here an allusion to Marx's famous remarks about the Hegelian >dialectic - the rational kernel, and standing on its head etc. I am not a >Hegelian scholar, nor, for that matter, is my grasp of Marx that detailed. > But, for what it is worth, I think that Hegel will always elude any simple >formula. Ruben puts this nicely when he says ' I do not think that one an >ever capture all of what Hegel was trying to say by translating his >terminology into clearer but non-Hegelian terminology' (Ruben, 1979: 40) >What then was the rational core in the Hegelian dialectic that Marx took >over? Bhaskar says it is 'the notion of the dialectical explanation of >contradictory forces in terms of a structured common ground.' I will return >to this in my discussion of dialectical counterparts, when I will outline >what I think this formula means. But for the moment it might be helpful to >give Ruben's view of what the 'rational kernel' consists of. He argues this >is 'the necessary development, opposition and change in things' (1979: 55). > > >The reminder of this introductory section summarises Marx's critique of >Hegel. The content is reasonably clear, but the presentation is somewhat >cluttered. Much of the criticism of Hegel is familiar but Bhaskar attempts >to give it a Critical Realist spin and perhaps this might be a source of >confusion. In any case Hegel's crimes are >1. The principle of identity. I take this to mean subject-object identity. >2. Logical mysticism. >3. 'The triple inversions'. I am not at all clear what these are, but I >love that phrase, sounds like a gay bar on a busy Saturday nite. It turns >up again on page 93. >4. Realised idealism. This is linked to Hegel's triumphalism, that is the >claim of total success for his system. >5. Spiritual monism. This is linked to centrism. Monist philosophies >maintain that there is one and one only substance. Centrism is a somewhat >slippery concept, at least for me. I see it as referring to systems, which >see diverse phenomena as merely expression of one element, say the economy >as in vulgar Marxism. >6. Preservative dialectical sublation. This was covered in the >introduction. Briefly the charge here is that Hegel's dialectic preserves >rather than absents. This is possibly linked to endism. Endist >philosophies posit some kind of goal or terminus, most notably in the 'end >of history' thesis. Communism in Marx's Manifesto is suggested as a >terminus or end for the class struggle. >7. Hegel's inability to sustain the autonomy of nature. >8. His cognitivism >9. His failure to uphold the (geo)historicity of social forms. > >Bhaskar now restates these accusation in Dialectical Critical Realist >terminology. Here Hegel is guilty of >10. The Speculative Illusion. The reduction of everything to philosophy >11. The Unholy Trinity of Irrealism, that is the >12. Epistemic fallacy - that is the reduction of ontology to epistemology >13. Ontological monovalence - a purely positive account of being. That is >an account that does not have a notion of absence. >14. The Primal Squeeze -The most difficult of the three concepts. It is >the denial of a stratified reality. This is produced by the conflict >between those who would deny science and those who would deny philosophy. >As a result we lose a notion of natural necessity and of controlled >scientific exploration of reality. > >These terms are all explained in the glossary and they are as well >reasonably familiar to the initiated. However they can demoralise the >beginner. > >I would like to draw particular attention to the last sentence in >Introduction B. It begins 'But it should be said before I commence…' This >is an interesting disclaimer. Bhaskar here disavows any claim to have >created a "theory of everything". The dialectic did not stop with Marx nor >will it stop with Bhaskar. > >I take these disavowals at the full value. A theory such as Dialectical >Critical Realism which is built around a stratified ontology and notions >such as epistemic relativism does not aim to be a "theory of everything'. >So postmodernist or neo-anarchist attacks do not apply. > >Part 1. This rehearses in a Critical Realist fashion Marx's critique of >Hegel's philosophy of identity > >I have read Marx's original critique in the Holy Family and it is very >funny. I recommend everyone to read it (Marx, Engels, Lenin, 1977: 17-20). > >Bhaskar divides Marx's critique into the exoteric and the esoretic. The >exoteric (easily understood by laypersons) critique is really the >Feuerbachian one. For Feuerbach humanity created the idea of a god and >then claimed that god had created them. Similarly the philosopher thought. >Then deified "Thought" and claimed that "Thought" had thought through the >philosopher. This can be expressed by the formula W -A -W, (word - act >-word) where 'word' is 'verbally recorded knowledge, knowledge in its >universal form, in the form of the 'language of science, in the form of >formulae, symbols, models of all kinds, etc., etc' (Ilyenkov, 1977: 249). >In reality the situation is A-W-A, where word or knowledge is the product >of human acts which leads to more acts. > >It is however the esoteric critique which really interests Bhaskar. It is >also where we find one of the real gems, namely the notion of dialectical >counterparts. Put simply and crudely Bhaskar says that Hegel and his >objective idealist system are the mirror opposites of the subjective >empiricist system. The two systems, while apparently opposed to each >other, share a common ground or conception of reality as non-stratified. > >Hegel begins his system with 'uncritically received empirical data' (p 88). >He covertly assumes that reality consists of these. Overtly these are >transformed into the products of the Infinite Mind or the Absolute or the >Idea or something out there. The subjective empiricist claims to receive >unconceptualised raw data. But covertly she has made the theoretical >assumption that the world consists of atomised facts and their constant >conjunction. In both the case of Hegel and the subjective empiricist there >is the absence of the notion of ontological depth. This is implicit in >Hegel and explicit with the subjective empiricist. In both cases they are >reading the world. Hegel claims that the Infinite Mind is writing on him; >while the subjective empiricist is claiming that the world as atomised >facts and constant conjunctions is writing on her. > >There are three diagrams in this part. Those on page 89 are extremely >elegant. However, for me, the really useful diagram is figure 2.10 on >page 91. Hegel (Speculative Illusion) departs from the status quo, while >the subjective empiricist (Positivistic illusion) arrives there. > >This gives us the core of this critique of Hegel. There is also the >interesting suggestion that Hegel was a logical-positivist before anyone >had even heard of the phrase. This is followed by a note on Marx's >epistemological materialist critique of Hegel. Immediately after this is a >wonderful spate of Dialectical critical realist "insults" hurled at Hegel >at the bottom of page 91 and 92 - 'atomist, punctualist, extensionalist and >individualist…expressivist-holist, blockist, intensionalist and >collectivist'. Wow! Go Roy go! > >Let us turn to page 92 and the paragraph beginning 'Marx's analysis has >three other important implications'. The implications are 1. Hegel is at >heart a conservative. 2. Beneath his dialectical analysis there is the >empiricist assumption about the nature of reality. 3. If we reject the >notion of subject object identity then we can have a diffracted dialectic. >We can have epistemological dialectics (subject) and ontological dialectics >(object) there can even be intermingled and embedded ones. Speaking of >which - Embedded dialectics. For the bold few on this list who are >interested in Cultural Studies, I would suggest that it would be fruitful >to think of the intertextual as a subset of the embedded dialectic. > >I would like to spend the remainder of this post on saying briefly why I >believe the notion of dialectical counter part is such a jewel. It gives >me nothing less than a critique of an entire tradition in Cultural Studies. >For example Babha's post colonial mimic, Bakhtin's Carnival Theory, and >Queer Theory's bi/tran/a etc sexual are all vulnerable to this critique. >While appearing to oppose the status quo they in effect share a common ground > >Take for example the theory of the carnival. Bakhtin's claim for this was >that it created an unofficial world marked by freedom, an alternate >universe and the people's truth. But the carnival always knew it had to >end. In no sense was it a challenge to the official world that might have >ended with the transcendence of the latter. Because at the heart of the >matter, Carnival and the Status Quo both rested on the ground of TINA - >There Is No Alternative to Das Bestehende - the existing state of affairs. >So at one stroke we have an elegant cut through the dominant moment in >Cultural studies theorising. We have a way of theoretical grounding our >feeling that neo-Bakhtinians, like John Fiske, were talking rubbish when >they hailed the progressive moment in television shows like The Price is >Right and Rock and Roll Wrestling (Fiske, 1987). > >Part Two (pp 92-3) > >This part deals specifically with Marx. It asks the question: To what >extent did Marx in his critique of Hegel move to a radically >anti-philosophical position? Did he perpetrate the Positivistic illusion? >Hegel was guilty of the opposite - the speculative illusion where >philosophy was everything and there was little or no role for science. >Bhaskar's answer would appear to be a tentative 'yes', especially for the >period in which Marx produced the German Ideology. > Next Bhaskar turns to the specifics of Marx's criticism of Hegel. The >first of these is clear. Hegel thought only in terms of abstract mental >labour. This enabled him to hold onto his W -A -W formulation. However if >he had worked more on the world he would presumably come to the correct >formula A - W- A. >There is a problem for me with this part of the key sentence I think there >is a typo. It goes > >'…and is in turn based on the second form of philosophical materialism to >which Marx is, except for a few early passages, committed, namely >ontological materialism, asserting the unilateral *independence of social >upon biological (and more generally physical) being, and the emergence of >the latter from the former. > >Surely this should read *dependence*? And the 'latter' is physical being? >And the 'former' is biological being? > >The next sentence, which concludes this part, gives us a critique of Marx. >It is very libertarian socialist and very 60s. I am prepared to go along >publicly with most of it. However deep within my Leninist closet, I mutter >secretly to myself about the primacy of class. >The criticism of Marx is triggered of by the statement that Hegel uses >constellationality in a theoretically triumphalist way. I take this to mean >that Hegel closes off his system with the return to the Absolute, the Idea >or something. He then claims to have solved everything. > >Marx's faults are that > >a. He places class as primary. >b. He perpetrates a linear presentation. This is the charge that one stage >is supposed to flow from the other. >c. He tended to think as communism as the 'end of history'. >d. His celebration of the achievements of technology (in the Manifesto?), >tended to be functionalist, that is, not to see the downside of >technological innovation. >e. He indulges in notions of necessity of the conquest of nature. This >stems in part from an uncritical reception or celebration of Modernism. >Most notable in the Manifesto and much less clear in the last writings. >f. This is a hard one!!! I take it to mean that in some way Darwinism >influenced Marx in the direction of Social Darwinism. I met many Social >Darwinists in China in 1990, but theirs was a very degenerated Marxism indeed. >g. This last charge of 'programmatic practical-expressivism' is for me >really the accusation that Marx did not take into account the full range of >oppressions in society. > > > > > >References > >Bakhtin, M., Laughter and Freedom in Solomon, M. (ed) Marxism and Art, >Detroit: Wayne State University, 1979: 295-300 >Bhaskar, R., Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, London: Verso, 1993 >Fiske, J., Television Culture, New York: Routledge, 1987 >Ilyenkov, E.V. Dialectical Logic: Essays on Its History and Theory, Moscow: >Progress Publishers, 1977 >Marx, Engels, Lenin, On dialectical Materialism, Moscow: Progress >Publishers, 1977 >Novack, G., Polemics in Marxist Philosophy: Essays on: Sartre Plekhanov >Lukacs Engels Kolakowski Trotsky Timpanaro Colletti New York: Monad >Press, 1978 > >Piaget, J., A brief tribute to Goldmann, in Goldmann, L., Cultural >Creation, St. Louis: Telos Press, 1979: 125-7 > >Ruben, D-H, Marxism and Dialectics, in Mepham, J., & Ruben D-H. (eds) >Issues in Marxist Philosophy, London: The Harvester Press, 1979: 37-87 > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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