File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2001/bhaskar.0103, message 10


Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2001 09:29:20 -0600 (CST)
From: viren viven murthy <vvmurthy-AT-midway.uchicago.edu>
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: moral/political theory


Hi James and Ruth,

I am somewhat confused about the way in which terms like de-ontology and
the distinction between the right and the good work in Bhaskar's
philosophy.  In DPF, Bhaskar makes some gestures towards Aristotle, but he
also endorses Gewirth's principle of generic consistency, which is clearly
de-ontological.  I was wondering how this Kantian-Aristotelian moral
theory would
translate into politics.   Kant separates the right from the
good (although he has a narrow definition of the "good.")  This is
developed by  liberals such as Rawls and Larmore.  However, Aristotle's
ethics seems to go against elements of liberalism, since he emphasizes a
substantial ideal of the good and bases it on a controversial idea of
human nature.  Bhaskar seems to affirm both of these.  
	Perhaps we should separate Bhaskar's theory into stages.  On the
on the one hand, he would affirm some sort of liberal pluralism for the
present.  This would be the Kantian moment in his thought.  However, his
larger project would involve transforming social relations to promote
universal flourishing.  This second moment depends on his definition of
real interests and four-planar human nature.  
	I think Bhaskar could also attempt to trace the position of those
who stop at the first position to an empiricism.  For example,
Larmore and Rawls look at recent history and conclude that "reasonable
people tend to disagree about the good life."  Bhaskar would say that this
statement only looks at the surface of recent conflict and does not look
at the underlying causes.  In other words, I think he would say that
reasonable people do not always have to disagree about the ultimate good
and can and should eventually work together.

Viren  

On Wed, 28 Feb 2001, james.daly wrote:

> Hi Ruth -- -- --
> 
> theI agree with you that the good should not be identified with utility, but
> in practice nowadays it tends to be. Rawls is a perfect example of what I
> mean by the modern dichotomising of right and good.  He claimed the good can
> be considered on its own, and that the right is something different which
> limits the good.  He means that justice sets limits to utilitarianism.  I
> suppose my position is basically Thomistic and I think the good includes
> justice.  The right for me means what is in accordance with right reason,
> Aristotle's orthos logos.  It is also in accordance with nature as an ideal,
> a telos -- not the Hobbesian and Benthamite "mere nature" which Kant and
> Hegel accept.  Aristotle's eudaimonia includes justice as part of the good
> (integrally not quantitatively).  I agree with you that Plato's theory of
> justice is ontological; it is pre-Cartesian, and dialectical.  The others on
> my list are also non-Cartesian, and dialectical.  So my list stands --
> Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, Marx and Bhaskar.
> 
> You asked -- -- --
>  >I agree -- I hope -- with Mervyn that an
> >ontological lack is a key to an understanding of values as the fulfilment
> of
> >essence. -- --  Can you explain this more?
> 
> What I meant was something like this: that for me RB's dialectic allows for
> the negative in the form of a need, an ontological deficit, something owing
> (an "ought"), something "worthy of [due to, debitum -- J. D.] human
> nature"(Marx,*Capital*Vol 3).
> 
> james daly
> james.daly-AT-ntlworld.com
> 
> 
> 
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> 



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