Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2001 22:39:26 -0500 From: lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> Subject: Re: BHA: Events and Mechanisms Mervyn -- I think your characterizations of my positions are very much off base. But let it be. You are entitled to your IMO. Howard At 11:10 AM 3/6/01 +0000, you wrote: >Dear Howard (and Ruth), > >I think you've made out as strong a case as can be made for your view in >relation to RTS. > >There is no way imo that this can be right for DPF which e.g. at the >level of 'experience' (or the subjective) clearly allows for conceptual >emergence. > >I don't have time to go through RTS with a fine comb, but a quick look >reveals the following. As you know, the book introduces the distinction >between the TD of science 'in which experiences and conjunctions of >events are seen as socially produced; and an ID in which the objects of >scientific thought are seen as generative mechanisms' (242). In the >section entitle 'Social Production of Knowledge by Means of Knowledge', >the TD of science is then referentially detached and contemplated as an >object of knowledge, ie as intransitive. It is very clearly stated and >argued that existing knowledge, facts, theories are causal, we even have >'methodological or *generative* theory' (194). The 'means of production' >metaphor also strongly implies causal properties. > >I'm not saying that there are no differences between RTS and the later >work on this issue. However imo you (and Ruth), operating within the >analytical problematic and identity-thinking seem to see only the >differences. If one adopts a 'dialectic of dialectical and analytical >reason' approach, one sees more - not just *either* the one thing *or* >the other, but *both* the differences as revealed by analytical logic >*and* the similarities, continuities, the pointers ahead and the >pointers back. > >You both tend to view each of Bhaskar's texts as completely self- >contained, and the meanings therein as snap-frozen, fixed, and self- >identical. This IMO is valid up to a point, but very limited. For the >words of a text (inevitably inadequately) register a (socially mediated) >*process* of thought which preceded their penning, went on during it, >and goes on after it. You don't seem to be seeing either the 'process- >in-product' or the 'product-in-process'. Bhaskarian statements, like all >entities, on a dialectical view, must be viewed *relationally* - 'entity >relationism', not fixism. Entities don't exist in some simple, pure way >'separate and distinct from any mediation' - on the contrary, they exist >complexly, 'impurely', fluidly, unstably. (See the notes on Alan >Norrie's book I posted a while ago.) And the statements are not just >related within RTS but within the totality of the evolving system. > >IMO, your analytical approach thus also actualistically ignores the >'mechanism of the text' - its inner logic in terms of where it's >heading, and is also impoverished in that it does not seem to allow for >'retrospective illumination' (Dai). > >In sum, I agree with Wittgenstein (as qouted DPF 83) that 'Logic cannot >bend' and so can only capture a 'super-something', not the rich >relationality and processuality of the evolving Bhaskarian system or of >the world in general. > >Mervyn > > > >lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes >> >> >>Hi Mervyn -- >> >>I think your last posts are really very helpful in focusing the issues that >>need to be sorted out. I want to get back to the one from a day or two ago >>as soon as I can. That one I think identifies especially the question of >>materialism, ontological, epistemological, practical and historical, and >>its relevance to grasping how things are. Also there is the specific issue >>of what we call establishing reality by causal criteria. That's one whole >>dimension. Your post below identifies another dimension which I think >>clarifies much of the exchange over the last couple of weeks. What we are >>really exploring is not whether absence is real, but whether events are >>causes. To understand that as the issue is an enormous help. >> >>On the one hand, I think we have to be careful and commonsensically >>cautious here. We speak as if events were causes all the time, and usually >>we disregard the acquisitions of common speech at our peril. Secondly, the >>distinction between events as conditions as causes has a pretty large >>history so it is possible to defer until there's been some chance to look >>at how these problems have been handled. On the other hand, many of the >>traditional distinctions made presuppose a Hume-Mill view of cause. >> >>But if for the moment we look just at RTS, I think its pretty clear that >>events aren't causes and that's not what we mean when we call them real. >>So on the basis of RTS I have to disagree with you. That then comes back >>to Ruth's question as to whether on this specific point DPF differs from >>RTS. It's hard for me to see how it could. >> >>First of all as to the chart at 56. Dr is greater than or equal to Da >>which is greater or equal to De. If events were causes why then greater >>than? The text may be more consistently read as arguing that the domain of >>the real is greater than the domain of the actual is greater than the >>domain of experience, but that the mechanisms of the real generate events >>and experiences and that since they are generated by the real they are >>themselves real. That is, they are not real because they are themselves >>causally efficacious but because they are generated by mechanisms of the >>real. This reading is anyway not foreclosed by the text. >> >>Now at p. 244, RB writes that the central argument of the book is that of >>"establishing an ontological distinction between causal laws and patterns >>of events (the independence of the domains of the real and the actual, the >>irreducibility of structures to events)." >> >>Now with that in mind we can look for convenience at the section just >>posted from RTS. Under (iii) in the first paragraph, if we are able to >>locate a reason for some occurrence in the enduring powers of things and >>the transfactually active mechanisms of nature, then we have a law. The >>problem with events in this respect is that they just happen. They do not >>endure, and they do not act. >> >>And then at 180 we read that "whatever is responsible for the world as >>manifest must possess causal powers which are continually being exercised . >>. . it cannot be atomistic or event-like." >> >>From earlier in the text at 77: "the key concept of a causal agent; ie the >>thing that produced or the mechanism that generated, in the circumstances >>that actually prevailed, the effect in question." Events occur, they are >>not causal agents. They do not generate or produce. >> >>In other words, I've been trying to distinguish the presence of a thing, >>which is an event, from the thing as an enduring mechanism. It is the >>generative mechanism as a minute by minute enduring thing that is the >>causal agent. Peirce's stone. That's the thing that endures. Events are >>what a mechanism produces. Boom it hits the floor. Hume and Mill are the >>ones that viewed cause as a total set of events. >> >>p. 47: "The world consists of mechanisms not events." As my wife would >>say, "I rest my case." The passage continues: "Such mechanisms combine to >>generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and >>happenings of the world." >> >>Or p. 50: "the generative mechanisms of nature exist as the causal powers >>of things." >> >>Then at 121 there is the transitive verb model of cause, "Tania pushed the >>door." But events don't act; they happen. And compare the passage about >>Lloyd George at 123 with Diagram 2.2 at 124: events identified in the >>passage, ie the influence of the Labour Party on workers, do not find their >>way into the diagram as causes; instead the causes are the mechanisms: the >>Labour Party, Workers, and President Wilson. >> >>If events are causes, then this is because one event produces another >>event. But then what are we to do with 129: >> >>"Underpinning deductivism is the actualist thesis that laws are relations >>between events or states of affairs." >> >>Also events are not the intransitive objects studied by science. >> >>And compare p. 144: "order in the world must be pitched at a level >>categorically distinct from events" with 186: "Explanation is achieved by >>reference to enduring mechanisms." >> >>Howard >> >> >> >> >> >>At 08:48 PM 3/4/01 +0000, you wrote: >>>Hi Howard >>> >>>>Notice finally that in the chart at RTS 56 (or in Collier), events are >>>>actual and real, and experiences real, actual and empirical/meaningful. >>>>Do we mean real here simply in the sense that events and experiences exist >>>>or do we mean it in the strong sense that anything that is real is causally >>>>efficacious? >>> >>>Confining myself to what I think Bhaskar means, there seems no doubt at >>>all from RTS 56 and elsewhere that events and experiences (and >>>conceptual structures, etc) *may* function in turn as causal mechanisms, >>>i.e. possess powers to produce effects (strong sense). >>> >>>To understand this I think one needs to think processually and >>>relationally about the schema at p 56. This does not entail collapsing >>>the distinctions. What is the effect of the exercise of causal powers of >>>M1....n at T1 (eg a collision on a motorway), i.e. an event (events), is >>>in turn at T2 one of the causes of the subsequent pileup (also involving >>>the activity of numerous mechanisms). Experience of the event can then >>>also be causal (eg trauma), just as experience (or its lack) was >>>complexly causal in producing the event(s). >>> >>>Similarly with the homely examples of causally efficacious absence we >>>have been discussing - Pierre's absence or the missing stapler. At T1 >>>they are events - the effect of the exercise of causal powers M1....n >>>(you took the stapler into the kitchen and forgot it, Pierre decided to >>>forego the rendezvous and visit his aunt). At T2, your experience of the >>>absence of the stapler can now combine causally with other mechanisms to >>>procude the conclusion that your house has been burgled yet again..... >>> >>>Which is to say that events (the effects of the exercise of causal >>>powers) have at least two dimensions - negative and positive (the >>>stapler is absent from your desk, the stapler is present in the >>>kitchen). Now locate this within 1M-4D, and consider the 'fourfold >>>polysemy' of absence - simple absence; absenting; process-in-product; >>>and product-in-process (DPF 105f), and it is easy to see that we have to >>>view things pretty polyvalently! >>> >>> >>>Mervyn >>> >>> >>>lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes >>>> >>>> >>>>Jan, Mervyn and all -- >>>> >>>>I have not had time to respond to Mervyn's recent post to me, but in >>>>reflecting on it and reviewing other posts I noticed something that seems >>>>to be at the root of much of our reciprocal confusions. >>>> >>>>We would all agree, I take it on the distinction between Mechanisms and >>>>Events made consistently in RB's work from RTS to DPF. Events occur in the >>>>ontological domain of the actual. They are what happens. REal and >>>>generative mechanisms are the bearers of causal powers. The actions of >>>>these cause events to occur as their effects. Such generative mechanisms >>>>belong to the domain of the Real. Actualism consists in "the reduction of >>>>the necessary and the possible, constitutive of the domain of the real, to >>>>the actual." (DPF Glossary 393) >>>> >>>>Now would we say that events are causally efficacious? For Hume cause just >>>>is the conjunction of events. For Bhaskar causes have the power to bring >>>>about their effects by virtue of a generative mechanism that links cause to >>>>effect. So how are we to understand the first sentence of the entry on >>>>Cause/Causation in the DPF Glossary: "A cause is typically either an >>>>antecedent condition or a generative mechanism." Does this mean that an >>>>event can be a cause insofar as it is an antecedent condition? Would this >>>>then make the event not merely actual and real, but also a Real mechanism? >>>>For example, the allies won World War II. Is this event a cause? >>>> >>>>The significance of the question comes from noticing that all the examples >>>>given of the causal efficacy of absence are actually examples of events. >>>>Recognizing that should go some way to narrowing differences. For example, >>>>the stapler missing from the desk. Suppose the stapler were present on the >>>>desk. That would be an event. The causal efficacy of the stapler's >>>>presence, say holding down a handful of papers, would be generated by the >>>>thing, the stapler as a Real mechanism, not the event of its presence. >>>>Similarly, the stapler's absence from the desk is an event. >>>> >>>>So too with Pierre in the cafe. Pierre's presence in the cafe would be an >>>>event. Pierre himself is a generative mechanism and a causal agent. >>>>Pierre's absence is an event, and like its counterpart, his presence, a >>>>phenomenon in the domain of the actual. The same analysis holds for all >>>>the examples given in Section 1 of Chapter 2 of DPF, eg at 48, the letter >>>>that didn't arrive, the failed exam, the missed plane, the monsoon that >>>>didn't occur, the deforestation of the Amazonian jungle, the holes in the >>>>ozone layer, the collapse of "actually existing socialism," the spaces in >>>>the text, absent authors and readers. EAch of these designates an event. >>>> >>>>Now events have consequences, but they are not, I have thought, generative >>>>mechanisms. Is this wrong? They have consequences because they are the >>>>raw material, so to speak, the conditions with which causal agents work. >>>>(Matter itself is always a causal agent, not an event, because in all its >>>>forms it is causally efficacious. The tree dulls the axe that cuts it. >>>>But matter's presence or absence is an event.) >>>> >>>>The same analysis holds for Jan's 2/25 list: Gravity is a Real mechanism; >>>>its presence or absence is an event. The hole in the ozone layer is an >>>>event. A father is a causal agent, his presence is an event. So too his >>>>absence. The lost soccer final is an event. The fall of the Berlin wall is >>>>an event. Lack of proper health care is an event. Fascism is a >>>>generative mechanism; its presence or absence is an event. Solving a math >>>>problem is an event; not solving it is an event. A stolen letter is an >>>>event. A telephone is a causal mechanism; a telephone off the hook is an >>>>event. A lurker is a person and a causal agent; her presence or absence in >>>>list discussions is an event. The absence of limbs is an event; nerves >>>>are real mechanisms carrying messages. A clock is a REal mechanism; that >>>>it is slow is an event. The presence of a real pipe in one of Magritte's >>>>paintings (a sign!) would be an event; it's absence is an event. >>>> >>>>And other examples: a hole in a sock is an event. My presence in class is >>>>an event; my not being in class is an event. The class (the ensemble of >>>>social relations) is a generative mechanism. It's search for the missing >>>>student is an event. The student's missing the bus is an event. Hitler's >>>>crushing victory over the Allies is, counterfactually, an event; Lao Tse's >>>>discovery of gene 43 is an event; Tobin's Nobel prize is an event. Persons >>>>working for the government are causal agents; their snooping on the list is >>>>an event. >>>> >>>>All this gives bite to Caroline's questions. We have difficulty finding >>>>structure because structure of the sort that belongs to Real mechanisms is >>>>not something that belongs to an event. Also, absences can be stratified >>>>in the sense that they are events and events can be experienced. But it is >>>>not so easy to show that the stratification extends to absence as a >>>>generative mechanism because the examples we have of it are of events. >>>> >>>>So I guess there are two possibilities here: On the one hand we can say >>>>events are causally efficacious as such. That would then explain why we >>>>would not have to bother looking for structure as a bearer of causal powers. >>>> >>>>Or, alternatively, we could insist on the distinction between generative >>>>mechanisms and events. Then would the effort to treat events as if they >>>>were generative mechanisms be a form of actualism? >>>> >>>>Notice finally that in the chart at RTS 56 (or in Collier), events are >>>>actual and real, and experiences real, actual and empirical/meaningful. >>>>Do we mean real here simply in the sense that events and experiences exist >>>>or do we mean it in the strong sense that anything that is real is causally >>>>efficacious? >>>> >>>>Howard >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>From Jan, 2/25 >>> >>> >>> --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- >>> >> >> >> --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > >-- >Mervyn Hartwig >13 Spenser Road >Herne Hill >London SE24 ONS >United Kingdom >Tel: 020 7 737 2892 >Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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