File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2001/bhaskar.0103, message 60


Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2001 22:39:26 -0500
From: lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org>
Subject: Re: BHA: Events and Mechanisms




Mervyn --

I think your characterizations of my positions are very much off base.  But
let it be.  You are entitled to your IMO.

Howard




At 11:10 AM 3/6/01 +0000, you wrote:
>Dear Howard (and Ruth),
>
>I think you've made out as strong a case as can be made for your view in
>relation to RTS.
>
>There is no way imo that this can be right for DPF which e.g. at the
>level of 'experience' (or the subjective) clearly allows for conceptual
>emergence.
>
>I don't have time to go through RTS with a fine comb, but a quick look
>reveals the following. As you know, the book introduces the distinction
>between the TD of science 'in which experiences and conjunctions of
>events are seen as socially produced; and an ID in which the objects of
>scientific thought are seen as generative mechanisms' (242). In the
>section entitle 'Social Production of Knowledge by Means of Knowledge',
>the TD of science is then referentially detached and contemplated as an
>object of knowledge, ie as intransitive. It is very clearly stated and
>argued that existing knowledge, facts, theories are causal, we even have
>'methodological or *generative* theory' (194). The 'means of production'
>metaphor also strongly implies causal properties.
>
>I'm not saying that there are no differences between RTS and the later
>work on this issue. However imo you (and Ruth), operating within the
>analytical problematic and identity-thinking seem to see only the
>differences. If one adopts a 'dialectic of dialectical and analytical
>reason' approach, one sees more - not just *either* the one thing *or*
>the other, but *both* the differences as revealed by analytical logic
>*and* the similarities, continuities, the pointers ahead and the
>pointers back.
>
>You both tend to view each of Bhaskar's texts as completely self-
>contained, and the meanings therein as snap-frozen, fixed, and self-
>identical. This IMO is valid up to a point, but very limited. For the
>words of a text (inevitably inadequately) register a (socially mediated)
>*process* of thought which preceded their penning, went on during it,
>and goes on after it. You don't seem to be seeing either the 'process-
>in-product' or the 'product-in-process'. Bhaskarian statements, like all
>entities, on a dialectical view, must be viewed *relationally* - 'entity
>relationism', not fixism. Entities don't exist in some simple, pure way
>'separate and distinct from any mediation' - on the contrary, they exist
>complexly, 'impurely', fluidly, unstably. (See the notes on Alan
>Norrie's book I posted a while ago.) And the statements are not just
>related within RTS but within the totality of the evolving system.
>
>IMO, your  analytical approach thus also actualistically ignores the
>'mechanism of the text' - its inner logic in terms of where it's
>heading, and is also impoverished in that it does not seem to allow for
>'retrospective illumination' (Dai).
>
>In sum, I agree with Wittgenstein (as qouted DPF 83) that 'Logic cannot
>bend' and so can only capture a 'super-something', not the rich
>relationality and processuality of the evolving Bhaskarian system or of
>the world in general.
>
>Mervyn
>
>
>
>lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes
>>
>>
>>Hi Mervyn --
>>
>>I think your last posts are really very helpful in focusing the issues that
>>need to be sorted out. I want to get back to the one from a day or two ago
>>as soon as I can.  That one I think identifies especially the question of
>>materialism, ontological, epistemological, practical and historical, and
>>its relevance to grasping how things are.  Also there is the specific issue
>>of what we call establishing reality by causal criteria.  That's one whole
>>dimension.  Your post below identifies another dimension which I think
>>clarifies much of the exchange over the last couple of weeks.  What we are
>>really exploring is not whether absence is real, but whether events are
>>causes.  To understand that as the issue is an enormous help.
>>
>>On the one hand, I think we have to be careful and commonsensically
>>cautious here.  We speak as if events were causes all the time, and usually
>>we disregard the acquisitions of common speech at our peril.  Secondly, the
>>distinction between events as conditions as causes has a pretty large
>>history so it is possible to defer until there's been some chance to look
>>at how these problems have been handled.  On the other hand, many of the
>>traditional distinctions made presuppose a Hume-Mill view of cause.
>>
>>But if for the moment we look just at RTS, I think its pretty clear that
>>events aren't causes and that's not what we mean when we call them real.
>>So on the basis of RTS I have to disagree  with you.  That then comes back
>>to Ruth's question as to whether on this specific point DPF differs from
>>RTS.  It's hard for me to see how it could.
>>
>>First of all as to the chart at 56.  Dr is greater than or equal to Da
>>which is greater or equal to De.  If events were causes why then greater
>>than?  The text may be more consistently read as arguing that the domain of
>>the real is greater than the domain of the actual is greater than the
>>domain of experience, but that the mechanisms of the real generate events
>>and experiences and that since they are generated by the real they are
>>themselves real.  That is, they are not real because they are themselves
>>causally efficacious but because they are generated by mechanisms of the
>>real.  This reading is anyway not foreclosed by the text.
>>
>>Now at p. 244, RB writes that the central argument of the book is that of
>>"establishing an ontological distinction between causal laws and patterns
>>of events (the independence of the domains of the real and the actual, the
>>irreducibility of structures to events)."
>>
>>Now with that in mind we can look for convenience at the section just
>>posted from RTS.  Under (iii) in the first paragraph, if we are able to
>>locate a reason for some occurrence in the enduring powers of things and
>>the transfactually active mechanisms of nature, then we have a law.  The
>>problem with events in this respect is that they just happen.  They do not
>>endure, and they do not act.  
>>
>>And then at 180 we read that "whatever is responsible for the world as
>>manifest must possess causal powers which are continually being exercised .
>>. . it cannot be atomistic or event-like."  
>>
>>From earlier in the text at 77: "the key concept of a causal agent; ie the
>>thing that produced or the mechanism that generated, in the circumstances
>>that actually prevailed, the effect in question."  Events occur, they are
>>not causal agents.  They do not generate or produce. 
>>
>>In other words, I've been trying to distinguish the presence of a thing,
>>which is an event, from the thing as an enduring mechanism. It is the
>>generative mechanism as a minute by minute enduring thing that is the
>>causal agent.  Peirce's stone.  That's the thing that endures.  Events are
>>what a mechanism produces.  Boom it hits the floor.  Hume and Mill are the
>>ones that viewed cause as a total set of events.  
>>
>>p. 47:  "The world consists of mechanisms not events."  As my wife would
>>say, "I rest my case."  The passage continues:  "Such mechanisms combine to
>>generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and
>>happenings of the world."  
>>
>>Or p. 50:  "the generative mechanisms of nature exist as the causal powers
>>of things."
>>
>>Then at 121 there is the transitive verb model of cause, "Tania pushed the
>>door."  But events don't act; they happen.  And compare the passage about
>>Lloyd George at 123 with Diagram 2.2 at 124:  events identified in the
>>passage, ie the influence of the Labour Party on workers, do not find their
>>way into the diagram as causes; instead the causes are the mechanisms: the
>>Labour Party, Workers, and President Wilson.
>>
>>If events are causes, then this is because one event produces another
>>event.  But then what are we to do with 129:
>>
>>"Underpinning deductivism is the actualist thesis that laws are relations
>>between events or states of affairs."
>>
>>Also events are not the intransitive objects studied by science.
>>
>>And compare p. 144:  "order in the world must be pitched at a level
>>categorically distinct from events" with 186:  "Explanation is achieved by
>>reference to enduring mechanisms."
>>
>>Howard
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>At 08:48 PM 3/4/01 +0000, you wrote:
>>>Hi Howard
>>>
>>>>Notice finally that in the chart at RTS 56 (or in Collier), events are
>>>>actual and real, and  experiences real, actual and empirical/meaningful.
>>>>Do we mean real here simply in the sense that events and experiences exist
>>>>or do we mean it in the strong sense that anything that is real is
causally
>>>>efficacious?  
>>>
>>>Confining myself to what I think Bhaskar means, there seems no doubt at
>>>all from RTS 56 and elsewhere that events and experiences (and
>>>conceptual structures, etc) *may* function in turn as causal mechanisms,
>>>i.e. possess powers to produce effects (strong sense). 
>>>
>>>To understand this I think one needs to think processually and
>>>relationally about the schema at p 56. This does not entail collapsing
>>>the distinctions. What is the effect of the exercise of causal powers of
>>>M1....n at T1 (eg a collision on a motorway), i.e. an event (events), is
>>>in turn at T2 one of the causes of the subsequent pileup (also involving
>>>the activity of numerous mechanisms). Experience of the event can then
>>>also be causal (eg trauma), just as experience (or its lack) was
>>>complexly causal in producing the event(s).
>>>
>>>Similarly with the homely examples of causally efficacious absence we
>>>have been discussing - Pierre's absence or the missing stapler. At T1
>>>they are events - the effect of the exercise of causal powers M1....n
>>>(you took the stapler into the kitchen and forgot it, Pierre decided to
>>>forego the rendezvous and visit his aunt). At T2, your experience of the
>>>absence of the stapler can now combine causally with other mechanisms to
>>>procude the conclusion that your house has been burgled yet again.....
>>>
>>>Which is to say that events (the effects of the exercise of causal
>>>powers) have at least two dimensions - negative and positive (the
>>>stapler is absent from your desk, the stapler is present in the
>>>kitchen). Now locate this within 1M-4D, and consider the 'fourfold
>>>polysemy' of absence - simple absence; absenting; process-in-product;
>>>and product-in-process (DPF 105f), and it is easy to see that we have to
>>>view things pretty polyvalently!
>>>
>>>
>>>Mervyn
>>>
>>>
>>>lynne engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Jan, Mervyn and all --
>>>>
>>>>I have not had time to respond to Mervyn's recent post to me, but in
>>>>reflecting on it and reviewing other posts I noticed something that seems
>>>>to be at the root of much of our reciprocal confusions.
>>>>
>>>>We would all agree, I take it on the distinction between Mechanisms and
>>>>Events made consistently in RB's work from RTS to DPF.  Events occur in
the
>>>>ontological domain of the actual.  They are what happens.  REal and
>>>>generative mechanisms are the bearers of causal powers.  The actions of
>>>>these cause events to occur as their effects.  Such generative mechanisms
>>>>belong to the domain of the Real.  Actualism consists in "the reduction of
>>>>the necessary and the possible, constitutive of the domain of the real, to
>>>>the actual." (DPF Glossary 393)
>>>>
>>>>Now would we say that events are causally efficacious?  For Hume cause
just
>>>>is the conjunction of events.  For Bhaskar causes have the power to bring
>>>>about their effects by virtue of a generative mechanism that links
cause to
>>>>effect.  So how are we to understand the first sentence of the entry on
>>>>Cause/Causation in the DPF Glossary:  "A cause is typically either an
>>>>antecedent condition or a generative mechanism."  Does this mean that an
>>>>event can be a cause insofar as it is an antecedent condition?  Would this
>>>>then make the event not merely actual and real, but also a Real mechanism?
>>>>For example, the allies won World War II.  Is this event a cause?
>>>>
>>>>The significance of the question comes from noticing that all the examples
>>>>given of the causal efficacy of absence are actually examples of events.
>>>>Recognizing that should go some way to narrowing differences.  For
example,
>>>>the stapler missing from the desk.  Suppose the stapler were present on
the
>>>>desk.  That would be an event.  The causal efficacy of the stapler's
>>>>presence, say holding down a handful of papers, would be generated by the
>>>>thing, the stapler as a Real mechanism, not the event of its presence.
>>>>Similarly, the stapler's absence from the desk is an event.
>>>>
>>>>So too with Pierre in the cafe.  Pierre's presence in the cafe would be an
>>>>event.  Pierre himself is a generative mechanism and a causal agent.
>>>>Pierre's absence is an event, and like its counterpart, his presence, a
>>>>phenomenon in the domain of the actual.  The same analysis holds for all
>>>>the examples given in Section 1 of Chapter 2 of DPF, eg at 48, the letter
>>>>that didn't arrive, the failed exam, the missed plane, the monsoon that
>>>>didn't occur, the deforestation of the Amazonian jungle, the holes in the
>>>>ozone layer, the collapse of "actually existing socialism," the spaces in
>>>>the text, absent authors and readers.  EAch of these designates an event.
>>>>
>>>>Now events have consequences, but they are not, I have thought, generative
>>>>mechanisms.  Is this wrong?  They have consequences because they are the
>>>>raw material, so to speak, the conditions with which causal agents work.
>>>>(Matter itself is always a causal agent, not an event, because in all its
>>>>forms it is causally efficacious.  The tree dulls the axe that cuts it.
>>>>But matter's presence or absence is an event.)
>>>>
>>>>The same analysis holds for Jan's 2/25 list:  Gravity is a Real mechanism;
>>>>its presence or absence is an event.  The hole in the ozone layer is an
>>>>event.  A father is a causal agent, his presence is an event.  So too his
>>>>absence.  The lost soccer final is an event. The fall of the Berlin
wall is
>>>>an event.  Lack of proper health care is an event.   Fascism is a
>>>>generative mechanism; its presence or absence is an event.  Solving a math
>>>>problem is an event; not solving it is an event.  A stolen letter is an
>>>>event.  A telephone is a causal mechanism; a telephone off the hook is an
>>>>event.  A lurker is a person and a causal agent; her presence or
absence in
>>>>list discussions is an event.  The absence of limbs is an event; nerves
>>>>are real mechanisms carrying messages.  A clock is a REal mechanism; that
>>>>it is slow is an event.  The presence of a real pipe in one of Magritte's
>>>>paintings (a sign!) would be an event; it's absence is an event.
>>>>
>>>>And other examples:  a hole in a sock is an event.  My presence in
class is
>>>>an event; my not being in class is an event.  The class (the ensemble of
>>>>social relations) is a generative mechanism.  It's search for the missing
>>>>student is an event.  The student's missing the bus is an event.  Hitler's
>>>>crushing victory over the Allies is, counterfactually, an event; Lao Tse's
>>>>discovery of gene 43 is an event; Tobin's Nobel prize is an event.
Persons
>>>>working for the government are causal agents; their snooping on the
list is
>>>>an event.
>>>>
>>>>All this gives bite to Caroline's questions.  We have difficulty finding
>>>>structure because structure of the sort that belongs to Real mechanisms is
>>>>not something that belongs to an event.  Also, absences can be stratified
>>>>in the sense that they are events and events can be experienced.  But
it is
>>>>not so easy to show that the stratification extends to absence as a
>>>>generative mechanism because the examples we have of it are of events. 
>>>>
>>>>So I guess there are two possibilities here:  On the one hand we can say
>>>>events are causally efficacious as such.  That would then explain why we
>>>>would not have to bother looking for structure as a bearer of causal
powers.
>>>>
>>>>Or, alternatively, we could insist on the distinction between generative
>>>>mechanisms and events.  Then would the effort to treat events as if they
>>>>were generative mechanisms be a form of actualism?
>>>>
>>>>Notice finally that in the chart at RTS 56 (or in Collier), events are
>>>>actual and real, and  experiences real, actual and empirical/meaningful.
>>>>Do we mean real here simply in the sense that events and experiences exist
>>>>or do we mean it in the strong sense that anything that is real is
causally
>>>>efficacious?  
>>>>
>>>>Howard 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>From Jan, 2/25
>>>
>>>
>>>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>>
>>
>>
>>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
>-- 
>Mervyn Hartwig
>13 Spenser Road
>Herne Hill
>London SE24 ONS
>United Kingdom
>Tel: 020 7 737 2892
>Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>


     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

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