From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gis.net> Subject: Re: BHA: Events and Mechanisms Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2001 22:46:10 -0500 For some reason it seems this hasn't gotten distributed on the list, so I'm resending. ======== Hi Tone, You wrote: > According to my understanding, in your example about your stumbling over > the power cord of your computer, you established the *condition* of a > causal reaction (you might say you triggered a causal mechanism). The > unplugging conditioned the disconnection of the power supply to your > computer, which caused it to "die". The fact that you stumbled over the > cord was a contingent event and non-intentional. However, the fact that the > computer "died", when the power supply was disconnected, was a necessary > effect (a mechanism was triggered). I thought that the term *causal* > (according to RTS) was to be reserved for necessary connections of events; > that is events that are connected by mechanisms. I think a lot hinges on how one understands "necessary." If one takes that to mean a law or regularity, "If event E, then result R," then one is working with a "deductive-nomological" concept of necessity, which RB rejects. But if one means "natural necessity," that is, a necessity arising from the nature of the generative mechanism (other conditions permitting), then one has the analysis in RTS. However, the comment about "other conditions permitting" is very important. Strictly speaking, *all* causes are co-causes. An object acted upon must have certain qualities or features which make it possible to be acted upon. So, for example, the Sun exerts a gravitational pull on Earth, which is possible because the Earth has mass; it exerts no such force on the *concept* of mass. Thus the Earth's mass is a co-cause of the Sun's gravitational pull upon it, or in other words, the gravitation requires a mass in order to operate. >From that perspective, the two events (I trip over the power cord, the cord is unplugged so the computer dies) are not really very different. In the first case, though I didn't intend to trip over the cord, once my foot was in the right place and going the right direction, its shape, solidity and force led of necessity to the cord getting yanked. Although there were many contingencies, natural necessities and causal forces came into play. (Likewise, a child may not mean to throw a ball into a window, but once it's thrown, the window breaks.) There are contingencies involved with the unplugging as well, such as the flow of electricity from the wall outlet through the plug and so forth. In short, as I understand it, real generative mechanisms have (or are) powers and susceptibilities, but it is always contingent whether they interact with other mechanims such that these powers actually operate. Thanks, T, --- Tobin Nellhaus nellhaus-AT-mail.com "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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