File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2001/bhaskar.0103, message 65


Date: Thu, 08 Mar 2001 19:16:14 +0100
From: Tone Skinningsrud <tones-AT-sv.uit.no>
Subject: Re: BHA: Events and Mechanisms




Dear Tobin,

Thanks for your answer. 

I regret having brought intentionality and contingency into the analysis,
because that diverts attention from the main problem I was trying to
address, namely the distinction between conditions and causes (or mechanisms):

1. I have now consulted RTS and finds that RB in his Postscript to the 2nd
edition (1978:252) clarifies that he has "used the term 'cause' to refer
both to the antecedent event, condition or agent which triggers a mechanism
[cause 1] and to the […] mechanism […] itself [cause 2]". Thus, he seems to
acknowledge that these two uses refer to different types of causality. 

I will therefore maintain that there is a difference between your stumbling
over the cord (cause 1- 'trigger') and the disconnection of the power
supply to your computer (cause 2- 'mechanism').

2.  However, I have also consulted with Collier (1994:126) who claims that
the distinction between conditions and causes is a serious problem in RBs
account of causality. Collier claims that RB is inconsistent in his
definition of conditions: "they do not have the power to change" and "they
are an epistemic category" (p. 125). Collier claims (like you do), that
conditions are co-determinants of events. 

3.  One possible resolution to this apparent disagreement (?) between
Collier and Bhaskar (or perhaps it is a concession to you and Collier) is
to see the investigative focus as determining what is considered condition
and what is considered mechanism. If the event to be explained is your dead
computer, then your stumbling is the condition (trigger-event) of the
mechanism: disconnected power supply/dead computer. However, your stumbling
could also be considered as an event to be explained, and therefore the
effect of conditions (such as the lightening in the room etc) and one or
more mechanisms, perhaps both at the physiological and psychological level.
Considered this way the distinction between condition and mechanism would
be relative to the specific perspective applied in the analysis of the
complex event.

I still feel, however, that event-causes are distinct from
mechanism-causes, f ex with regard to the time-dimension. Events are
instances, while mechanisms are relatively enduring.

This is getting considerably more complicated than I expected.


Tone






>Hi Tone,
>
>You wrote:
>
>> According to my understanding, in your example about your stumbling over
>> the power cord of your computer, you established the *condition* of a
>> causal reaction (you might say you triggered a causal mechanism). The
>> unplugging conditioned the disconnection of the power supply to your
>> computer, which caused it to "die". The fact that you stumbled over the
>> cord was a contingent event and non-intentional. However, the fact that
>the
>> computer "died", when the power supply was disconnected, was a necessary
>> effect (a mechanism was triggered). I thought that the term *causal*
>> (according to RTS) was to be reserved for necessary connections of events;
>> that is events that are connected by mechanisms.
>
>I think a lot hinges on how one understands "necessary."  If one takes that
>to mean a law or regularity, "If event E, then result R," then one is
>working with a "deductive-nomological" concept of necessity, which RB
>rejects.  But if one means "natural necessity," that is, a necessity arising
>from the nature of the generative mechanism (other conditions permitting),
>then one has the analysis in RTS.  However, the comment about "other
>conditions permitting" is very important.  Strictly speaking, *all* causes
>are co-causes.  An object acted upon must have certain qualities or features
>which make it possible to be acted upon.  So, for example, the Sun exerts a
>gravitational pull on Earth, which is possible because the Earth has mass;
>it exerts no such force on the *concept* of mass.  Thus the Earth's mass is
>a co-cause of the Sun's gravitational pull upon it, or in other words, the
>gravitation requires a mass in order to operate.
>
>>From that perspective, the two events (I trip over the power cord, the cord
>is unplugged so the computer dies) are not really very different.  In the
>first case, though I didn't intend to trip over the cord, once my foot was
>in the right place and going the right direction, its shape, solidity and
>force led of necessity to the cord getting yanked.  Although there were many
>contingencies, natural necessities and causal forces came into play.
>(Likewise, a child may not mean to throw a ball into a window, but once it's
>thrown, the window breaks.)  There are contingencies involved with the
>unplugging as well, such as the flow of electricity from the wall outlet
>through the plug and so forth.  In short, as I understand it, real
>generative mechanisms have (or are) powers and susceptibilities, but it is
>always contingent whether they interact with other mechanims such that these
>powers actually operate.
>
>Thanks,
>
>T,
>
>---
>Tobin Nellhaus
>nellhaus-AT-mail.com
>"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce
>
>
>
>
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>
>


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