From: "Andrew Brown" <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2001 11:23:54 -0000
Subject: Re: BHA: Reasonable, rational or meaningful?


But the point is that 'rationality' is embraced by 'intelligibility', 
whereas the converse is not the case. Intelligibility is the more 
abstract, general, hence more appropriate definition. That's why 
Bhaskar uses it.

As you know, Mervyn, Bhaskar does *not* argue *for* the 'big ditch 
argument' he simply *refers to* the argument approvingly without 
explaining what it is.

And frankly the argument is obviously circular. How do we judge 
progress?! No one seriously doubts the rationality of science 
(POMOS don't in practice of course, that's their theory practice 
inconsistency). The trick is to uphold our intuitions philosophically, 
not simply to repeat what our intuitions are!

Best wishes,

Andy

On 14 Mar 2001, at 23:12, Mervyn Hartwig wrote:

> Hi Ruth, Andrew
> 
> >There is no question but that it assumes the
> >rationality of science (among other things). 
> 
> This is not to say, of course, that the assumption is not argued for -
> see eg SRHE 18-19, where the 'Big Ditch Argument' is deemed to make a
> prima facie case for the superior explanatory power of science over
> against 'other historically materialised practices (magic, religion,
> etc.)' 
> 
> Does any one on the list save a few POMO lurkers, Gary, Jan and the
> later Bhaskar himself seriously doubt this? :-)
> 
> There is no assumption of course that the way in which scientific
> results are applied is rational, as Bhaskar is careful to say (19).
> 
> Also, re my joke: he's also careful to say that superiority is not an
> all or nothing question, only where there's a conflict (18). The later
> Bhaskar's position can be seen as one in which a religious outlook
> overreaches and *embraces* emancipatory science.
> 
> Mervyn
> 
> 
> Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca> writes
> >Hi Andrew (Andrew M!),
> >
> >I agree with you that this issue is interesting.  I really do think that it
> >is important to remember that the original transcendental argument based on
> >experimentation is developed as an internal critique of positions within the
> >philosophy of science.  There is no question but that it assumes the
> >rationality of science (among other things).  It is not until later in
> >Bhaskar's writing that he makes arguments that, as I understand them, do not
> >hinge on such an assumption. 
> >
> >Warmly,
> >Ruth
> >
> >At 06:27 PM 3/13/01 -0800, you wrote:
> >>This intelligibility/rationality dual is an
> >>interesting one, as it's been taken on by other CR
> >>authors, such as Tony Lawson.  Although there are many
> >>quotations where 'intelligibility' is used, I don't
> >>think it's a clear cut issue. As Benton (1981, in
> >>ERCR, p. 299) notes, to deduce the nature of the world
> >>from experimental activity assumes that such activity
> >>displays rationality (in the sense of rational
> >>justifiability).  If it were not assumed that
> >>scientists were rational in some sense nothing about
> >>the world could be inferred from experimental
> >>activity, save that it contained some insane
> >>scientists. Similarly, scientific development must be
> >>assumed to proceed somewhat rationally to draw
> >>inferences from it (above).  Indeed, Bhaskar (RTS, p.
> >>176) talks of my rational reconstruction of the
> >>process of scientific discovery.  Moreover, Bhaskar
> >>talks (RTS, p. 46) of ontology providing a rationale
> >>for experiment; then (SR, p. 8) of TR aiming to
> >>uphold and display the intelligibility and rationale
> >>of science; and of transfactual tendencies showing
> >>that a rationale existsfor the experimental and
> >>applied activity of science.  Also Bhaskar
> >>acknowledges (PN, p. 171) Bentons argument that there
> >>exists the need to assume the rational justifiability
> >>of the epistemic practices of science before strong
> >>conclusions are drawn [about the world] and that this
> >>requires one to declare ones hand with science.  
> >>
> >>Andrew 
> >>
> >>--- Andrew Brown <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> wrote:
> >>> 'none of the above':
> >>> 
> >>> you want INTELLIGIBLE.
> >>> 
> >>> Of your three options 'meaningful' comes closest.
> >>> 
> >>> Best wishes,
> >>> 
> >>> Andy
> >>> 
> >>> On 12 Mar 2001, at 16:29, Fredrik Liljeros wrote:
> >>> 
> >>> > Dear all,
> >>> > 
> >>> > Which of the three questions bellow would be best
> >>> to use in a description of
> >>> > Bhaskars transcendental technique?
> >>> > 
> >>> > 1. What must be the case for the experiment to be
> >>> a RATIONAL activity?
> >>> > 
> >>> > 2. What must be the case for the experiment to be
> >>> a MEANINGFUL activity?
> >>> > 
> >>> > 3. What must be the case for the experiment to be
> >>> a REASONABLE activity?
> >>> > 
> >>> > Thanks,
> >>> > 
> >>> > Fredrik
> >>> > 
> >>> > Fredrik Liljeros
> >>> > Dep. of Sociology
> >>> > 106 91 Stockholm
> >>> > Sweden
> >>> > 
> >>> > Tel. +4g 8 163117
> >>> > 
> >>> > 
> >>> > 
> >>> >      --- from list
> >>> bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>>      --- from list
> >>> bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>
> >>
> >>__________________________________________________
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> >>
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> >
> >
> >
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> 
> -- 
> Mervyn Hartwig
> 13 Spenser Road
> Herne Hill
> London SE24 ONS
> United Kingdom
> Tel: 020 7 737 2892
> Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk
> 
> 
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