From: Andrew Hagen <xah-AT-myrealbox.com>
Date: Thu, 03 May 2001 11:57:32 -0400
Subject: Re: BHA: RB's terminology  metaphor of depth


On Thu, 03 May 2001 14:52:29 +0200, Hans Puehretmayer wrote:
>could you please explain the metaphor of depth?
>And what are the criteria for a knowledge to be "deeper" than another
>knowledge?
>>>... if the knowledge called upon is DEEPER ...<<

I don't know if I can. Let me try, though. I was trying to say that a
larger collection of knowledge could lead to a more rational judgement.
That might not make sense, however. The rationality of a judgement is
not contingent on the available knowledge being comprehensive. A larger
collection of knowledge (more facts) is intrinsically useful. The
rationality of judgement does not depend on how big a library in which
you research. If you research in a bigger library though, it stands to
reason that you will have more knowledge. Maybe I'm relying too much on
an inductive sense here, but I think if you have more facts that you
can draw on, you can reach a better decision. RB tells us that it
doesn't matter how many "facts" (erroneous, or not) you have, you still
may form a more rational judgement.

Compare two scientists of equal ability. Both are studying a rare
species of bird. The first scientist observes these birds within one
square mile. The second scientist observes this area and an additional
area that extends to a nearby stream. The first scientist notices that
every day the birds leave the area for a few hours and then come back.
Additionally, every week or so, one of the birds doesn't come back. The
first scientist uses this data to conclude that the birds go looking
for food. He further concludes that once every week or so they don't
find food. Thus, they are forced to eat one of their own. The second
scientist notices the birds' movements as well. She sees the birds come
to the stream every day to hunt for fish and drink water. Every week or
so, the scientist observes an alligator eat one of the birds. The
second scientist concludes that the birds are fish eaters, not
cannibals.

In the above example, both scientists have drawn rational conclusions,
given their respective data. A third scientist who reads their field
reports and resulting papers together treats their observations and
conclusions as being of equal value. The third scientist makes a
rational judgement that the birds are not cannibals. Like the first two
scientists, the third has done nothing terribly exciting or unlikely.
Yet all three have practiced epistemic relativism and judgemental
rationalism.

Nick Hostettler recently posted an interesting message in another
thread on this subject. In part, he wrote: "It can be possible that
historically relative modes of understanding develop superior
capacities of rational judgement in relation to others." I think it
would be useful to add that if we practice social science as it
traditionally has been done, our inquiry is complete once we have
achieved Verstehen, or an understanding of the phenomena. We would have
no
need to reconcile differing historical modes of understanding, so long
as we know what the differences are. If we wish to achieve Erklarung,
or an explanation of the phenomena, however, we would have to reconcile
the
differences. This has traditionally been reserved for the natural
sciences. Winch only requires epistemic relativism. Bhaskar suggests
the possibility of naturalism bewteen the branches of science.

A potentially larger question is how will we reconcile the differences,
or practice judgemental rationalism. What will be the criteria for our
judgement? Doesn't RB beg the question in saying that the judgement
must be rational? Sure, it must be rational. How are we to know which
competing historical mode of understanding is more rational, however? 

Maybe this is a question we can only answer once we are in the position
of making a judgement, for our judgement will be based on all of the
knowledge we have, and all of the insights taken together provided by
the competing historical modes of understanding. Maybe once we get to
that point it will become obvious which is the rational judgement. 

Andrew Hagen
xah-AT-myrealbox.com




>Andrew Hagen wrote:
>> 
>> RB separates what is usually taken together. Epistemic relativism seems
>> easy to understand. No source of knowledge is to be privileged over
>> another. As a result, for example, the problem of induction disappears.
>> On the other hand, at first glance judgemental rationalism begs the
>> question. If we are epistemic relativists, how are we to judge
>> rationally? How do we frame criteria for rationally judging one
>> statement over another?
>> 
>> For RB, the epistemic and the judgemental seem to take place at
>> different moments, or in different places, or on different levels.
>> Maybe we should lay down our tools of analysis in the knowledge
>> gathering stage, but pick them back up once knowledge is gathered and
>> we must come to a judgement. As RB wrote in PON1, "Epistemic
>> relativism. . . respects a distinction between the sense and reference
>> of propositions." (pp 73-74). In PE RB would place
>> judgemental rationalism in the constellationality of epistemic
>> relativism. (p 218). (Thanks to those who posted the page references.)
>> 
>> Is it necessary that the judgemental phase always follows the epistemic
>> in the time dimension? I would argue that this is not necessary. The
>> epistemic phase is not discrete to the particular judgement that we
>> must make. Knowledge is gathered during a whole lifetime. We are always
>> making new assumptions and learning new things. Sometimes this later
>> applies to a judgement, and sometimes not. The larger point, in my
>> mind, however, is that the epistemic phase is not the servant of the
>> judgemental phase. We are not producing knowledge, socially or
>> otherwise, for the purpose of later making a judgement. Knowledge is
>> gathered for its intrinsic worth. Our judgements are made from time to
>> time, when we must. When we make a judgement, we only have access to
>> the knowledge that we have at that time. Judgements can be made more
>> rationally if there is a greater variety of knowledge available. The
>> rationality of a judgement is also dependent on its own logic. Thus, a
>> judgement can be more rational if the knowledge called upon is deeper,
>> and if the judgement's logic is well considered.
>> 
>> Andrew Hagen
>> xah-AT-myrealbox.com
>> 
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