From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gis.net> Subject: BHA: Re: events and mechanisms Date: Wed, 2 May 2001 18:27:21 -0400 Hi John-- You raise some interesting issues in your discussion of the distinction (or lack of one) between events and mechanisms. I agree -- with a few caveats -- that "all is (in) flux" (if I may be so epigrammatic!), but I don't think that one can conclude that the distinction can be collapsed. Throughout your discussion, you conceptualize the matter as one of observation (e.g., time frames, etc). I think this is where the problem in your argument lies. As soon as one uses observation as the (sole) criterion for existence, then the mechanism/event distinction immediately collapses, and it makes little difference whether one thinks mechanisms collapse into events or vice versa. The human body is an enduring mechanism (mechanism), but it also is born, ages, and dies (event). It is a product-in-process and process-in-product -- fair enough. So too is everything else, including the universe itself. However, the mechanism/event distinction (as I understand it) is an ontological one leveraged on an *causal* criterion of existence. A generative mechanism has powers and susceptibilities which *may or may not* in fact be active or in operation at any particular moment. It is only when one or more of these powers and susceptibilities are actually at work that we have events. My body has structures and mechanisms which enable me to walk across my flat and grab a snack, but that is not an event, since instead I'm sitting here typing. My body is also capable of devouring a very large steak, but that may never happen at all (I'm a vegetarian). So an array of causal powers and susceptibilities exists independently of their activity. That is the basis of the mechanism/event distinction. (Insert brief pause here as "getting a snack" becomes an event.) On the other hand, I think your reference to time is appropriate, but not in terms of lengths of time (time frames), which are empty and arbitrary, but instead to the *work* of time, which is tied to specific processes and causal forces. Causal structures may generate events -- a work across time. But also, events may create new structures. For example, water erosion may carve out a river, and sexual intercourse may lead to a baby. So there are interactions between the levels of structures and events, but the two remain ontologically distinct. I hope that makes sense. Thanks, T. --- Tobin Nellhaus nellhaus-AT-mail.com "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce ----- Original Message ----- From: "John Mingers" <ORSJM-AT-rapier.wbs.warwick.ac.uk> To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu> Sent: Tuesday, 01 May 2001 4:36 AM Subject: BHA: events and mechanisms > Dear all > > Having just managed to catch up with the fascinating discussion on > absences and events I would like to belatedly add my bit. > > Eventsand mechanisms > > I would like to make the case that there is not so strong a > distinction between the two as is currently, generally assumed. In > fact, I would argue that the distinction is simply a relative one > based on the time frame the observer adopts. > Generally an event has been defined as a happening in time (with > a start and finish) whereas a mechanism is relatively enduring. > This clearly points to the importance of time in the distinction. I > suggest that what counts as an event depends entirely on the > time frame used for the observation. Events do not take place > instantaneously they always have a duration, and so to be > observed as an event, with a start and finish, the period of > observation must be at least longer than the duration. > Thus, if you increase the time period, from, say, hours to weeks > to years to centuries etc, then more and more things become > events. If you reduce the period, to seconds, millisecs, etc, there > are less events and more things are relatively enduring. I think of > it like time lapse photography if you have long intervals > between snaps you can see things changing that you dont > normally see, and vice versa. > > Lets return to Pierre, and assume that he does arrive at the > caf. Its very commonsensical to see this as an event but if you > take a short time period then it consists of many events the taxi > arriving, Pierre getting out (does he fall?), entering the caf, > getting a seat (is there one free?), ordering a drink, etc. If you > take a long period, the whole visit is but one event among many > in a year, and Pierres whole life could be seen as an event > within a historical perspective. At the extremes, if we take a very > short time period virtually everything except sub-atomic > interactions are fixed and relatively enduring; if we take billions > of years even the birth/death of suns become events. > > We can transpose this discussion into concepts from systems > theory. Here, there is a very similar duality between structure > and process. When observing a system (of whatever type) we > see some elements and relations that remain the same (its > structure) and some elements that change in some way > (process). Once again, the distinction is entirely relative to the > observers time frame. > > What is the result for the mechanism/event distinction? > > It seems to me that it leads ever more heavily away from > empiricism, in fact to reduce events to structures (the opposite of > what RB was concerned about, as Howard reminded us, ie > reducing structures to events.) > > The Real, consists of structures, mechanisms (or, as I would say, > systems), both material and conceptual, that come into being, > change and develop, interact with others, and eventually > disintegrate. All that actually happens is a continual dynamic > interplay of constancy and change, presence and absence. IF > particular time frames are put on these occurrences, if the world > is punctuated in particular ways, THEN we can say that certain > events did (or did not) occur but this is essentially a second > order phenomena an imposition of a particular temporal > structure on an ongoing flux. > > Does this mean that events, and the domain of the Actual, is > merely epiphenomenal? To be honest I am not sure, but I think > one can argue that, evolutionary at least, particular time frames > do have survival value and therefore organisms have evolved > structures that do punctuate reality in particular ways. Thus the > event the presence (or absence) of food does trigger (cause) > particular sequences of actions, ie further events, but ultimately > they are all just changes in the structures of temporarily existing > systems. > > Similar ideas to these can be found in Gregory Bateson, who > conceptualises the world as a continual transmission of > differences. He defines information as a difference that makes a > difference which is quite consistent with a causal criterion of > existence. > > Also in Maturana (who developed ideas of autopoiesis in part > from Bateson) who talks of systems being structurally > determined, that is changes (or lack of changes) in a system > depend on its particular structural configuration at the time, not > on the external source which can only act as a trigger (see > previous discussion on different types of causes). > > I will follow this up into presence/absence shortly > > John > > > > > > > > Dr. John Mingers, Professor of OR and Systems > Warwick Business School, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK > j.mingers-AT-warwick.ac.uk > phone: +2476 522475 fax: +2476 524539 > http://users.wbs.warwick.ac.uk/ors/people/mingers/index.htm > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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