File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2001/bhaskar.0106, message 16


Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2001 09:54:03 -0400 (EDT)
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca>
Subject: BHA: reply to Mark


Hi Mark,

If we think about the question not in terms of whether or not particulars
are all that exists, but rather in terms of whether or not things have
properties or dispositions independent of how we classify them (i.e.,
whether or not there are natural kinds, even if each "kind" only has one
member) then the contrast is sharper I think.

See what I mean?

Bhaskar, like Locke, does admit both of the fact that we group things
together in certain ways and of the "fact" that things have properties of
their own.  (I'm talking the Bhaskar of RTS here; no comment on the current
position.) Unlike Locke, though, he thinks that we can have scientific
knowledge of things' "real essences."  Nonetheless, I think that Ronny is
right that the view that there *are* real essences is incompatible with the
view that there aren't!  

It's really unfortunate that Bhaskar doesn't (didn't) engage much with any
of the philosophical debate surrounding these issues.  O well.  

Ruth




  natural At 11:44 PM 6/16/01 -0500, you wrote:
>Thanks for your comment. Let me expand on what I wrote before. 
>
>Nominalism, in my view, is not incompatible with essentialism either. The
difference is that, in ontological realism (such as Platonism and Thomism),
particulars of a given species are all believed to share the same essence
(ideal form). In ontological nominalism, each particular has its own essence.
>
>Now, assuming the real dimension to be a kind of universal essence would be
incompatible with nominalism. However, assuming the real dimension to be a
set of laws and hidden structures which make the appearance of individual
essences possible would not be incompatible with nominalism.
>
>In any event, as I read Bhaskar, he proposed the "actual" dimension (i.e.,
events) as a way of distinguishing between the real (laws) and the empirical
(individual experiences of events), not as a refutation of ontological
nominalism.
>
>However, I would appreciate the clarifications of those who may be more
familiar with Bhaskar's arguments than myself. Since I am fairly new to CR,
that shouldn't be too difficult to do. ;-)
>
>Mark A. Foster, Ph.D.
>"Sacred cows make the best hamburger" 
>-- Mark Twain and Abbie Hoffman
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>



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