File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2001/bhaskar.0108, message 19


Date: Sun, 26 Aug 2001 22:21:53 -0400
From: howard engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org>
Subject: Re: BHA: What's wrong with naturalism?


Mervyn,

Unh,uh.

First Bhaskar revises Aristotle, then Marx is read as the revised
Aristotelian. In SRHE, if I recall correctly, Bhaskar says social
structures are "like" the sort of thing Aristotle does with material cause.
 If the text is as you say, then that locates RB's idealism there, and I
think it is useful to mark this development.  Anyway, even from scratching
at surfaces I know this is not adequate to Aristotle, and moreover
unnecessary to him.  And, when Marx writes material conditions, I do indeed
think he means material things.

Howard


At 11:40 AM 8/25/01 +0100, you wrote:
>Howard, Agner,
>
>Just to chip in on this: imo a material cause in the Aristotelian
>tradition is by no means confined to 'material things'. Thus for Bhaskar
>the social, while not in itself material, is the material cause of
>people's activities in that they necessarily work on and with its pre-
>existing forms in the same way as a sculptor works on and with a block
>of marble. In the same way, when Marx speaks of 'material conditions'
>he's not thinking exclusively of material things, rather of material
>causes in the Aristotelian sense (which of course have a necessary
>material substrate in the narrower sense: people and their material
>transactions with nature).
>
>Mervyn
>
>howard engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes
>>Agner,
>>
>>"Nobody came to the concert last Sunday because people didn't like the
>>orchestra."
>>
>>Why isn't this an example of a material cause, because members of the
>>orchestra, or their instruments, are material things?
>>
>>Why isn't this an example of a structural cause, because the orchestra is a
>>social structure?
>>
>>Why isn't this an example of a final cause, because people are not going to
>>the concert in order to accomplish a particular purpose?
>>
>>Howard
>>
>>
>>At 04:53 PM 8/22/01 +0200, you wrote:
>>>Howard Engelskirchen wrote:
>>>>Thanks for the post and references.
>>>>
>>>>As one who couldn't attend the IACR congress, I'd be very interested in a
>>>>review of the focus of attention on causality and some summary of main
>>>>points of discussion.
>>>
>>>You can find the conference papers at www.ssc.ruc.dk/iacr/programme.htm
>>>The topic of causality is discussed in my paper as well as the paper by
>>>Berth Danermark and by Bob Carter and Caroline New.
>>>
>>>>There is much I agree with in your post, but I am not really clear on what
>>>>you mean by structural causality.  Also, I am not clear when you say that
>>>>we must accept the three kinds of causal powers whether you mean that they
>>>>all do the same thing. Do structures roll a ball uphill? 
>>>
>>>Caroline New also asks about this, so I better elaborate on my three kinds
>>>of causality:
>>>
>>>1. Efficient cause. Example:
>>>   "Nobody came to the concert last Sunday because people didn't like the
>>>orchestra."
>>>   Here, the cause lies in people.
>>>
>>>2. Structural cause. Example:
>>>   "Nobody came to the concert last Sunday because Sunday is church-going
>>>day."
>>>   Here the cause lies in the rule that Sunday is church-going day.
>>>
>>>3. Material cause. Example:
>>>   "Nobody came to the concert last Sunday because it was raining."
>>>   Here the cause lies in a material thing - the rain.
>>>
>>>Some philosophers accept only efficient causes, arguing that only people
>>>can do things.
>>>The material cause would then have to be rephrased as: "Nobody came to the
>>>concert because people didn't like the weather." Nothing is gained by this
>>>transcription, because the weather is much more likely to change than
>>>peoples tolerance for bad weather. Thus, the explanation why people come to
>>>one concert and not to another concert is that the weather has changed, not
>>>people's tolerance for rain.
>>>
>>>>Or again,
>>>>methodological individualism is not a problem because it focuses attention
>>>>on the fact that only individuals ever act in the world; it is a problem
>>>>because it ignores the social relations presupposed by and within which
>>>>they act.
>>>
>>>Exactly, an explanation of collective social phenomenon by reference to
>>>individual action appears to be reductionist, when the phenomenon is an
>>>emergent property of a social structure.
>
>
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