Date: Wed, 05 Sep 2001 22:07:45 -0400
From: howard engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org>
Subject: Re: BHA: material cause


Ruth,

As it happens, I had a look at SRHE (which I do not have with me) the other
night.  What Bhaskar says is that society *is* a material cause.  I'm okay
with that because society is an ensemble of social relations, and social
relations may be understood as material relations.

Howard

At 10:14 AM 9/5/01 -0400, you wrote:
>Hiya Howard and Mervyn,
>
>I only have a minute, but Howard, can yu say more about how you disagree
>with what Mervyn's representation of Aristotle and of Marx on material
>cause.  I'm not sure that I entirely agree.  Also, it seems to me that it
>really does matter whether or not RB means the comparison as an analogy.  I
>mean, I think of the transitive object of science as being the both the
>material and the formal cause of scientific theory.  In this case it is the
>accumulated conceptual resources that are the wood and nails, or whatever
>(and also the floor plans), of the metaphorical "house" under construction. 
>
>Eager to listen in.  Gotta run.  Been away.  Semester starts in an hour!
>
>Ruth
>
>
>At 10:21 PM 8/26/01 -0400, you wrote:
>>Mervyn,
>>
>>Unh,uh.
>>
>>First Bhaskar revises Aristotle, then Marx is read as the revised
>>Aristotelian. In SRHE, if I recall correctly, Bhaskar says social
>>structures are "like" the sort of thing Aristotle does with material cause.
>> If the text is as you say, then that locates RB's idealism there, and I
>>think it is useful to mark this development.  Anyway, even from scratching
>>at surfaces I know this is not adequate to Aristotle, and moreover
>>unnecessary to him.  And, when Marx writes material conditions, I do indeed
>>think he means material things.
>>
>>Howard
>>
>>
>>At 11:40 AM 8/25/01 +0100, you wrote:
>>>Howard, Agner,
>>>
>>>Just to chip in on this: imo a material cause in the Aristotelian
>>>tradition is by no means confined to 'material things'. Thus for Bhaskar
>>>the social, while not in itself material, is the material cause of
>>>people's activities in that they necessarily work on and with its pre-
>>>existing forms in the same way as a sculptor works on and with a block
>>>of marble. In the same way, when Marx speaks of 'material conditions'
>>>he's not thinking exclusively of material things, rather of material
>>>causes in the Aristotelian sense (which of course have a necessary
>>>material substrate in the narrower sense: people and their material
>>>transactions with nature).
>>>
>>>Mervyn
>>>
>>>howard engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes
>>>>Agner,
>>>>
>>>>"Nobody came to the concert last Sunday because people didn't like the
>>>>orchestra."
>>>>
>>>>Why isn't this an example of a material cause, because members of the
>>>>orchestra, or their instruments, are material things?
>>>>
>>>>Why isn't this an example of a structural cause, because the orchestra
is a
>>>>social structure?
>>>>
>>>>Why isn't this an example of a final cause, because people are not
going to
>>>>the concert in order to accomplish a particular purpose?
>>>>
>>>>Howard
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>At 04:53 PM 8/22/01 +0200, you wrote:
>>>>>Howard Engelskirchen wrote:
>>>>>>Thanks for the post and references.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>As one who couldn't attend the IACR congress, I'd be very interested
in a
>>>>>>review of the focus of attention on causality and some summary of main
>>>>>>points of discussion.
>>>>>
>>>>>You can find the conference papers at www.ssc.ruc.dk/iacr/programme.htm
>>>>>The topic of causality is discussed in my paper as well as the paper by
>>>>>Berth Danermark and by Bob Carter and Caroline New.
>>>>>
>>>>>>There is much I agree with in your post, but I am not really clear on
what
>>>>>>you mean by structural causality.  Also, I am not clear when you say
that
>>>>>>we must accept the three kinds of causal powers whether you mean that
they
>>>>>>all do the same thing. Do structures roll a ball uphill? 
>>>>>
>>>>>Caroline New also asks about this, so I better elaborate on my three
kinds
>>>>>of causality:
>>>>>
>>>>>1. Efficient cause. Example:
>>>>>   "Nobody came to the concert last Sunday because people didn't like the
>>>>>orchestra."
>>>>>   Here, the cause lies in people.
>>>>>
>>>>>2. Structural cause. Example:
>>>>>   "Nobody came to the concert last Sunday because Sunday is church-going
>>>>>day."
>>>>>   Here the cause lies in the rule that Sunday is church-going day.
>>>>>
>>>>>3. Material cause. Example:
>>>>>   "Nobody came to the concert last Sunday because it was raining."
>>>>>   Here the cause lies in a material thing - the rain.
>>>>>
>>>>>Some philosophers accept only efficient causes, arguing that only people
>>>>>can do things.
>>>>>The material cause would then have to be rephrased as: "Nobody came to
the
>>>>>concert because people didn't like the weather." Nothing is gained by
this
>>>>>transcription, because the weather is much more likely to change than
>>>>>peoples tolerance for bad weather. Thus, the explanation why people
come to
>>>>>one concert and not to another concert is that the weather has
changed, not
>>>>>people's tolerance for rain.
>>>>>
>>>>>>Or again,
>>>>>>methodological individualism is not a problem because it focuses
attention
>>>>>>on the fact that only individuals ever act in the world; it is a problem
>>>>>>because it ignores the social relations presupposed by and within which
>>>>>>they act.
>>>>>
>>>>>Exactly, an explanation of collective social phenomenon by reference to
>>>>>individual action appears to be reductionist, when the phenomenon is an
>>>>>emergent property of a social structure.
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
>
>
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