File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2001/bhaskar.0111, message 29


Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 23:01:44 +0000
Subject: Re: BHA: PON ch. 3 question


Hi Ruth,

> this would seem to 
>suggest, though, that the philosophy of psychology (or of agency, within social 
>science) that Bhaskar is working out in this section is limited (consciously 
>so?), in that it doesn't get at whole embodied selves (but rather at 
>"psychological units").

'Unit' is my term, not Bhaskar's, and perhaps unfortunate - 'core' would
perhaps be better. I don't think this entails limitation - rather, it
gets at the key dimension of the embodied self, which also includes a
'physiological' dimension, as well as 'sociological' inputs (see e.g.
third para of the Chapter). In DPF this becomes, precisely, 'a
stratified model of the self' (149, etc) and shows I think the direction
in which the PON thought was pointing.

In the recent CCR seminar, in a talk entitled 'Who am I?', Bhaskar spoke
of three dimensions of the person:

1) The ego, as atomised and separate from other people. This is an
ideological illusion.

2) The embodied personality (a phrase which suggests that the
personality is in the ascendant, so to speak - but it includes the
unconscious and preconscious, so presumably is not all cognitive), which
he spoke of as 'through and through contextual and relative' (to the
material and socio-historical context).

3) The transcendentally real self - our true or alethic selves, what we
essentially are.

These correspond to:

1) demi-real relative being   2) relative being  3) absolute being -
what it is possible for us to be in virtue of the way that the universe
fundamentally is. And:

1) the empirical  2) the actual   3) the real

It is essence in the sense of 3) that is perhaps missing from PON, but
I'm speaking a bit off the top of my head. In PON our essence seems to
reside at 2).

Dunno whether this helps, but hoping so, 

Mervyn


Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca> writes
>Hi Mervyn,
>
>Thanks a lot.  Would you have a minute to say a word or two for me about the 
>difference between "person(s)" and "people."  You distinguish between the 
>"psychological unit" and the "whole embodied self" -- this would seem to 
>suggest, though, that the philosophy of psychology (or of agency, within social 
>science) that Bhaskar is working out in this section is limited (consciously 
>so?), in that it doesn't get at whole embodied selves (but rather at 
>"psychological units").  Do you think he would have meant to delimits things 
>that way at the time, even if he would now?  This is not meant to be a loaded 
>question; I genuinely appreciate any insights you or others have.
>
>Thanks again,
>Ruth
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

-- 
Mervyn Hartwig
13 Spenser Road
Herne Hill
London SE24 ONS
United Kingdom
Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk


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