Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2001 00:15:18 +0100 Subject: Re: BHA: Philosophy and the idea of freedom Hi John, i'd always had a soft spot for PIF, and i quess mainly because it contains such a sharp interrogation of and attack on Rorty (section one of the book is bluntly titled "Anti-Rorty"). In fact the book is -for the larger part- a very critical (realist) inquiry of the ontological and epistmological claims of postmodernism, of which Rorty is taken as its prime epigone. Roughly sketched, Bhaskar is arguing/critiqueing the following: - Rorty's account of science is basically a positivist-instrumentalist one; - rationality (truth), according to Rorty, is just a paradigma (a language game, a story), thus one out of many possible justifiable paradigmata; - Rorty's relativism leads to ontological scepticism and epistemological stoicism, and as such proclaims and defends the *status quo* in social reality (thus emancipation is impossible, or -at least- of relative value); - Rorty's deontologized super-idealist epistemology rejects that the world has an intrinsic nature; - Rorty's (re)description of human being, as 'a network of beliefs, desires and emotions with noting behind it', lacks any concept of an essential moral and political human subjectivity; - for Rorty, freedom is grounded in ignorance. All in all, Rorty is accused of (i) lacking a substantial ontology (i.e. no ID) and (ii) a relativist and antropomorphic epistemology (no JR), and (iii) is thusly unmasked as the ideologue of the 'leisured elite - intellectual yuppies - neither racked by pain nor immersed in toil', one explicitely defending the status quo in social reality. yours, Jan below a paragraph on the 'c ref' and 'p ref' stuff [cf. PIF: pp.112-113]: "I want to distinguish at the outset 'conversational reference' - c ref - and 'practical reference' - p ref. *Conversational referring* is a human, quasi-deictic act by which, with any means to hand, one person tries to draw the attention of another to a being, event, etc. c ref is governed by conventions, such as those that underpin the institution of 'naming' and is primarily oriented to communicative success, including communi- cative success in the transitive dimension of scientific life. But such an act may be to a being whether it is present or not; it may be more or less communicatively successful; and the verbal means may be semantically incorrect or attributively false. *Practical referring* is a human, quasi- deictic act by meansof which one or more person achieves a physical relationship or link with some being, event, etc., which may have been previously more or less hidden or undetected. p ref is what is achieved in the existential discoveries, displays and demonstrations in the intransitive dimension of scientific life. 'Epistemic access' involves practical reference, and practical reference may involve capturing or landing on or reveiling or photographing something, temporarily or permanently (indefinitely) securing access either (a) to the denotation or (b) to some effect(s) of the denotation of a term. (a) and (b) correspond respectively to our perceptual and causal criteria for attributing reality to things, etc. (cf. PON1, pp. 15-16; PON2, p. 12). p ref presupposes that the being, event, etc. has already been known and conversationally reffered to, e.g. as a hypothetical, postulated or imagined entity in theoretical science, under some indentifying description and before any baptism could occure. p ref, when secured, satisfies a modified form of the axiom of existence - what i will call the axiom of reality, AR: 'whatever is p referred to must be real.' Thus something may be absent from its space-time region and so be non-existent in this sense, and yet this absence, precisely *qua* absence, may be real in virtue of its causal powers - the case of what i will call *radical negation* - and be p referred to. c ref (e.g. in the hypothetical or fictional modes) need not satisfy the axiom of reality." --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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