Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2002 10:46:15 -0500
From: dbbwanika-AT-netscape.net
Subject: RE: RE: BHA: on Hegel, Bhaskar, Descartes



Phil

I have to come in with my input. I do believe in the academia especially
sociology are caught in a language trap.  Espacaping the trap is via
grasping the purpose of life and human nature itself here on earth.

For that particural reason i ask : 

1. How does this world solve "socio-economic" issues (not problems since the majority are MAN made) merely with economic tools as life is about economics which is actually a small fraction of it?
2. How does this world with seemingly devastating healthy quasi environmental issues( not problems - the majority are also MAN made) solve them solely by applying an economist logic devoid of a moral imperative?!

Now is moral and life itself, traditional in very meaning of the word 
sociologically, philosphically and biologically?!

It seems to me social scientist want to stick with modernity however meaningless in evolution terms and even in Marxian ethos the word is.
It seems the struggle is to discover a more meaningfull life besides what it is meant to be? How do you do it?
 
Human nature both on a macro and micro biology time scale will not change in our life time   by certianly, the way we do things can change to our detriment to progress. That is to say, a better society can generate  better preconditions for a better society and the opposite is true. 

However, everything which contibutes to human nature is equally important.




Bwanika.
 



Phil Walden <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:

>Hi Viren, Mervyn, and listers,
>
>Yes, I agree with what you have said below, Viren, that "inversion" is not
>the right way to think about the historical relationship between traditions.
>In my view, for example, Marx was wrong to think of himself as having
>"inverted" Hegel's dialectic - rather, what he actually did was to *develop*
>Hegel's dialectic.  But this is not a case of stressing continuity over
>rupture, because Marx had to take Hegel's dialectic apart before he could
>employ a reconstructed Hegelian dialectic in Das Kapital.  And come to think
>of it, to think about the history of philosophy in terms of *traditions*
>sounds to me like a hermeneutic-type standpoint that overlooks or downplays
>the dynamic dialectical relationship between ideas.  And your idea of
>"synthesis" seems to involve a final rupture, whereas I agree with the
>Hegelian concept of sublation - that the past is always contained within the
>present.  So I don't agree with your view that Hegel starts from a premise
>of the modern rational subject - rather he is arguing for the release of a
>potentially rational human subject.  He does not think that humanity *is*
>rational in 1830.  But he does think the real is rational - which I
>interpret as there being a potential for rationality.
>
>Regards,
>
>Phil
>>
>>
>> Hi Mervyn:
>>
>> Thanks for the detailed explanation.
>>
>> I have a minor question with respect to your remark:
>>
>> Think of it dialectically
>> > - one tradition is dominant, with the other subordinate, then this
>> > relation is inverted. Now we are trying to stand it right way up again!
>>
>>
>> Your (and James') main point here seems to be that ideals associated with
>> the medieval and ancient periods continue in the modern period, but people
>> subordinate them to mechanism and a new epistemological
>> framework. However, as you note below, this epistemological framework is
>> also what makes modern science and critical realism possible.  Now I
>> wonder to what extent elements of non-bourgeois ideals can remain
>> in tact after the transformations of modernity.  One of the key issues
>> here concerns the philosophy of the subject and subjectivity.  Recall that
>> in DPF, Bhaskar uses the Gewirth's moral theory in order build a morality
>>  on the basis of the prospective purposive agent and her obligations
>> to other human beings.  Bhaskar of course incorporates elements of
>> care-ethics in his theory, however;  he develops this theory from a modern
>> premise namely the modern rational subject.  (I think he makes similar
>> moves in Plato ETC using Habermas.)  One could make similar
>> statements about Hegel and Marx.  People often say that Hegel combines
>> premodern religious views of religion and totality with modern
>> subjectivity.  I do not know enough about Hegel to say whether this is
>> true, but it seems persuasive.
>>
>> Perhaps all of this comes down to deciding on whether we are to stress
>> continuities over ruptures when dealing with modernity and
>> capitalism.  When we say that one tradition continues, we should add that
>> it is also transformed.  The question is therefore not of putting it
>> right-side up again, but of synthesizing.  It was not right-side up during
>> the middle-ages since science did not exist then and the problem of
>> such a synthesis did not arise.
>>
>>
>> Viren
>>
>> > Hi Viren
>> >
>> > I found this very thought-provoking.
>> >
>> > >I wonder
>> > >whether talking about a pre-bourgeois enlightenment doesn't risk making
>> > >the term "Enlightenment" meaningless, precisely because such an
>> > >application of the term does not historically analyze its emergence. I
>> > >wonder what is gained  by lumping Aristotle, Aquinas, Plato
>> and Plotinus
>> > >with Descartes, Kant, Mill and Voltaire and calling them all
>> Enlightenment
>> > >thinkers.
>> >
>> > What is going on imo is a ('life-and-death') struggle for the mantle of
>> > Enlightenment. James Daly (hi James! - in case he's lurking) doesn't
>> > think the bourgeois Enlightenment (he uses a range of terms including
>> > the Anglo-French Enlightenment, mechanistic and materialist
>> > enlightenment) really is Enlightenment. It's anti-Enlightenment. Very
>> > roughly, from his perspective there is only one tradition of
>> > Enlightenment, the dialectical and spiritual one originating in ancient
>> > Greece (but replicated to some extent elsewhere). Until the Anglo-French
>> > Enlightenment it is the dominant philosophical outlook. With the Anglo-
>> > French Enlightenment, it is 'overthrown' as the dominant outlook and its
>> > title *usurped*. This dominance is then challenged in turn by
>> > dialectical Enlightenment (Hegel, in a flawed way, and Marx, who got it
>> > pretty right).
>> >
>> > >In your review, you mention that elements of pre-bourgeois
>> > >thinking continue to exist in Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant.  I
>> > >agree and would add that such elements exist in Mill and Montesquieu as
>> > >well.  If this is the case, then there is no need to prefer the
>> > >"pre-bourgeois enlightenment" to the bourgeois Enlightenment.
>> >
>> > 'Pre-bourgeois' is your term, not mine. Historically, it's an earlier
>> > tradition but it *continues* in modernity (so yes, there are elements of
>> > it in the thinkers you mention and others - Rousseau definitely) and is
>> > taken up again in a big way by Hegel and Marx. Think of it dialectically
>> > - one tradition is dominant, with the other subordinate, then this
>> > relation is inverted. Now we are trying to stand it right way up again!
>> >
>> > It's important to note that James's discussion is in terms of the 'ideal
>> > type'. Things aren't nearly so neat 'on the ground'. He's discussing two
>> > different outlooks or orientations, two 'claims' (his term) to
>> > Enlightenment.
>> >
>> > By 'bourgeois Enlightenment' James basically means mechanism, dualism,
>> > the underlying Cartesian theory of the subject and the dominance of
>> > instrumental rationality and the analytical problematic. I raise in my
>> > review the question of whether this is not a restricted view of the b.
>> > E. - I think it is, but also that it is a *valid* one i.e. a valid
>> > perspectival take on the conventional view of 'the' Enlightenment (i.e.
>> > your sort of view) i.e., in terms of Weber's ideal type, a 'one-sided
>> > accentuation of reality'.
>> >
>> > There is a sense however in which I think it's not so 'one-sided' (and
>> > this bears on your question of how 'capitalist' the b. E. is.) I think
>> > it is quite valid to speak with Charles Taylor (*Hegel*, 9) of 'a
>> > transformation of philosophical outlook', a 'philosophical revolution'
>> > in the seventeenth century. When you examine what Taylor says about the
>> > 'content' of this transition, it is very similar to James's account -
>> > there's essentially a movement from one of James's ideal types to the
>> > other. Neither Taylor nor James (I think) link this *causally* to the
>> > rise of capitalism - for James that would smack too much of mechanism,
>> > he's a rationalist and idealist and so I think doesn't look at history
>> > like this, and I don't think has latched onto Bhaskar's account of
>> > causes yet. (He does however link the mechanistic tradition to the
>> > market, viz., 'deals', whether in Greece or 17th C Europe, and sees it
>> > as 'compatible' with capitalism, and dialectical enlightenment as
>> > 'incompatible' with it.) So if I've been giving the impression that
>> > there is a causal link it's more me than James - I certainly think the
>> > philosophical revolution (and the scientific and religious one) are
>> > causally (in Bhaskar's and Marx's sense of 'cause') bound up with the
>> > 17th C crisis, the rise of capitalist agriculture, the expansion of
>> > merchant capital, etc etc.  But I don't want to get into a debate here
>> > whether a 'materialist primacy' thesis holds good or an 'idealist' one
>> > (maybe neither!). It's sufficient that the revolution in the mode of
>> > production and in the orientation of ideas are bound up together, and
>> > that the future dominance of a genuinely Enlightened outlook would
>> > presuppose a change of system, since capitalism both generates and
>> > 'requires' anti-Enlightenment values - inequality, exploitation,
>> > atomisation, alienation and the dominance of the values of having and
>> > possessing, greed and growth, success and power. These are diametrically
>> > opposed to the values of being and loving and communality and service
>> > and autonomy of the Enlightenment tradition.
>> >
>> > >rather
>> > >than posing an alternative the bourgeois Enlightenment, I
>> would claim that
>> > >Marx, and Bhaskarians continue this tradition.  In continuing this
>> > >tradition, they point out that many of the fundamental ideals of the
>> > >bourgeois Enlightenment, such as freedom and liberty, are incompatible
>> > >with capitalism, which perpaps the original members of the bourgeois
>> > >enlightenment would not have accepted.
>> >
>> > As I suggest in my review, James thinks (and I agree) that on the
>> > contrary what we have with Hegel, Marx and Bhaskar is a *dialectical
>> > development of* the earlier tradition which sublates - turns the tables
>> > on - the usurper (at the level of ideas), incorporating those
>> > developments within modernity that are compatible with it (including
>> > realist *science*). As I'm sure you'll agree, they are certainly not
>> > continuing the Anglo-French Enlightenment as defined by James - that was
>> > continued by Kautsky and Plekhanov, in the Soviet bloc, and in a good
>> > deal of Western Marxism (e.g. the analytical 'Marxists'). This kind of
>> > Marxism is just a sub-plot within the paradigm of bourgeois
>> > enlightenment, with no prospect of moving beyond it.
>> >
>> > But I can see what you're perhaps getting at. There's a school of
>> > thought according to which liberalism carried to its logical conclusion
>> > would issue in a vision of socialism or eudaimonia, and I think there's
>> > a good deal of truth in this. The trouble is even the best liberals
>> > (e.g. Mill, e.g. Hegel, e.g. Rawls) never do carry it to its logical
>> > conclusion, compromising with the established order - endorsing private
>> > property and class, justifying injustice by 'progress' and accepting a
>> > mechanistic account of nature. And of course liberalism at its best
>> > draws on both of James's traditions, and the ideals of genuine equality
>> > and liberty didn't originate with the b. E.
>> >
>> > Mervyn
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > viren viven murthy <vvmurthy-AT-midway.uchicago.edu> writes
>> > >Hi Mervyn:
>> > >
>> > >I just read your review of Daly's book and I think it gave me
>> enough of a
>> > >background to jump in to this discussion, or at least part of it.
>> > >
>> > >I am now quite confused about the pre-bourgeois Enlightenment.  I agree
>> > >with the thrust of Daly's (and your) attempt to provide an ethical
>> > >grounding for Marxist thought.  Many Marxists interpret him as
>> a radical
>> > >historicist and as having no room for ethical universalism.
>> Against this
>> > >trend, you, Daly and Bhaskar argue that Marxism is at least compatible
>> > >with a modern Aristotelianism.  The trick however seems to be
>> to maintain
>> > >Marx's historical sensitivities without lapsing into
>> relativism.  I wonder
>> > >whether talking about a pre-bourgeois enlightenment doesn't risk making
>> > >the term "Enlightenment" meaningless, precisely because such an
>> > >application of the term does not historically analyze its emergence. I
>> > >wonder what is gained  by lumping Aristotle, Aquinas, Plato
>> and Plotinus
>> > >with Descartes, Kant, Mill and Voltaire and calling them all
>> Enlightenment
>> > >thinkers.  In your review, you mention that elements of pre-bourgeois
>> > >thinking continue to exist in Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant.  I
>> > >agree and would add that such elements exist in Mill and Montesquieu as
>> > >well.  If this is the case, then there is no need to prefer the
>> > >"pre-bourgeois enlightenment" to the bourgeois Enlightenment.
>> > >
>> > >This brings me to another question, namely how capitalist is
>> the bourgeois
>> > >Enlightenment?  The answer to this question hinges on when we
>> conceive of
>> > >capitalism as emerging in Europe.  Ellen Wood <<Pristine Culture of
>> > >Capitalism>>) argues that while Locke and
>> > >others in the English liberal tradition theorize in the context of
>> > >agrarian capitalism, Rousseau and other French liberals were theorizing
>> > >with the threat of feudal fragmentation.  Hence, while Locke
>> stresses the
>> > >rights of the individual, Rousseau stresses the importance of
>> > >community.  Clearly, elements of Rousseau can be retrieved today as we
>> > >criticize the atomization related to capitalism as well.  Moreover,
>> > >Rousseau speaks highly of the ancients, especially when he
>> contrasts them
>> > >to the moderns.
>> > >
>> > >Although Bhaskar may disagree, I tend to be more sympathetic to the
>> > >bourgeois
>> > >Enlightenment, or at least, some of versions of it.  Mill and Rousseau,
>> > >for example, drew on classical sources to combat some of the
>> problems of
>> > >their time ( commodification, fragmentation).  I would say that this is
>> > >precisely what Daly is doing with Acquinas and Aristotle.  So,  rather
>> > >than posing an alternative the bourgeois Enlightenment, I
>> would claim that
>> > >Marx, and Bhaskarians continue this tradition.  In continuing this
>> > >tradition, they point out that many of the fundamental ideals of the
>> > >bourgeois Enlightenment, such as freedom and liberty, are incompatible
>> > >with capitalism, which perpaps the original members of the bourgeois
>> > >enlightenment would not have accepted.
>> > >
>> > >Viren
>> > >
>> >
>> >
>> >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
-- 






















____________



Bwanika

url: http://www.uganda.co.ug
e-mail: dbbwanika-AT-netscape.net












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