Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 00:51:08 +0100
From: Jan Straathof <janstr-AT-chan.nl>
Subject: Re: BHA: Down with theocracy!


Hi Phil, all,

Thanks for your thoughtful reflections and comments. I'm pleased
that Heidegger is receiving some attention in this forum, but i'm
afraid of some misunderstandings that could obscure our debate.

A quick and too sketchy response:

1. It is very true that Heidegger advocated a clear demarcation between
the task of philosophy and that of science, but this must be understood
in his proper historical context. The dominant scientific paradigm in
Heidegger's (pre-WO II) time was instrumental actualist Positivism,
and, in fact, this paradigm boldly claimed that the days of (traditional)
philosophy were numbered: soon philosophy would be shown to become
obsolete and overthrown by the powers of instrumental reasoning of a
positivist nature. Heidegger was very wary of the totalizing and absorbing
grip that Positivism was trying to cast on the erstwhile authentic domains
of philosophy (i.e fundamental ontology, transcendental epistemology,
ethics, aesthetics), and thus proclaimed and passionately defended the
*independent status* of philosophy vis-a-vis science (politics etc.).

     One of the demarcations Heidegger is putting forward is that the
prime task of philosophy is not giving answers, but is posing questions:
for Heidegger questioning is the mother of philosophy, or in his own
word: "Questioning is the Piety of Thinking". To say that Heidegger
promotes some sort of "anti-science with a very limited view of
philosophy's role" is thus really inaccurate imho; for Heidegger wanted
to expand the domain of philosophy, one explicitely without the control
and intrusion of the so-called real sciences. To be able to understand and
critique science, according to Heidegger, mean that one has to get in
view that *the essence of science is not (something) scientific*.


2. The concept of "Apophansis" (self-showing) is the ancient greek notion
that beings (things etc.) possess "phusis": i.e. the capacity [dunamis] of
beings to arise and endure [telos] and show itself as itself [apophansis].
It is important to note that for the (pre-socratic) greeks this self-showing
didn't imply a showing to/for us (humans), it's only with Plato's "Eidos"
and Aristotle's "Ousia; Noein" that apophansis becomes to denote a
unique ontological relationship with human being: and it's here, Heidegger
says, that metaphysics is born, a metaphysics that has ultimately brought us
nihilism and positivsm.

    (btw. it would be interesting here imo to compare Heidegger's diagnosis
    -that the problem of philosophy lies burried in the origine of greek
    metaphysics- with Bhaskar's observation of the Platonic/Aristotelian
    faultline ?)

Thus Heidegger saw that the roots of these evils (viz. the lack of deep
ontology in nihilism and positivism) were to trace back to the early
metaphysicians, and so he sought to overcome it by (i) turning back to
the pre-socrates, and (ii) turning forward to a daring new vocabulary
for (his) philosophy. I know people hate Heidegger for his neologisms,
but i think, for philosophy to develop further, we *need* new words,
concepts and perspectives: and here the philosoper enters the realms of
the poet and of the mathematician !

    (btw. i think Bhaskar comes quite close to the original greek notion
    of apophansis, when he talks about "truth as alethic": here "aletheia"
    as self-showing is the epilogue of his truth tetrapolity [cf. PE p.64])

    (btw. but Heidegger was even more interested in the essential notion
    of the *self-hiding of Being in the being of beings*: "Das Sein entzieht
    sich, indem es sich in das Seiende verbirgt" [cf. Holzwege p.310].
    The topic of the "hiding of Being", also of pre-socratic origine (cf.
    Herakleitos dictum: nature loves to hide), is another of Heidegger's
    central concerns in his critical questioning of science and technology.
    There's a lot to say and wonder about this 'hiding' and 'concealing'
    as essential elements of (non-actualist) ontology and on its possible
    bearings on Bhaskar's ideas on 'absence' and 'radical negation', but
    let's leave that for some other occasion.)

3. I'd be the last to deny the many many merits of Adorno: i remember
well reading his study of Authoritarian Personality, its scope, rigor and
methodology were a real eye-opener for me as a young student in the
field of social sciences; for me -over time- Adorno has become some
kind of modern "homo universalis", besides being a scientist and
philosopher, he was a poet, a composer, a radio talkshow leader,
a teacher, a political activist etc.------- But when is comes to Adorno's
reception of Heidegger i have my doubts, personally i've never found
Adorno a reliable and trustworthy guide to Heidegger, i sense a deep
resentment in Adorno against Heidegger, i don't know what it is, maybe
only a german (philosopher) can understand this ? ;-)

yours,
Jan




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