From: "Andrew Brown" <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2002 13:56:01 -0000 Subject: Re: BHA: re: cr and social science Hi Meryvn, You wrote: > . I can't agree with Andy that this undermines the original analysis of > experimentation in artificially closed systems. The purpose of that > analysis was to critique the postivist conception of a causal law etc, and > to argue for a philosophical depth ontology. Mission accomplished. There's > no question imo of illicitly 'generalising from the hard sciences' (Andy) > for if the premises are sound the arguments follow with respect to the > general nature of a causal law and depth ontology as such (unless you want > to say that we need different philophical conceptions of the nature of a > causal law, natural necessity etc in the hard sciences and the life > sciences!). What it 'undermines' is the very purpose of PON; the argument for *critical* naturalism. Bhaskar's argument turns upon the premise that natural sciences, unlike social sciences, are unable to undertake scientific experiment (from this follows various other distinctions between natural and social sciences). Once this premise is contested, then one is left wondering just what is *critical* about Bhaskar's naturalism. In other words, just what does distinguish natural and social science, for Bhaskar. The problem this question poses is particularly acute for those trying to gain methodolgical insight from Bhaskar regarding social science. Thus it is has come up in various discussions with Doug, Marshall and others on this list re quantitative methodology. You also wrote: > When an important thinker seems to be drawing an odd conclusion, I think a > wise rule is to consider seriously whether the fault is not in oneself. I'm not sure the above pearl of wisdom takes us very far!! :) Thanks, Andy --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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