Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2002 01:20:09 -0500
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca>
Subject: Re: BHA: re: cr and social science


Hi all,

Two things. First, I've been re-reading some of the passages where Bhaskar says that critical realism is a transcendental condition of intentional human agency. Can anyone (Mervyn?) help me to appreciate what the actual argument is for this? It makes sense to me, but I can only seem to find it formulated as an assertion. 

Meanwhile, on the beating a dead horse front: What about this passage (p93, Plato, Etc.): "Epistemologically, the openness of social systems is entailed by the complete absence of universal empirical generalizations of any cognitive import. This leaves the social sciences without the possibility of crucial experiments to investigate the necessary transfactuality of its subject matter (if it is to be the object of science)." [Bhaskar then goes on to say how social science is instead characterized by dialectical explanations and arguments. And note that it's "to *investigate*," not "to *decide*."] 

I guess you can say that this still leaves social science with the possibility of non-crucial experiments (which presumably cannot be used to investigate the necessary transfactuality of its subject matter considered as the object of science. But that's not saying much. And as a matter of interpretation it doesn't shed much light on (1) why Bhaskar is always talking about what social scientists (should) do in lieu of engaging in experimentation and (2) why he never says what scientific experimentation in the social sciences with cognitive import should or would look like.

[As an aside, about this quotation: can anyone explain why it is openness that is entailed by "the complete absence of universal empirical generalizations of any cognitive import," and not the reverse? Doesn't it seem like it should be the reverse?] 

r.




     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---