Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2002 17:44:39 +0000
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: re: cr and social science



Dear Andy,

Thanks for calling this difference between natural scientific and social
scientific reasoning, according to PON, to my attention (pp. 64-5 are
the crucial ones in my 1979 edition). I hadn't really registered it.
What Bhaskar says there is important, too, I think, for grasping his
understanding of the relation between philosophy and science (natural as
well as social).

I still think, though, that you are committing the opposite error and
emphasising the difference at the expense of commonality. Stressing only
the difference overlooks that Bhaskar's overall intent is to establish
the possibility of a non-positivist unity of scientific method, and that
to say that one argument form is a species of another is to stress what
they have in common as well as the differences - something that is
underlined in both PON and DPF by use of the adverb 'merely' - 'merely a
species of', 'merely types of'. 

Best,

Mervyn



Andrew Brown <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> writes
>Hi Mervyn,
>
>Your cite from DPF illustrates preciscely my point. This isn't 
>surprising because, as you know, RB is usually quite consistent 
>on matters such as these. Recall my point is that transcendental 
>arguements are a *species* of the *genus* which is retroductive 
>arguments. Your mistake is to take transcendental arguments as 
>the genus (you said that they are widespread in natural science, 
>yet they aren't - only retroductive arguments are) . Thereby you 
>miss the essential pont RB is making about social scientific 
>method in PON. This is all quite clear from the section of PON I 
>pointed out in my previous post. I simply do not have time to cite at 
>length from PON, but I assure it is all there.
>
>Best wishes.
>
>Andy
>
>On 11 Feb 2002, at 1:43, Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
>
>> Hi Andy,
>> 
>> '... transcendental arguments are merely types of the retroductive-
>> explanatory argument form familiar to science'. - DPF 108 (et passim).
>> 
>> Mervyn
>> 
>> Andrew Brown <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> writes
>> >Hi Mervyn,
>> >
>> >> >Why develop a 
>> >> >method in social science, viz. 'transcendental deduction', 
>> >> 
>> >> I don't know where you got this from. Transcendental reasoning
>> >> according to Bhaskar is central to the natural as well as social
>> >> sciences.
>> >
>> >I got it from our friend RB! I think you just need to re-read the
>> >relevant section of PON (pp.49-54) to remind yourself of this. 
>> >
>> >You are wrong re 'transcendental reasoning': this is employed by both
>> >philosophy and social sciences, but not by natural sciences. What I
>> >think you must have in mind is 'retroductive reasoning'. This latter
>> >is the genus of which transcendental deduction (argument) is the
>> >species. Once again this illustrates that you are downplaying what is
>> >crucial to Bhaskar's argument on method - in this case the
>> >specificity of social scientific method - and what is apparently
>> >undermined by the 'little exaggeration' to which you refer.
>> >
>> >I think I am basically restating Collier's position here, though he
>> >stresses all that is left in critical naturalism, viz. it's
>> >*philosophical* aspects, whilst recognising the problem I stress,
>> >viz. that Bhaskar's key discussion of *method* in social science has
>> >had its apparent foundation (lack of ability to do social scientific
>> >experiment) removed.
>> >
>> >Best wishes,
>> >
>> >Andy
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>


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