File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2002/bhaskar.0202, message 90


Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 23:45:14 +0000
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: transcendental deduction from intentional action


Hi Ruth, all,

>I still don't see what the actual *argument* is, in support 
>of it.  Couldn't a rational interlocutor just say that this is the epitome of a 
>dogmatic assertion?  

I'm not sure I can help to make the argument(s) more visible to you,
because I'm not quite sure what your problem is. Some thoughts:

1. Perhaps you're expecting too much. There can be nothing definitive in
an area like this, only plausible cases. The concept of a 'rational
interlocutor' overlooks that what is rational from one perspective won't
seem rational from another, etc. Bhaskar himself refers, I think earlier
in DPF, to the kind of case developed in the passage I cited, insofar as
it doesn't depend on science 'in the laboratory', as establishing (only)
a 'prima facie' case for ontology etc.

2. There are imo at least the following strands to the argument:

2.1 Referential detachment, intransitivity and ontology (RD for short)
are pervasive, real and necessary for human praxis.

a) We all as a matter of fact (and evidence is supplied) presuppose RD
in our daily *practice* (making a cup of coffee etc), particularly? when
things go wrong (the pathology of everyday life). Do you have a problem
with this claim? 

b) It is transcendentally necessary that we should do this as creatures
who speak, desire and engage in praxis, for such acts must be about, for
or with something other than themselves (dpf 212). Supporting this is an
implicit appeal to *experiment* (I choose the word deliberately!),
whether thought experiments or practical ones. If you think you can make
a cup of coffee etc without RD presuppositions, then be consistent and
do it! The 'reality principle' will impose itself. Is it possible that
you and I could discuss Bhaskar's claim without assuming that we can
detach it? Bhaskar clearly and imo very plausibly thinks that activity
based on these presuppositions is co-terminous with specificially human
existence, and necessary for navigating our way in the world, referring
at DPF 213 to 'the *primordial* activities of referential detatchment
and the necessity of ontology' (my emphasis) and in FEW he deploys the
concept of 'the first act of referential detachment' in a Hegelian way
to signify the moment of the emergence of specifically human praxis.

2.2 This yields an *immanent critique* of irrealist theories such as
Heideggerian ontology which don't 'presuppose an ontology that would
apply without the mediation of human beings' - such theoreticians are
clearly guilty of a *theory/practice inconsistency*, practicing one
thing and preaching another. (Immanent critique for Bhaskar is '*the*
characteristic method of criticism and advance in all spheres of
life...' (PE 8); the epistemological dialectic of science itself
'progresses largely by a process of immanent critique' (dpf110). Perhaps
you don't see things this way.)

>Also, is it non-
>reductive materialism that is presupposed by intentional action, or is it 
>objective idealism/pantheism?  Or is it some even more general metaphysical 
>stance?

The argument in the passage I cited doesn't address these issues, only
ontology etc in general; I don't want to get into a discussion again of
what is presupposed by intentionality according to other arguments e.g.
for SEPM. 

BTW, I don't think 'pantheism' is technically correct, and I now have my
doubts about objective idealism too - rather, he sees his position as
transcending the metaphysical idealism/materialism divide: mind is
enfolded in matter, and matter in mind, in the one ultimate stuff...

Best,

Mervyn


Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca> writes
>Hi Mervyn, everyone,
>
>Thanks Mervyn for the reference.  I looked at it again.  
>
>But here's the thing:  the claim in question seems perfectly sensible to me (no 
>pun intended!), yet I still don't see what the actual *argument* is, in support 
>of it.  Couldn't a rational interlocutor just say that this is the epitome of a 
>dogmatic assertion?  With respect to experimentation, there is clearly an 
>argument offered to support the transcendental deduction.  Admittedly it 
>presupposes a certain understanding of what an experiment is, but still, it's 
>an 
>argument.  Here, though, I'm still having trouble seeing it.  Also, is it non-
>reductive materialism that is presupposed by intentional action, or is it 
>objective idealism/pantheism?  Or is it some even more general metaphysical 
>stance?
>
>Warmly,
>Ruth 
>
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

-- 
Mervyn Hartwig
Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
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Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>

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