Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 23:45:14 +0000 From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk> Subject: Re: BHA: transcendental deduction from intentional action Hi Ruth, all, >I still don't see what the actual *argument* is, in support >of it. Couldn't a rational interlocutor just say that this is the epitome of a >dogmatic assertion? I'm not sure I can help to make the argument(s) more visible to you, because I'm not quite sure what your problem is. Some thoughts: 1. Perhaps you're expecting too much. There can be nothing definitive in an area like this, only plausible cases. The concept of a 'rational interlocutor' overlooks that what is rational from one perspective won't seem rational from another, etc. Bhaskar himself refers, I think earlier in DPF, to the kind of case developed in the passage I cited, insofar as it doesn't depend on science 'in the laboratory', as establishing (only) a 'prima facie' case for ontology etc. 2. There are imo at least the following strands to the argument: 2.1 Referential detachment, intransitivity and ontology (RD for short) are pervasive, real and necessary for human praxis. a) We all as a matter of fact (and evidence is supplied) presuppose RD in our daily *practice* (making a cup of coffee etc), particularly? when things go wrong (the pathology of everyday life). Do you have a problem with this claim? b) It is transcendentally necessary that we should do this as creatures who speak, desire and engage in praxis, for such acts must be about, for or with something other than themselves (dpf 212). Supporting this is an implicit appeal to *experiment* (I choose the word deliberately!), whether thought experiments or practical ones. If you think you can make a cup of coffee etc without RD presuppositions, then be consistent and do it! The 'reality principle' will impose itself. Is it possible that you and I could discuss Bhaskar's claim without assuming that we can detach it? Bhaskar clearly and imo very plausibly thinks that activity based on these presuppositions is co-terminous with specificially human existence, and necessary for navigating our way in the world, referring at DPF 213 to 'the *primordial* activities of referential detatchment and the necessity of ontology' (my emphasis) and in FEW he deploys the concept of 'the first act of referential detachment' in a Hegelian way to signify the moment of the emergence of specifically human praxis. 2.2 This yields an *immanent critique* of irrealist theories such as Heideggerian ontology which don't 'presuppose an ontology that would apply without the mediation of human beings' - such theoreticians are clearly guilty of a *theory/practice inconsistency*, practicing one thing and preaching another. (Immanent critique for Bhaskar is '*the* characteristic method of criticism and advance in all spheres of life...' (PE 8); the epistemological dialectic of science itself 'progresses largely by a process of immanent critique' (dpf110). Perhaps you don't see things this way.) >Also, is it non- >reductive materialism that is presupposed by intentional action, or is it >objective idealism/pantheism? Or is it some even more general metaphysical >stance? The argument in the passage I cited doesn't address these issues, only ontology etc in general; I don't want to get into a discussion again of what is presupposed by intentionality according to other arguments e.g. for SEPM. BTW, I don't think 'pantheism' is technically correct, and I now have my doubts about objective idealism too - rather, he sees his position as transcending the metaphysical idealism/materialism divide: mind is enfolded in matter, and matter in mind, in the one ultimate stuff... Best, Mervyn Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca> writes >Hi Mervyn, everyone, > >Thanks Mervyn for the reference. I looked at it again. > >But here's the thing: the claim in question seems perfectly sensible to me (no >pun intended!), yet I still don't see what the actual *argument* is, in support >of it. Couldn't a rational interlocutor just say that this is the epitome of a >dogmatic assertion? With respect to experimentation, there is clearly an >argument offered to support the transcendental deduction. Admittedly it >presupposes a certain understanding of what an experiment is, but still, it's >an >argument. Here, though, I'm still having trouble seeing it. Also, is it non- >reductive materialism that is presupposed by intentional action, or is it >objective idealism/pantheism? Or is it some even more general metaphysical >stance? > >Warmly, >Ruth > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- -- Mervyn Hartwig Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia') 13 Spenser Road Herne Hill London SE24 ONS United Kingdom Tel: 020 7 737 2892 Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk> Subscription forms: http://www.criticalrealism.demon.co.uk/iacr/membership.html --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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