File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2002/bhaskar.0203, message 16


From: "Marsh Feldman" <MarshFeldman-AT-Cox.net>
Subject: BHA: RE: Re: RE: Epistemological relativism
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2002 00:22:51 -0500


This is a multi-part message in MIME format.


Marko,

You wrote:

    .

      This is an example of the epistemic fallacy. The world's existence
does not depend on our knowledge of it. Our knowledge is fallible and
socially constructed. This does NOT necessarily imply our knowledge is
wrong. It simply (1) means that the reality of the world does not depend on
our knowledge and (2) we can always be wrong. Socially constructed knowledge
is not necessarily fiction, although it likely has biases and blind spots.
The practice of dismissing anything but a "God's eye view of the world" as
falsehood is a typical positivist practice.

      Take what you wrote above. Would you say the world according to
Newton's physics was real or not? If it was real, when Einstein came along
did it become unreal? Knowledge changes, grows, and perhaps shrinks. This
does not mean the object of knowledge does so in the same way.

      Newton's physics was most definitely real and still is. There exists a
great falsehood in much discussion about Einstein's general theory of
relativity. Take Newtonian gravity. Newton discovered the inverse square law
and had to rely on "spooky action at a distance" to explain Gravity.
Einstein explained Gravity as the curvature of space-time but notice that GR
contains Newton as a low energy approximation in much the same way that
M-theory would contain GR as a low energy approximation. Newton was not
displaced, our "knoweledge" of gravity became much more deeper it did not
"change". To see that Newton is "real" just ask NASA-they still use Newton.
One can even derive classical physics from Quantum Mechanics, for instance
one can derive Maxwell's equations from QM. Of course what you assert to be
the epistemic fallacy of course may be false, if one takes the Copenhagen
Interpretation of QM seriously (which a realist would not do of course). But
even if we accept the claim, which we should not, does that mean that
Einstein came up with a new theory becuase he was living in a different
society from Newton? Both Newton and Einstein used the scientific method
that has nothing to do with "geo-historical" processes. Note also that space
and time are absolute in Minkowski's 4-manifold.

      The particular example of Newton and Einstein is perhaps unfortunate
since, as you say, one can derive much of classical mechanics from QM.
Nonetheless, Newton's theory was incomplete and, insofar as it stated
universal laws without appropriate qualification for extreme cases (in terms
of speed, mass, or energy), it was wrong because the laws do not apply under
such conditions. However, this is all a diversion from the issue.

      The history of science is replete with examples in which theories were
totally discarded in favor of new theories. Kuhn, Harre, and others have
written on this. Well-rehearsed examples include the Ptolemaic theory of
planetary motion, phlogiston, and spontaneous generation. There's also a
literature questioning the so-called scientific method. On one hand, studies
of science (including Kuhn, but particularly people like Latour) shows
convincingly that science involves a whole lot more that the scientific
method and that many important scientific discoveries do not fit the model
of the scientific method. On the other, by what virtues does the scientific
method produce legitimate knowledge rather than simply provide a template
that keeps people busy?

      Nonetheless, all this is besides the point. Even if science progressed
linearly, with no paradigm shifts or revisions, that still would not be
grounds for claiming that the reality of science's object depends in any way
on the correctness of science. You might want to look at Richard Bernstein's
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Although I have severe criticism of many
aspects of the book, Bernstein's discussion of the Cartesian anxiety is
right on target. By this he means that element of Western culture that
cannot accept the limits of human knowledge or its fallibility.


      To see that epistemic relativism is false consider Mathematics. Is a
mathematical theorem socially constructed?

      Mathematics is a special case in that in is not the study of something
external to itself. I believe Husserl had a name for such sciences.
Nonetheless, mathematics most certainly is socially constructed. One has
simply to look at mathematical programming or probability to see that
certain practical concerns outside mathematics motivated its development in
certain directions. Von Neumann, Nash, and that whole group at Princeton
during the forties got their "juice" from the war effort and defense
funding. Some of the most famous mathematical problems have names that make
quaint references to historically specific, socially constructed practices
("the traveling salesman problem," game theory, Buffon's (did I spell that
right?) needle problem, etc.).

      Beyond this we can look at mathematical axioms and their fundamental
elements. Consider number theory, for instance. It's been a long time since
I studied it, so I have a hard time recalling specific details, but it
definitely builds from smaller, discrete units to larger ones. The undefined
terms and basic elements, as well as the logical structure based on them,
bear an uncanny resemblance to the atomism and individualism so prevalent in
Western, liberal thought. In principle, there is no reason why the undefined
terms and fundamental elements of an axiomatic system could not be
relations, networks, or processes that are logically prior to individuals.
Do you suppose the fact that number theory build its logic the other way is
accidental? Do you think that all mathematical concepts can be expressed
equally and have the same meaning in all languages?

      Nonetheless, this again is really not the issue when we speak of
epistemic relativism. Although I believe knowledge is socially constructed
(we haven't even begun to discuss more blatant examples like the bias in
medical research towards drugs and other profitable cures and away from
nutritional and other low-cost cures that do not have the backing of large
corporations), knowledge could be something else and we could still face the
issue of epistemic relativism. To see this, we'd first have to define much
more clearly what we mean by social construction and then pose a situation
in which social construction is completely absent. This means we'd have to
posit a situation devoid of concepts influenced by the scientists' life
history, in which gender is irrelevant to the quality and quantity of
science produced, funding doesn't influence what's studied or how, the costs
of scientific equipment is devoid of social influence (some non-social
process sets relative prices so that the ease with which one does one kind
of science versus another does not depend on socially constructed costs),
language has no effect on what we do or can think, scientific journals and
their practices have no effect on what people study, prestige and old-boy
networks play no role in who gets appointed to what lab or who gets
published, university politics and practices have no effect on scientific
development, etc. Next, once we've distilled all social influence out of
science, we would just have to posit a single, linearly developed, asocial
body of scientific knowledge. Now, to address the issue of epistemic
relativism, we need to pose the following question. Must this body of
asocial, linearly developed knowledge be the only correct depiction of the
world? Or, is it possible that there might be another, different body of
(perhaps equally asocial, linearly developed) knowledge that is equally or
more correct? (Let's leave "correct" undefined for now.) Epistemic
relativism simply holds that knowledge is always fallible and that more than
one understanding of the world may be correct. This does not mean that ALL
such understandings are correct, only that two or more may be correct.

      BTW, how do you know that Newton and Einstein both used the scientific
method? Did you use the scientific method to test this hypothesis? Did you
consider the possibility that they also may have used something else in
addition and this, rather than the scientific method, accounts for their
accomplishments?


      Human nature is most certainly not socially constructed. Human social
forms arise as a result of our biological natures. The fact that we can form
such societies must have something to do with our biological/cognitive
makeup. This is the only way can say that human nature is space and time
invariant. Are we to suppose that human nature was different in 1965? That
human nature in China differs from human nature in the US? As for
water/steam etc, these matters can be explained from the atomic hypothesis.
It is a well known scientific fact that Chemistry reduces to Physics, i.e.
Quantum Mechanics. My bank account is real and the US constitution etc to
the extent that I make them real. They are not real indepedent of human
agency. I am most certainly "natural" and whatever I do can ultimately be
explained through naturalism.

      I don't know what you mean by human nature or, for that matter, by
"human." Are you positing a constant human nature for all humans starting
1,000,000, 100,000, 10,000, 1,000, 100, or 10 years ago? Are you assuming
human nature is a characteristic of individual humans rather than of
humanity as a whole? What specifically would count as human nature? There's
so much variability among humans and human societies that we'd have to
discard most characteristics to find that essential kernel that you're
calling human nature. Without defining this kernel more clearly it's
impossible to evaluate your claim since your claim is a mixture of examples
and bold assertions. If you're saying human nature includes such
generalities as (1) people communicate with each other, (2) they transform
the material world in order to survive, and (3) they only exist in
societies, I'll grant you there's such a thing as human nature. However, I
don't think that takes us very far. If I understand correctly what you're
saying, you believe that social things like your bank account can be
explained, ultimately, by quantum mechanics. Let's not use your bank account
as an example, since that's your private information. Let's take something
related but more public. Please outline an explanation for the "dot com"
crash, as well as the relative development of computer-related firms in
Silicon Valley versus Boston's Route 128 in terms of the quantum mechanics
that underpins biological nature?

      Note that humans are not the only organism's to have societies so if
we assert that there exists some unnatural form of existience, "social
kinds", are termite societies a part of this unnatural domain? If not, why
not?

      Again, there's a whole literature on "nature" as a social construct.
Of course everything in the world is part of the world, so nothing is
outside nature. The fact that people live in societies is not "unnatural."
The point is that human societies vary and have their own histories and
geographies. The point is also that human societies have their own causal
powers and dynamic properties. Capitalist societies have business cycles,
feudal societies do not. Attitudes and behaviors regarding sex in nineteenth
century South Sea Islands were different from those in Victorian England.
The largest buildings at the centers of human settlements have been
pyramids, coliseums, churches, and World Trade Centers. If everything can be
reduced to biological nature, how would you explain such variations?

      An epistemic relativist has no justification in asserting that
anything is real. He is not therefore a realist.

      Let's test this. I believe viruses cause disease by taking over
certain cellular functions, but I recognize that this may be wrong or that
another explanation may be equally legitimate. Does this mean that viruses
must not be real or that they really do not cause disease this way? At the
very least it would seem you'd have to concede that I have the right to
claim viruses may really cause disease as described. In your opinion, what
would one need to go beyond this and assert legitimately that viruses
probably cause disease by taking over cell functions or just that viruses
cause disease by taking over cell functions? I don't see how the truth or
falsity of these assertions would be affected by me changing my tune and
saying I'm right ("I'm always right, and I never lie" -- Firesign Theater)
or that only this explanation could possibly be correct.

          Marsh Feldman

HTML VERSION:

Marko,
 
You wrote:
 
. 
 
This is an example of the epistemic fallacy. The world's existence does not depend on our knowledge of it. Our knowledge is fallible and socially constructed. This does NOT necessarily imply our knowledge is wrong. It simply (1) means that the reality of the world does not depend on our knowledge and (2) we can always be wrong. Socially constructed knowledge is not necessarily fiction, although it likely has biases and blind spots. The practice of dismissing anything but a "God's eye view of the world" as falsehood is a typical positivist practice.
 
Take what you wrote above. Would you say the world according to Newton's physics was real or not? If it was real, when Einstein came along did it become unreal? Knowledge changes, grows, and perhaps shrinks. This does not mean the object of knowledge does so in the same way.
 
Newton's physics was most definitely real and still is. There exists a great falsehood in much discussion about Einstein's general theory of relativity. Take Newtonian gravity. Newton discovered the inverse square law and had to rely on "spooky action at a distance" to explain Gravity. Einstein explained Gravity as the curvature of space-time but notice that GR contains Newton as a low energy approximation in much the same way that M-theory would contain GR as a low energy approximation. Newton was not displaced, our "knoweledge" of gravity became much more deeper it did not "change". To see that Newton is "real" just ask NASA-they still use Newton. One can even derive classical physics from Quantum Mechanics, for instance one can derive Maxwell's equations from QM. Of course what you assert to be the epistemic fallacy of course may be false, if one takes the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM seriously (which a realist would not do of course). But even if we accept the claim, which we should not, does that mean that Einstein came up with a new theory becuase he was living in a different society from Newton? Both Newton and Einstein used the scientific method that has nothing to do with "geo-historical" processes. Note also that space and time are absolute in Minkowski's 4-manifold. 
 
The particular example of Newton and Einstein is perhaps unfortunate since, as you say, one can derive much of classical mechanics from QM. Nonetheless, Newton's theory was incomplete and, insofar as it stated universal laws without appropriate qualification for extreme cases (in terms of speed, mass, or energy), it was wrong because the laws do not apply under such conditions. However, this is all a diversion from the issue.
 
The history of science is replete with examples in which theories were totally discarded in favor of new theories. Kuhn, Harre, and others have written on this. Well-rehearsed examples include the Ptolemaic theory of planetary motion, phlogiston, and spontaneous generation. There's also a literature questioning the so-called scientific method. On one hand, studies of science (including Kuhn, but particularly people like Latour) shows convincingly that science involves a whole lot more that the scientific method and that many important scientific discoveries do not fit the model of the scientific method. On the other, by what virtues does the scientific method produce legitimate knowledge rather than simply provide a template that keeps people busy?
 
Nonetheless, all this is besides the point. Even if science progressed linearly, with no paradigm shifts or revisions, that still would not be grounds for claiming that the reality of science's object depends in any way on the correctness of science. You might want to look at Richard Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Although I have severe criticism of many aspects of the book, Bernstein's discussion of the Cartesian anxiety is right on target. By this he means that element of Western culture that cannot accept the limits of human knowledge or its fallibility.
 
 
To see that epistemic relativism is false consider Mathematics. Is a mathematical theorem socially constructed?
 
Mathematics is a special case in that in is not the study of something external to itself. I believe Husserl had a name for such sciences. Nonetheless, mathematics most certainly is socially constructed. One has simply to look at mathematical programming or probability to see that certain practical concerns outside mathematics motivated its development in certain directions. Von Neumann, Nash, and that whole group at Princeton during the forties got their "juice" from the war effort and defense funding. Some of the most famous mathematical problems have names that make quaint references to historically specific, socially constructed practices ("the traveling salesman problem," game theory, Buffon's (did I spell that right?) needle problem, etc.).
 
Beyond this we can look at mathematical axioms and their fundamental  elements. Consider number theory, for instance. It's been a long time since I studied it, so I have a hard time recalling specific details, but it definitely builds from smaller, discrete units to larger ones. The undefined terms and basic elements, as well as the logical structure based on them, bear an uncanny resemblance to the atomism and individualism so prevalent in Western, liberal thought. In principle, there is no reason why the undefined terms and fundamental elements of an axiomatic system could not be relations, networks, or processes that are logically prior to individuals. Do you suppose the fact that number theory build its logic the other way is accidental? Do you think that all mathematical concepts can be expressed equally and have the same meaning in all languages?
 
Nonetheless, this again is really not the issue when we speak of epistemic relativism. Although I believe knowledge is socially constructed (we haven't even begun to discuss more blatant examples like the bias in medical research towards drugs and other profitable cures and away from nutritional and other low-cost cures that do not have the backing of large corporations), knowledge could be something else and we could still face the issue of epistemic relativism. To see this, we'd first have to define much more clearly what we mean by social construction and then pose a situation in which social construction is completely absent. This means we'd have to posit a situation devoid of concepts influenced by the scientists' life history, in which gender is irrelevant to the quality and quantity of science produced, funding doesn't influence what's studied or how, the costs of scientific equipment is devoid of social influence (some non-social process sets relative prices so that the ease with which one does one kind of science versus another does not depend on socially constructed costs), language has no effect on what we do or can think, scientific journals and their practices have no effect on what people study, prestige and old-boy networks play no role in who gets appointed to what lab or who gets published, university politics and practices have no effect on scientific development, etc. Next, once we've distilled all social influence out of science, we would just have to posit a single, linearly developed, asocial body of scientific knowledge. Now, to address the issue of epistemic relativism, we need to pose the following question. Must this body of asocial, linearly developed knowledge be the only correct depiction of the world? Or, is it possible that there might be another, different body of (perhaps equally asocial, linearly developed) knowledge that is equally or more correct? (Let's leave "correct" undefined for now.) Epistemic relativism simply holds that knowledge is always fallible and that more than one understanding of the world may be correct. This does not mean that ALL such understandings are correct, only that two or more may be correct.
 
BTW, how do you know that Newton and Einstein both used the scientific method? Did you use the scientific method to test this hypothesis? Did you consider the possibility that they also may have used something else in addition and this, rather than the scientific method, accounts for their accomplishments?
 
 
Human nature is most certainly not socially constructed. Human social forms arise as a result of our biological natures. The fact that we can form such societies must have something to do with our biological/cognitive makeup. This is the only way can say that human nature is space and time invariant. Are we to suppose that human nature was different in 1965? That human nature in China differs from human nature in the US? As for water/steam etc, these matters can be explained from the atomic hypothesis. It is a well known scientific fact that Chemistry reduces to Physics, i.e. Quantum Mechanics. My bank account is real and the US constitution etc to the extent that I make them real. They are not real indepedent of human agency. I am most certainly "natural" and whatever I do can ultimately be explained through naturalism. 
 
I don't know what you mean by human nature or, for that matter, by "human." Are you positing a constant human nature for all humans starting 1,000,000, 100,000, 10,000, 1,000, 100, or 10 years ago? Are you assuming human nature is a characteristic of individual humans rather than of humanity as a whole? What specifically would count as human nature? There's so much variability among humans and human societies that we'd have to discard most characteristics to find that essential kernel that you're calling human nature. Without defining this kernel more clearly it's impossible to evaluate your claim since your claim is a mixture of examples and bold assertions. If you're saying human nature includes such generalities as (1) people communicate with each other, (2) they transform the material world in order to survive, and (3) they only exist in societies, I'll grant you there's such a thing as human nature. However, I don't think that takes us very far. If I understand correctly what you're saying, you believe that social things like your bank account can be explained, ultimately, by quantum mechanics. Let's not use your bank account as an example, since that's your private information. Let's take something related but more public. Please outline an explanation for the "dot com" crash, as well as the relative development of computer-related firms in Silicon Valley versus Boston's Route 128 in terms of the quantum mechanics that underpins biological nature?
 
Note that humans are not the only organism's to have societies so if we assert that there exists some unnatural form of existience, "social kinds", are termite societies a part of this unnatural domain? If not, why not? 
 
Again, there's a whole literature on "nature" as a social construct. Of course everything in the world is part of the world, so nothing is outside nature. The fact that people live in societies is not "unnatural." The point is that human societies vary and have their own histories and geographies. The point is also that human societies have their own causal powers and dynamic properties. Capitalist societies have business cycles, feudal societies do not. Attitudes and behaviors regarding sex in nineteenth century South Sea Islands were different from those in Victorian England. The largest buildings at the centers of human settlements have been pyramids, coliseums, churches, and World Trade Centers. If everything can be reduced to biological nature, how would you explain such variations?
 
An epistemic relativist has no justification in asserting that anything is real. He is not therefore a realist.
 
Let's test this. I believe viruses cause disease by taking over certain cellular functions, but I recognize that this may be wrong or that another explanation may be equally legitimate. Does this mean that viruses must not be real or that they really do not cause disease this way? At the very least it would seem you'd have to concede that I have the right to claim viruses may really cause disease as described. In your opinion, what would one need to go beyond this and assert legitimately that viruses probably cause disease by taking over cell functions or just that viruses cause disease by taking over cell functions? I don't see how the truth or falsity of these assertions would be affected by me changing my tune and saying I'm right ("I'm always right, and I never lie" Firesign Theater) or that only this explanation could possibly be correct.
 
    Marsh Feldman
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