Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 11:18:34 -0600
From: Carrol Cox <cbcox-AT-ilstu.edu>
Subject: Re: BHA: Epistemological relativism, human rights, culture




Richard Moodey wrote:
> 
> Hi Listers,
> 
> I have been following this discussion with much interest.  I agree with
> Marko that human rights must be based upon human nature. 

Any conception of "human nature" which goes beyond trivial tautologies
(humans need to eat, humans can run, etc.) is apt to be reactionary. As
Hannah Arendt once pointed out, if humannature existed, we couldn't know
what it was without being non-human. That is, the claim to "know" human
nature is more or less a claim to divinity (or at leas divine
inspiration). I think that in some ways Marx's most important work was
one word in length -- his reply to a reporter's question very late in
his life. The reporter asked, "What is?" and Marx replied "Struggle."

Human rights are defined in struggle and  change endlessly.

Carrol Cox


 But our
> understandings both of human nature and of the connection between human
> natures and human rights are, imo, socially constructed.  I affirm the
> existence of both "brute facts" and "social facts," but confess to
> imperfect understanding of both realms and of there relations.
> 
> At 05:03 PM 03/14/2002 +1100, you wrote:
> >My comments follow below. My responses appear below the original text, which
> >should be preceded by arrows. My comments do not.
> >
> >
> > > I think you may be drawing too direct an equivalence between human nature,
> > > human rights, and human freedom.  It's important to recognize the the
> > > concept of rights is historically quite recent, at most 300 years old, I
> > > think.  The extension of that concept to all humans everywhere is still
> >more
> > > recent.  It is essentially a social and historical achievement, and one
> >that
> > > obviously is still quite tenuous.  The notion of human rights is not
> > > accepted everywhere, it is not always granted to all people, it does not
> > > always include the same elements (the UN Declaration notwithstanding), and
> > > still less are its implications regularly put into practice.  In a word,
> >it
> > > is contingent.
> >
> >I must disagree with you here.
> 
> Any particular formulation of human rights is contingent, as it the
> acceptance of that formulation either by individuals or by collectivities
> (through their agents and representatives).   But Marko's point, with which
> I tend to agrree, is that, like gravity, there are rights which exist as
> "brute facts" -- independently of any human understanding of them or of
> attempts to formulate that understanding verbally.
> 
> >One may well argue that Gravity is a concept
> >that is historically quite recent, but this does not (or should not) obscure
> >the fact that Gravity did not come into being when some apple landed on
> >Newton's head. The same goes for human rights.
> 
> The analogy between gravity and human rights is useful only up to a
> point.  The disanalogy appears when we contrast the way Newton's laws of
> gravitation are limited  (they accurately describe relations among
> "mid-size" bodies, but probably not relations among very big or the very
> teeny-tiny bodies)  with the way human rights are limited.  Humans can, and
> frequently do, violate any rights anyone claims are "natural" or
> "universal."  Stars and planets were attracted to one another in accord
> with Newton's laws before Newton formulated them.  We humans murder,
> torture, rape, etc. despite our rights to be free from such abuse.
> 
> >If one reads Plato or any
> >work of antiquity one can see quite clearly that people have reasoned
> >ethically throughout history. Human rights as a concept makes no sense
> >without reference to human nature, but the fact that human rights was a
> >concept formulated at a moment of history does not mean that human nature
> >itself is a social construction. The problems we have faced have differed
> >throughout history, so the proper ethical solution to those problems must
> >also differ. But what does not differ is the innate endowment of ethical
> >reasoning, which we all share, that we bring to bear on a given problem.
> 
> I believe that what makes us distinctively human is the innate ability to
> take the role of the other, to imaginatively walk in the other's
> shoes.  From this, we have socially constructed both language, ethics, and
> our other symbol systems.
> 
> >The
> >concept of the Universe itself is quite recent.
> >
> >Is the Universe a social construction? If so how could something exist, a
> >human society, prior to the existience of the totality of all existience?
> >
> > > The concept of human nature is no less variable, even -- or perhaps
> > > especially -- when based on biology.  People have made all sorts of
> >claims,
> > > purportedly based on biology, that it is human nature to be competitive
> >(as
> > > though people don't frequently act cooperatively), to be selfish, to lie;
> >or
> > > that human nature applies to certain groups but not others, in a practice
> > > called "subspeciation" which asserts that (say) blacks, Jews, women,
> > > Koreans, etc are less than human; or that human nature is divided, so that
> > > it is (say) men's nature to rape, women's nature to be stupid, Chinese
> > > people's nature to be inscrutible, etc.  All of these ideas, which I trust
> > > you agree are specious, have been "based" on biology (even down to cell
> > > biology or DNA).  How many times have you been told that socialism goes
> > > against human nature?  Also, what happens to people who manifestly have
> >some
> > > sort of birth defect or genetic disorder, such as mental retardation or
> > > hereditary blindness?  Let's not forget that such differences have been
> >used
> > > to justify forced sterilization or worse.  So grounding the idea of human
> > > rights on human nature is a risky strategy.
> >
> >I don't think so. In fact quite the contrary. Take racism. In another post
> >on these issues it has been pointed out that personal suffering has resulted
> >as a result of other people's discrimination based on the colour of their
> >skin. For a racist they must demonstrate that human races are something
> >which are so significant that it justifies discrimination. What does the
> >evolution of man tell us? Well, first of all we are all "out of Africa".
> >This has recently been proven rigorously, that is there exists greater
> >variety in the African gene pool than in, say, the European gene pool. In
> >other words all "Europeans", "Asians", "Australians" etc are in fact
> >Africans...we are all, every single one of us no matter the colour of skin,
> >eye shape etc  Africans. So I take the opposite view, "grounding the idea of
> >discrimination on human nature is a risky strategy".
> 
> Good points
> 
> >The way I look at it cultural differences are as superficial as skin colour.
> 
> Weak point.  We construct the core of our personalities, our self-concepts
> and our identities, from cultural materials.  My deepest sense of who and
> what I am has been formed in the matrix of my culture.  That's hardly as
> superficial as my skin color.    What racist thinking does is to put skin
> color into the core of the personality.  If I conceive of myself as
> "essentially white," in contrast to the "essential blackness, brownness,
> redness, or yellowness" of others, I am a racist.  I have assented to a
> socially constructed transformation of something that is biologically
> superficial into something personally deep.
> 
> Snip.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Dick Moodey
> 
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