File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2002/bhaskar.0203, message 81


Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 11:12:46 -0600 (CST)
From: viren viven murthy <vvmurthy-AT-midway.uchicago.edu>
Subject: Re: BHA: Emergence


Hi Everyone:

Let me see if I grasp the terms of the below dispute.  As I understand it,
both sides agree that beliefs have an ontological status.  The question is
whether a cluster of beliefs, such as Marxism, may be on a different
ontological level than another system such as Hegelianism.  It seems  that
Bhaskar's idea of conceptual emergence presupposes that this must be the
case.  

I have been trying to understand this in terms of levels within levels, so
that our answer to the question of whether Marxism, as a theory, is on a
different ontological level than Hegelianism may depend on the domain to
which we refer.  If we compare them both as ideas to beer or sandwiches,
we may say that theories are on a different ontological level than are
material entities.  However, if we limit our gaze to theories, we can say
that Heglianism is on a different ontological level than is Marxism.  So
perhaps, when we talk about conceptual emergence, we bracket other aspects
of the universe.  

Ruth, I think this is what you are saying, but I would add that the issue
may also involve the relationship between ideas in addition to content and
meaning.  Hence two theories may deal with identical objects, but one
may be ontologically "deeper" than the other, because it uses concepts in
such a way that it can explain the objects in a more complete manner.  So
the ontological depth of a theory is measured by its explanatory power
rather than by the ontological depth of its content (the objects to which
it refers).


Best,

Viren

On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Ruth Groff wrote:

> Hi all,
> 
> I can't pursue this at length either, but I have obviously not communicated my position well enough. 
> 
> Mervyn wrote:
> >Ruth writes:
> >
> > >I don't see how, QUA belief systems, different metaphysical positions can be 
> > >said to differ in ontological status.
> >
> >I don't see how you don't see, except on the assumption that you hold
> >(perhaps as a result of a reification of the epistemology/ ontology
> >distinction) that belief systems are somehow not included within
> >ontology. 
> 
> 
> No.  It's exactly the opposite.  I said,
> 
> >  certainly different belief systems (e.g., Kantianism, Hegelianism, transcendental 
> > >dialectical critical realism, etc.) may contain different claims about what 
> > >exists, and the basic properties thereof (i.e., have different ontologies).  
> 
> For example, person A might argue that the only things that can be said to exist are things that can be observed.  Everything else is metaphysical mumbo-jumbo.  Person B might respond that there exist underlying dispositional properties, which give rise to those things which can be observed, and that such properties exist even if they cannot be observed.  In this case we can certainly say that B's theory, if it is true (and even if it isn't, although there the case is a little trickier) contains concepts whose CONTENT is ontologically more basic than those contained in A's theory.   
> 
> I continued:
> >It is also the case that some belief systems can be seen to presuppose others.  
> 
> This relationship, of "presupposing" can take a number of different forms, I would say.  Kant's work presupposes Hume's for example; Marx's work presupposes Hegel's in an entirely different way.
> 
> But in all of this we are talking about the content, or meaning of the ideas.  If we shift categories, and talk instead about the ontological status *of ideas per se*, considered as one of the kinds things that exist in the world -- along with beer (the existence of which I know gives a lot of you guys pleasure), cats, nation-states, people, etc. -- then, in my view, all of the members of the kind have the same existential status.  Think for a minute about books.  Most of us would agree that books exist, though we probably disagree about exactly what a book *is*, ultimately.  Whatever one's preferred account is, however, what I object to (by analogy) is the idea that, AS a book, any *given* book's ontological status depends on its content.  
> 
> This seems to me to be a category mistake.  I may be wrong about this -- and I may even be willing to change my mind, or modify the position (for example, I probably would want to make certain general ontological claims about ideas that are ideological in the strict sense)  -- but the judgment is not based on excluding beliefs from my ontology.    
> 
> Warmly,
> Ruth
> 
> 
> 
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> 



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