From: "Martti Puttonen" <pop-AT-saunalahti.fi> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2002 09:27:19 +0200 Subject: Re: BHA: Emergence Hi Merwyn, You very clearly conclude many philosophical threads in my e- mail. I agree with your first four points, only the last one is in need for further clarification by me and maybe also by some others interested of the issue of ontological philosophical dialectics. > Hi Martti, Tobin, > > Thanks Martti. I agree with nearly everything I think you're saying, but > I'm not sure I've understood it fully, especially the last paragraph and > within that the last sentence. You say the main point below, but my aim was to say, that Bhaskar has explicated both what it is when perspectival switches are not 'valid' and what it is when they are valid. > > 5. Your last sentence, with its emphasis on the personal pronoun 'my', > seems to want to subjectivise both perspectival switching in the TD with > ontology in the ID to the particular individual. If so, I don't of > course agree both because knowledge is a social product and because the > way things are in the ID is existentially or causally (or both) > independent of our knowledge of it. But I rather suspect that's not what > you're trying to say. Yes, this subjectivisation of thinking is necessary, but this does not necessarily entail losing realist ontology in philosophical sense. Here my initial writing was: How to elaborate this human action as problem solving ...., as human living in a tensed rhythmics, because thoughts of irreal inductions (as products) and their abstractions can comprise the idea of the necessary perspectival switches which arise in thoughts with their general ontological possibility of superstructures and intrastructures? Reacting back, hm, hm... negations their modes in my perspectival switches and or in my ontological world....intransitive, transitive world(?)... . I think that your saying about ID/TD is also included in my text at least implicitly. I see (T)DCR as a philosophy that is cabable of having an authentic concrete singularity at least in philosophy if not in real life. If this concrete singularity, cabable of thinking in the mode of dialcectical univesalizability, emerges in contextual and contextualised social-material world these 'my' switches are not only perspectival switches due to their subjective intentionalities, but of real things, also in and of ID. But there always occurs in human knowing that this knowing of real things is not possible. Human thinking is not freefloating, but under bad constraints, tina compromises, that is thinking is actualist thinking or mere sensate or other experiences. In that human living there are only identities and differences not real things in thinking. Here, real contextual singularized human being is absent and or has been absented by the real dialectics. > Mervyn > Martti --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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