Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 14:45:59 +0100
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Emergence


Martti: thanks for explaining. I agree. Mervyn

Martti Puttonen <pop-AT-saunalahti.fi> writes
>
>Hi Merwyn,
>
>You very clearly conclude many philosophical threads in my e-
>mail. I agree with your first four points, only the last one is in need 
>for further clarification by me and maybe also by some others 
>interested of the issue of ontological philosophical dialectics. 
> 
>> Hi Martti, Tobin,
>> 
>> Thanks Martti. I agree with nearly everything I think you're saying, but
>> I'm not sure I've understood it fully, especially the last paragraph and
>> within that the last sentence.
>
>You say the main point below, but my aim was to say, that 
>Bhaskar has explicated both what it is when perspectival switches 
>are not 'valid' and what it is when they are valid.  
>> 
>> 5. Your last sentence, with its emphasis on the personal pronoun 'my',
>> seems to want to subjectivise both perspectival switching in the TD with
>> ontology in the ID to the particular individual. If so, I don't of
>> course agree both because knowledge is a social product and because the
>> way things are in the ID is existentially or causally (or both)
>> independent of our knowledge of it. But I rather suspect that's not what
>> you're trying to say.
>
>Yes, this subjectivisation of thinking is necessary, but this does 
>not necessarily entail losing realist ontology in philosophical 
>sense.   
>
>Here my initial writing was: How to elaborate this human action 
>as problem solving ...., as human living in a tensed rhythmics, 
>because thoughts of irreal inductions (as products) and their 
>abstractions can comprise the idea of the necessary perspectival 
>switches which arise in thoughts with their general ontological 
>possibility of superstructures and intrastructures? Reacting back, 
>hm, hm... negations their modes in my perspectival switches and 
>or in my ontological world....intransitive, transitive world(?)... . 
>
>I think that your saying about ID/TD is also included in my text at 
>least implicitly. I see (T)DCR as a philosophy that is cabable of 
>having an authentic concrete singularity at least in philosophy if not 
>in real life. If this concrete singularity, cabable of thinking in the 
>mode of dialcectical univesalizability, emerges in contextual and 
>contextualised social-material world these 'my' switches are not 
>only perspectival switches due to their subjective intentionalities, 
>but of real things, also in and of ID. 
>
>But there always occurs in human knowing that this knowing of 
>real things is not possible. Human thinking is not freefloating, but 
>under bad constraints, tina compromises, that is thinking is 
>actualist thinking or mere sensate or other experiences. In that 
>human living there are only identities and differences not real things 
>in thinking. Here, real contextual singularized human being is 
>absent and or has been absented by the real dialectics. 
>
> 
>> Mervyn
>> 
>Martti  
>
>
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