Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2002 10:44:00 -0500 From: Richard Moodey <moodey001-AT-mail1.gannon.edu> Subject: Re: BHA: Knowledge as a social product Hi Ruth, You have put this very well. The one thing I would want to add is that the claim that knowledge is "discovered" can be made by a Platonist as well as by a positivist. Dick At 10:10 AM 03/28/2002 -0500, you wrote: >Hi all, > > >Mervyn, you wrote: > >' Scientific knowledge is socially produced knowledge *of* intransitively >existing >objects. Presumably that is far more acceptable to you, Marko, than just >to say that it is a social production. > > >It may be more acceptable to say it this way, but there is still the >matter of the actual content. There are three different points being made >(of course related). One has to do with the ontological status of >knowledge; one has to do with the ontological status of the things that >scientists, let's say molecular chemists, produce knowledge of; one is the >claim that knowledge is knowledge OF something. > > >My understanding of this debate with Marko is that we all agree that the >properties of molecules are mind-independent. Yes? >We also all agree that knowledge is necessarily knowledge of something. >The thing that there is actually disagreement about, it seems to me, is >the ontological character of knowledge. > > >Specifically, Marko contends that, as he put it, knowledge is not >"produced." Rather (as he puts it), it is discovered. And often by >single individuals -- who need not be thought of as being engaged in >activity that is social. > > >If we are to take him at his word that this is, indeed, his position, then >Marko (along with many others in the world, it must be said) accords a >very different ontological status to knowledge (of mind-independent >objects) than do proponents of non-positivist accounts of knowledge, such >as critical realism -- according to whom knowledge (including, e.g., >"facts"), is taken to be a product of necessarily social human activity. > > >[Critical realism, it is worth noting, differs from some other >non-positivist accounts because in critical realism the view (a) that >knowledge is a product is combined with the view (b) that certain features >of the natural world are mind-independent, and the view (c) that competing >knowledge-claims can be rationally assessed. In contrast to critical >realism, some non-positivist accounts of knowledge are coupled with >ant-realism about the natural world and/or with relativism.] > > >Personally I have no problem with Marko adhering to a positivist theory of >knowledge. Really. In my first or second post I pointed to some >assumptions connected to his position that he might want to look at if he >wanted to really understand the critical realist critique of it. But >that's about it. I think it is useful for someone who is encountering any >position for the first time to see how the new ideas might differ from the >ones that they currently hold. Maybe after some consideration they will >adopt some of the new ideas; maybe instead they will only come to better >understand why they hold the beliefs that they do hold. > > >The only thing that is frustrating is what seems to me to be your effort, >Mervyn, to render a positivist account of knowledge consistent with >critical realism. I'd rather say to Marko (Hi Marko) "Look, critical >realism is a non-positivist theory of knowledge, combined with a realist >ontology. Go figure." So consider it said. > >Warmly, >Ruth > > >I have no problem with agreeig > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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