Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2002 10:44:00 -0500
From: Richard Moodey <moodey001-AT-mail1.gannon.edu>
Subject: Re: BHA: Knowledge as a social product


Hi Ruth,

You have put  this very well.  The one thing I would want to add is that 
the claim that knowledge is "discovered" can be made by a Platonist as well 
as by a positivist.

Dick

At 10:10 AM 03/28/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Hi all,
>
>
>Mervyn, you wrote:
>
>' Scientific knowledge is socially produced knowledge *of* intransitively 
>existing
>objects. Presumably that is far more acceptable to you, Marko, than just
>to say that it is a social production.
>
>
>It may be more acceptable to say it this way, but there is still the 
>matter of the actual content.  There are three different points being made 
>(of course related).  One has to do with the ontological status of 
>knowledge; one has to do with the ontological status of the things that 
>scientists, let's say molecular chemists, produce knowledge of; one is the 
>claim that knowledge is knowledge OF something.
>
>
>My understanding of this debate with Marko is that we all agree that the 
>properties of molecules are mind-independent.  Yes?
>We also all agree that knowledge is necessarily knowledge of something.
>The thing that there is actually disagreement about, it seems to me, is 
>the ontological character of knowledge.
>
>
>Specifically, Marko contends that, as he put it, knowledge is not 
>"produced."  Rather (as he puts it), it is discovered.  And often by 
>single individuals -- who need not be thought of as being engaged in 
>activity that is social.
>
>
>If we are to take him at his word that this is, indeed, his position, then 
>Marko (along with many others in the world, it must be said) accords a 
>very different ontological status to knowledge (of mind-independent 
>objects) than do proponents of non-positivist accounts of knowledge, such 
>as critical realism -- according to whom knowledge (including, e.g., 
>"facts"), is taken to be a product of necessarily social human activity.
>
>
>[Critical realism, it is worth noting, differs from some other 
>non-positivist accounts because in critical realism the view (a) that 
>knowledge is a product is combined with the view (b) that certain features 
>of the natural world are mind-independent, and the view (c) that competing 
>knowledge-claims can be rationally assessed.  In contrast to critical 
>realism, some non-positivist accounts of knowledge are coupled with 
>ant-realism about the natural world and/or with relativism.]
>
>
>Personally I have no problem with Marko adhering to a positivist theory of 
>knowledge.  Really.  In my first or second post I pointed to some 
>assumptions connected to his position that he might want to look at if he 
>wanted to really understand the critical realist critique of it.  But 
>that's about it.  I think it is useful for someone who is encountering any 
>position for the first time to see how the new ideas might differ from the 
>ones that they currently hold.  Maybe after some consideration they will 
>adopt some of the new ideas; maybe instead they will only come to better 
>understand why they hold the beliefs that they do hold.
>
>
>The only thing that is frustrating is what seems to me to be your effort, 
>Mervyn, to render a positivist account of knowledge consistent with 
>critical realism.  I'd rather say to Marko (Hi Marko) "Look, critical 
>realism is a non-positivist theory of knowledge, combined with a realist 
>ontology.  Go figure."  So consider it said.
>
>Warmly,
>Ruth
>
>
>I have no problem with agreeig
>
>
>
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