Date: Mon, 13 May 2002 22:50:49 +0100 From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk> Subject: Re: BHA: what is the role of philosophy? Hi Phil, Dick, Ruth, >As far as spirit is concerned, I think that it exists but am not sure where >to put it, if you see what I mean, Bhaskar (that alleged 'subjective idealist') currently seems to be saying what you yourself seem to be groping towards here - that mind is enfolded in matter and vice versa within a stratified and differentiated cosmos monistically conceived. The difference is a) that you say this is a (metaphysically) materialist position, whereas he says more plausibly that it is neither to accept nor reject materialism; and b) he says metaphysical materialism is a rather undeveloped concept, which you deny in theory but affirm in practice via the delightful forthrightness of the above. (Try putting it in a box with a hefty lock on it?) >Hegel is supplying us (humanity) >with a categorial system which is powerfully reflective of the real >constitution of the universe, in the sense that it enables us - for the >first time in history - to be conscious of our place in the universe. This sounds exactly like Bhaskar's 'categorial realism'. So why is Bhaskar a subjective idealist and Hegel - not an objective idealist - but a materialist? In reality Hegel is by common consent an objective idealist, and Bhaskar imo is a metaphysical realist (full stop - neither materialist nor idealist, whether objective or subjective). Mervyn Phil Walden <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk> writes >Hi Dick, > >Some sort of response interspersed with our text: >> >> >> >According to Hegel, the role of philosophy is to develop >> knowledge towards >> >the Absolute. The concept comes to know itself as the Absolute >> Idea. (And >> >before Dick tells me that "only people can come to know >> themselves" I will >> >appeal to the dialectics of nature - something which had the stamp of >> >approval of not only Hegel but also Marx and Engels). Thus the point of >> >philosophy is to facilitate the coming-to-know itself of the Absolute >> >through the exercise of reason. Nothing is unknowable - there >> are none of >> >Kant's things-in-themselves - since the mere positing of a thing's >> >unknowability means that it exists and is therefore knowable. >> Scepticism is >> >thus refuted by reason. >> >> For me, an essential attribute of being a person is being a self-knowing >> knower. > >Isn't that the same as an autonomous ego, almost Sartrean even? Or does >"self-knowing knower" mean something very different? > > I have no problem with the notion of non-human persons (I never >> met one I didn't like). > >I do not understand what a non-human person could be. Does that make me an >incorrigible atheist? Anyway, any elaboration you can give of what a >non-human person might be would be gratefully received. > > For me, then, the Absolute coming to know itself >> is a process of the Absolute becoming a person. I like the idea that >> philosophy, and perhaps even other forms of human inquiry, might >> be a part >> of this process. Those of us who in our small ways struggle to know >> participate in a much bigger process. >> >> One of my problems with Hegel is that he puts too much weight upon the >> concept -- this shows up in your assertion: "The concept comes to know >> itself as the Absolute Idea." I believe that concepts result from >> insights into experience, and that concepts must be expressed in >> ways that >> allow us to judge them as more-or-less true or false. But >> Hegel's vision >> is grand. > >Dick, you say that concepts result from insights into experience. But >surely some contribution to our concepts is made by nature and external >material reality. Isn't it the attempt to establish concepts and the truth >by trying to deny nature (matter?) that leaves us unable to judge concepts >as true or false? >> >> I also wonder if all concepts come to know themselves as the Absolute >> Idea. Do they all converge into one AI, or can each develop into >> a unique >> AI. The vision of multiple Absolute Ideas might not be >> self-contradictory, perhaps we will just have to wait for better >> knowledge >> of the meaning of "absolute." > >Well, I hold a monist conception of the Absolute according to which there is >one material (and dialectical) universe in which there is no fundamental >ontological hiatus between thought and reality, i.e. they are both matter. >As far as spirit is concerned, I think that it exists but am not sure where >to put it, if you see what I mean, but I suspect a good answer would lie in >a thorough reading of Hegel on the question. > >Regards, > >Phil >> >> Regards, >> >> Dick >> >> >> >> >> >> --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- >> > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- -- Mervyn Hartwig Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia') 13 Spenser Road Herne Hill London SE24 ONS United Kingdom Tel: 020 7 737 2892 Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk> Subscription forms: http://www.criticalrealism.demon.co.uk/iacr/membership.html There is another world, but it is in this one. Paul Eluard --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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