From: "Marshall M. A. Feldman" <Marsh-AT-URI.EDU>
Subject: RE: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 07:50:03 -0400


Hi Mervyn,

Thanks for the advice. Actually it's the radical philosphers' conference and
it's nearby at Brown. So, I just want to see how the other half lives.

	Cheers,
	Marsh

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> [mailto:owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu]On Behalf Of Mervyn
> Hartwig
> Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 5:59 PM
> To: bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
>
>
> Hi Marsh, Ruth,
>
> I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the positivist
> tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering critique), and
> is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects, as are many
> who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even Ellis, e.g.,
> in his reductionism is still operating within it. Politically, too, this
> kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the 'critical' in
> critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
> accepts Hume on facts and values.
>
> >Bohr's interpretation of quantum
> >mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at
> odds with
> >the answer CR offers to the question,
>
> [snip]
>
> >But why then are so many
> >other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of
> science, such as
> >the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?
>
>
> Chris Norris has a whole book on the quantum dispute from a CR
> perspective, reviewed by Doug Porpora in JCR. Bhaskar in DPF and
> elsewhere deploys a concept of 'quantised' causality, and his view of
> the radical relationality or connectivity of the world is almost
> certainly strongly influenced by quantum theory.
>
> >I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms of explanation
> >and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at
> best a partial
> >account of science.
>
> I've cited Bhaskar's defense of functionalist explanation a number of
> times on this list, and John Mingers recently posted a bibliography of
> his CR writings on systems theory.
>
> As for giving a talk on CR to a conference of mainstream philosophers,
> my advice is, if you're not a professional philosopher (and I believe
> you're not), don't do it! What would be the point? Give a talk on a CR
> approach to whatever you're into (community planning, isn't it?) to an
> audience that's interested in that subject.
>
> Ruth writes:
>
> >So I think that mainstream philosophers don't know about Bhaskar
> because he
> >hasn't undertaken to force himself upon the discipline.
>
> The other side of this coin, of course, is that their minds are so
> imprisoned within mainstream dogmas that 'force' is necessary.
>
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
> Marsh Feldman <MarshFeldman-AT-cox.net> writes
> >Hi friends,
> >
> >I'm reading sections of _The Philosophy of Science_, ed. David Papineau.
> >(Oxford 1996). The back cover describes the book thus:
> >
> >       "This volume contains the most important contributions to
> the recent
> >debate
> >on the philosophy of science. The
> >       contributors crystallize the oft heated arguments of the last two
> >decades,
> >assessing the skeptical attitudes within
> >       philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific
> >realists."
> >
> >The cover goes on to list Papineau's credentials, among which it
> lists these
> >books: _For Science in the Social Sciences_ (1978), _Reality and
> >Representation_ (1987), and _Philosophical Naturalism_ (1983).
> >
> >I am troubled by this book. Despite its topic and the obvious relation
> >between it and CR, it doesn't mention CR. The index has no references to
> >Bhaskar, and thus far I've found only one reference to anything typically
> >considered part of CR. (A passing reference to Harre and Madden
> on p. 170,
> >which the author uses as an example of one of two realist approaches to
> >causality. Harre and Madden represent the natural necessity
> approach, while
> >the other approach is Humean.) Similarly, a quick glance at key
> works in CR
> >(RTS, PON, Essential Readings) shows almost no overlap with the
> authors in
> >this anthology (one reference to Nancy Cartwright is all I found).
> >
> >Yet many of the issues in this book are relevant for CR. Here are a few:
> >
> >       1. The Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics, in
> particular Bohr's
> >anti-realist position. Bohr's argument would seem to imply that
> what happens
> >and exists in closed systems is entirely of a different kind that what
> >happens and exists outside the lab. Bohr's interpretation of quantum
> >mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at
> odds with
> >the answer CR offers to the question, "What must the world be like for
> >science to be possible?" (see the essays by Fine and Musgrave).
> >
> >       2. Brian Ellis' distinction between causal, functional,
> model-theoretic,
> >and systemic explanations. CR typically focuses on causal
> explanations, and
> >I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms of explanation
> >and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at
> best a partial
> >account of science.
> >
> >       3. John Worrall's account of structural realism. This
> seems akin to CR
> >accounts, except "structure" for Worrall has to do with formal properties
> >(e.g., Maxwell's equations) rather than the nature (structure)
> of the thing
> >possessing these properties. Might it not be possible to extend
> this formal
> >account to what critical realists mean when they speak of structure (i.e.
> >necessary internal relations) without requiring an ontological
> commitment to
> >the stuff making up such relations?
> >
> >       4. The Maxwell-Bridgman criterion for physical reality,
> namely that "an
> >entity is physically real if it manifests itself in more than
> one way." This
> >resembles the CR emphasis on independent corroboration (cf. RTS ch. 3).
> >
> >       5. Papineau's presentation of realism boiling down to two
> propositions:
> >the
> >independence of the world (i.e. the existence of an intransitive
> dimension)
> >and the possibility of knowledge of the world (i.e., that the transitive
> >dimension is more than a social ritual). The latter seems to suggest a
> >question, "What must the world be like for scientific knowledge to be
> >possible?" that one would expect CR to ask.
> >
> >Although these issues are interesting, what concerns me is the seeming
> >disconnect between CR and mainstream philosophy of science. Does
> anyone have
> >insight into this disconnect? Why do mainstream philosophers seemingly
> >ignore CR? Why does CR seemingly avoid questions that seem central to
> >mainstream philosophy? (I realize CR wants to make a Copernican
> revolution,
> >but a major part of the agenda is resolving issues that mainstream
> >philosophy cannot resolve. Surely this is true with, for
> instance, Bhaskar's
> >claim that CR resolves the problem of induction. But why then are so many
> >other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of
> science, such as
> >the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?)
> >
> >This question is motivated by a fear of mine. About a year from now I'm
> >scheduled to give a talk on CR at a conference of philosophers.
> I have this
> >terrible fear that, after they stop their hysterical laughter, they will
> >tell me that most of the solutions that CR purports to give were
> discussed
> >long ago and discredited by mainstream philosophers. When I was
> finishing my
> >doctorate, I was on the job market and gave a talk at Penn,
> where something
> >very much akin to this scenario happened. Today, I do think the people at
> >Penn were wrong, but at the time I was unprepared for their
> reaction to my
> >talk and did not have an appropriate response. Once in a
> lifetime is enough
> >to go through an experience like this. Can anyone help me assuage my
> >anxiety?
> >
> >       Best,
> >
> >       Marsh Feldman
> >
> >
> >
> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
> --
> Mervyn Hartwig
> Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
> 13 Spenser Road
> Herne Hill
> London SE24 ONS
> United Kingdom
> Tel: 020 7 737 2892
> Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>
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>
> There is another world, but it is in this one.
> Paul Eluard
>
>
>
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