From: "howard Engelskirchen" <lhengels-AT-igc.org>
Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 23:4:52 -0400


Ronny,

Thanks so much for your post!  It's terrific.  

Some comments --

The Harre and Madden book is not that widely engaged in establishment
literature either, is it?

Tell me this, based on your review of the materials referenced, does anyone
else develop the idea of ontological stratification?  Does Aristotle or the
aristotelian tradition?  Hegel?  The New Dialectics and Value Form theory
people for example specifically rely on Hegel for not taking that up.  (For
example, and there is no need to take up this thread, in Value Form Theory
and the State, Geert and Williams acknowledge the significance of Bhaskar,
but, if not there, then otherwise, reject ontological stratification by
appeal to Hegel).  But actually, rather than the history of philosophy
stuff, I'm more immediately interested in your impression of contemporary
philosophers of science in their engagement with causal realism.  Why has
so little been made of the issue of ontological stratification?  My guess
is because mainstream realisms have emerged from the soil of Quine and
Putnam.  Another way of asking this is how central has the critique of Hume
been to the mainstream evolution of scientific realism?  (Back to Harre and
Madden again.)  In other words, it has not been the underground tradition
of aristotelian realism that has driven the mainstream.  Though even there
is ontological stratification to be found?  By the way Erin McMullin has a
wonderful small, readable set of lectures called something like "The
Inference that Made Science" that traces a realist thread from Aristotle to
contemporary scientific realism.  He's after what Peirce called abductive
reasoning, though curiously he doesn't make that much of Pierce as I
recall.  

I'm interested onlist or off on anything more you could  say about the
underground aristotelian tradition.

I agree with your appraisal of RTS and PON.  Without in any way intending
divisive evaluations of Bhaskar's later work, for those of us interested in
a CR scientific realism, these are foundational.  Some want to qualify them
in terms of later developments.  Fine.  But they are there as a common
language for us.

I think it would be great to do some common reading of some of the
references you mention.  This would take up the task of engagement you
establish as necessary.  We could  do this with Ellis or Psillos, but
perhaps it makes most sense to start with the Papineau collection since we
have Marshall to get us going.  Moreover the Papineau collection is a group
of separate shorter essays so we wouldn't get bogged down as we always do. 
We could read one and move on, or not, or get bogged down anyway.  Also it
is readily accessible and inexpensive.   Psillos or Ellis are harder to
come by and take a considerably more sustained effort than is likely to be
resonant with our common energies.  But I do think Psillos would be great
to work through and actually it is readily available through Amazon etc.

The whole issue of moral realism is completely mysterious to me.  You'd
think you could go to moral realism and more or less readily find stuff you
could relate to from a critical realist perspective.  But I'm inclined to
think they are off on a different tack.  Here Marx needs to be present in
the debate, but instead there seem to be concern with the reality of moral
entities that doesn't seem to make much realist sense to me at all. 
Perhaps I'm wrong.  I don't know this material and so will reserve judgment
until I get a better idea of what is going on.

Howard


> [Original Message]
> From: <rsmyhre-AT-frisurf.no>
> To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> Cc: <rsmyhre-AT-frisurf.no>; <ronnym-AT-stud.ntnu.no>
 > Date: 5/15/2002 10:13:27 AM
> Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
>
> Hi,
> 
> Mainstream Philosophy of Science. Is there such an animal?
> 
> I think this thread is highly interesting and as a wannabe philosopher of 
> science I feel I have to respond.
> 
> I dispute that there are any mainstream philosophy of science today. I
also 
> disagree with the claim that most philosophers of science is positivists.
In 
> the 1950s and the 1960s maybe there was such a beast as 'mainstream
philosophy 
> of science' but certainly not today. On the contrary, contemporary
philosophy 
> of science (now I am talking about specialists in philosophy of science
not 
> other academics) is a highly disputed terrain. I can't think of any
central 
> interesting topic that most philosophers of science agree on.
> 
> Another question is why Bhaskar is almost unknown among professional 
> philosophers. I think some have made to much about this. For two reasons. 
> Firstly, RTS is certainly a original book but it is nothing of the
watershed 
> in philosophy of science as some on this list has made it into. An
underground 
> tradition of aristotelians have defended causal realism all the time,
also 
> during the heyday of positivism. Several philosophers, contemporary with
the 
> RTS, developed a realist theory of causal powers - Milton Fisk's 'Nature
and 
> Necessity' (1973), Sydney Shoemaker's 'Causality and Properties'
(article) 
> (1980), Michael Ayers' 'The Refutation of Determinism' (1968) etc.
Several 
> others on this list have mentioned Rom Harre & Edward Madden's 'Causal
Powers' 
> (1975), a work, to my mind, more impressive in some ways than RTS.
Secondly, 
> there have been some critical engagement with RTS among philosophers of 
> science. Take Alan Chalmers book 'What is this thing Called Science?' a
widely 
> used introduction to philosophy of science, for instance, Chalmers
discusses 
> Bhaskar and defend him against the alternative realist account developed
by 
> Nancy Cartwright. I discovered Bhaskar through Marxism but one of my
friends 
> started reading Bhaskar through Chalmers.
> 
> In any case we have to reflect on any other reasons why Bhaskar is not
more 
> widely discussed among philosophers of science. I can think of some
reasons.
> 
> 1) As Ruth notes, to establish oneself as an important philosopher of
science 
> takes hard work. You will have to attend to conferences and participate
in 
> discussions in journals (especially such as Philosophy of Science,
British 
> Journal for Philosophy of Science and Synthese). It seems that Bhaskar
has not 
> done any original work in metaphysics and philosophy of (natural) science 
> since RTS. It seems that DPF is more influenced by his reading of
Derrida, 
> Hegel, Heidegger and other 'continental philosophers than analytic 
> philosophers. What he writes about philosophy of science in Plato Etc is 
> simply a restatement of what he said in RTS and the artcles published in
the 
> 1970s.
> 
> 2) Bhaskar's style. Bhaskar's books (even RTS but to a lesser degree) is
noted 
> by the absence (sic) of critical engagement with other philosophers, both 
> living and non-living. Bhaskar can refute a whole position in one
paragraph. 
> This is alien to analytic philosophy, if not 'continental' philosophy.
Most 
> philosophers like books where they can learn something through particular 
> arguments. With Bhaskar it is in some way opposite, you will have to
accept 
> the whole packet before the particular arguments make sense.
> 
> 3) Several philosophers have developed positions than transgresses
Bhaskar. 
> Bhaskar was undoubtably one of the first to develop a realist account of 
> causal powers and something like realism about possibilities. Today
several 
> other positions compete, Cartwright, Salmon, Ellis, Tooley defends causal 
> power realism if not full blown modal realism. I think that Bhaskars
account 
> in some ways are superior to those mentioned above, but Bhaskars position
need 
> to be enriched and developed by a critical engagement with contemporary 
> metaphysics and philosophy of science. This is a condition of necessity
for 
> its survival as a tenable position today in contemporary philosophy of
science.
> 
> 4) This topic has been widely discussed earlier but I have to mention it 
> again. Most analytic philosophers are either reductive or non-reductive 
> (emergent) physicalists. FEW and the books to be published this summer
seem to 
> be spiritualist or something like spititualism. Not suprisingly, most 
> philosophers would be put off by this turn. In any case it seems that the 
> project launched in RTS (a philosophy FOR science) looks to have exploded
in 
> favour of a philosophy of wisdom, more in commom with Krishnamurti 
> and 'eastern wisdom' than topics discussed by philosophers of science.
> 
> Maybe I have formulated myself to harsh regarding Bhaskar. But that will
be a 
> misunderstanding of my position. RTS, PON is to my mind great works that
would 
> enrich contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science if it became
more 
> widely known. But that means that CR need to renew itself by engaging in 
> contemporary philosophy of science.
> 
> Mervyn:
>  
> > I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the positivist
> > tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering critique), and
> > is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects, as are many
> > who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even Ellis, e.g.,
> > in his reductionism is still operating within it. Politically, too, this
> > kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the 'critical' in
> > critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
> > accepts Hume on facts and values.
> 
> I think this is unfair. Ellis seems to be something like a social
democrat, or 
> at least a critic of neo-classical economics. Maybe he would be
interested in 
> Lawson's book? Bhaskar's 'withering critique of positivism' would in no
way 
> hurt Papineau's position. (Interestingly Papineau supervised Psillos 
> dissertation at the LSE, and Psillos as Howard has mentioned is in some
ways a 
> critical realist). It is correct that Papineau is a naturalist and a 
> reductionist but not a positivist. He defends theoretical entities. Some 
> philosophers of this 'tradition' is also committed  to moral realism
(Richard 
> Boyd, Mario Bunge) but theirs have been a minority position. Most
philosophers 
> of science, I believe, don't have neither time nor strenght to develop 
> systematically their views on ethics. Bhaskar's 'synoptic vision' is in
such a 
> perspective highly admirable.
> 
> Be




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