From: "Marshall Feldman" <marsh-AT-uri.edu>
Subject: RE: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 09:12:09 -0400


Howard,

Your idea of engaging with "mainstream" work is enticing. I'd suggest
starting with the introductory overview by David Papineau, as it lays out
some basic ideas that already diverge from CR (I think).

	Marsh

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> [mailto:owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu]On Behalf Of howard
> Engelskirchen
> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 10:01 PM
> To: bhaskar lists
> Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
>
>
> Ronny,
>
> Thanks so much for your post!  It's terrific.
>
> Some comments --
>
> The Harre and Madden book is not that widely engaged in establishment
> literature either, is it?
>
> Tell me this, based on your review of the materials referenced,
> does anyone
> else develop the idea of ontological stratification?  Does
> Aristotle or the
> aristotelian tradition?  Hegel?  The New Dialectics and Value Form theory
> people for example specifically rely on Hegel for not taking that
> up.  (For
> example, and there is no need to take up this thread, in Value Form Theory
> and the State, Geert and Williams acknowledge the significance of Bhaskar,
> but, if not there, then otherwise, reject ontological stratification by
> appeal to Hegel).  But actually, rather than the history of philosophy
> stuff, I'm more immediately interested in your impression of contemporary
> philosophers of science in their engagement with causal realism.  Why has
> so little been made of the issue of ontological stratification?  My guess
> is because mainstream realisms have emerged from the soil of Quine and
> Putnam.  Another way of asking this is how central has the
> critique of Hume
> been to the mainstream evolution of scientific realism?  (Back to
> Harre and
> Madden again.)  In other words, it has not been the underground tradition
> of aristotelian realism that has driven the mainstream.  Though even there
> is ontological stratification to be found?  By the way Erin McMullin has a
> wonderful small, readable set of lectures called something like "The
> Inference that Made Science" that traces a realist thread from
> Aristotle to
> contemporary scientific realism.  He's after what Peirce called abductive
> reasoning, though curiously he doesn't make that much of Pierce as I
> recall.
>
> I'm interested onlist or off on anything more you could  say about the
> underground aristotelian tradition.
>
> I agree with your appraisal of RTS and PON.  Without in any way intending
> divisive evaluations of Bhaskar's later work, for those of us
> interested in
> a CR scientific realism, these are foundational.  Some want to
> qualify them
> in terms of later developments.  Fine.  But they are there as a common
> language for us.
>
> I think it would be great to do some common reading of some of the
> references you mention.  This would take up the task of engagement you
> establish as necessary.  We could  do this with Ellis or Psillos, but
> perhaps it makes most sense to start with the Papineau collection since we
> have Marshall to get us going.  Moreover the Papineau collection
> is a group
> of separate shorter essays so we wouldn't get bogged down as we
> always do.
> We could read one and move on, or not, or get bogged down anyway.  Also it
> is readily accessible and inexpensive.   Psillos or Ellis are harder to
> come by and take a considerably more sustained effort than is likely to be
> resonant with our common energies.  But I do think Psillos would be great
> to work through and actually it is readily available through Amazon etc.
>
> The whole issue of moral realism is completely mysterious to me.  You'd
> think you could go to moral realism and more or less readily find
> stuff you
> could relate to from a critical realist perspective.  But I'm inclined to
> think they are off on a different tack.  Here Marx needs to be present in
> the debate, but instead there seem to be concern with the reality of moral
> entities that doesn't seem to make much realist sense to me at all.
> Perhaps I'm wrong.  I don't know this material and so will
> reserve judgment
> until I get a better idea of what is going on.
>
> Howard
>
>
> > [Original Message]
> > From: <rsmyhre-AT-frisurf.no>
> > To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> > Cc: <rsmyhre-AT-frisurf.no>; <ronnym-AT-stud.ntnu.no>
>  > Date: 5/15/2002 10:13:27 AM
> > Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > Mainstream Philosophy of Science. Is there such an animal?
> >
> > I think this thread is highly interesting and as a wannabe
> philosopher of
> > science I feel I have to respond.
> >
> > I dispute that there are any mainstream philosophy of science today. I
> also
> > disagree with the claim that most philosophers of science is
> positivists.
> In
> > the 1950s and the 1960s maybe there was such a beast as 'mainstream
> philosophy
> > of science' but certainly not today. On the contrary, contemporary
> philosophy
> > of science (now I am talking about specialists in philosophy of science
> not
> > other academics) is a highly disputed terrain. I can't think of any
> central
> > interesting topic that most philosophers of science agree on.
> >
> > Another question is why Bhaskar is almost unknown among professional
> > philosophers. I think some have made to much about this. For
> two reasons.
> > Firstly, RTS is certainly a original book but it is nothing of the
> watershed
> > in philosophy of science as some on this list has made it into. An
> underground
> > tradition of aristotelians have defended causal realism all the time,
> also
> > during the heyday of positivism. Several philosophers, contemporary with
> the
> > RTS, developed a realist theory of causal powers - Milton Fisk's 'Nature
> and
> > Necessity' (1973), Sydney Shoemaker's 'Causality and Properties'
> (article)
> > (1980), Michael Ayers' 'The Refutation of Determinism' (1968) etc.
> Several
> > others on this list have mentioned Rom Harre & Edward Madden's 'Causal
> Powers'
> > (1975), a work, to my mind, more impressive in some ways than RTS.
> Secondly,
> > there have been some critical engagement with RTS among philosophers of
> > science. Take Alan Chalmers book 'What is this thing Called Science?' a
> widely
> > used introduction to philosophy of science, for instance, Chalmers
> discusses
> > Bhaskar and defend him against the alternative realist account developed
> by
> > Nancy Cartwright. I discovered Bhaskar through Marxism but one of my
> friends
> > started reading Bhaskar through Chalmers.
> >
> > In any case we have to reflect on any other reasons why Bhaskar is not
> more
> > widely discussed among philosophers of science. I can think of some
> reasons.
> >
> > 1) As Ruth notes, to establish oneself as an important philosopher of
> science
> > takes hard work. You will have to attend to conferences and participate
> in
> > discussions in journals (especially such as Philosophy of Science,
> British
> > Journal for Philosophy of Science and Synthese). It seems that Bhaskar
> has not
> > done any original work in metaphysics and philosophy of
> (natural) science
> > since RTS. It seems that DPF is more influenced by his reading of
> Derrida,
> > Hegel, Heidegger and other 'continental philosophers than analytic
> > philosophers. What he writes about philosophy of science in
> Plato Etc is
> > simply a restatement of what he said in RTS and the artcles published in
> the
> > 1970s.
> >
> > 2) Bhaskar's style. Bhaskar's books (even RTS but to a lesser degree) is
> noted
> > by the absence (sic) of critical engagement with other
> philosophers, both
> > living and non-living. Bhaskar can refute a whole position in one
> paragraph.
> > This is alien to analytic philosophy, if not 'continental' philosophy.
> Most
> > philosophers like books where they can learn something through
> particular
> > arguments. With Bhaskar it is in some way opposite, you will have to
> accept
> > the whole packet before the particular arguments make sense.
> >
> > 3) Several philosophers have developed positions than transgresses
> Bhaskar.
> > Bhaskar was undoubtably one of the first to develop a realist
> account of
> > causal powers and something like realism about possibilities. Today
> several
> > other positions compete, Cartwright, Salmon, Ellis, Tooley
> defends causal
> > power realism if not full blown modal realism. I think that Bhaskars
> account
> > in some ways are superior to those mentioned above, but
> Bhaskars position
> need
> > to be enriched and developed by a critical engagement with contemporary
> > metaphysics and philosophy of science. This is a condition of necessity
> for
> > its survival as a tenable position today in contemporary philosophy of
> science.
> >
> > 4) This topic has been widely discussed earlier but I have to
> mention it
> > again. Most analytic philosophers are either reductive or non-reductive
> > (emergent) physicalists. FEW and the books to be published this summer
> seem to
> > be spiritualist or something like spititualism. Not suprisingly, most
> > philosophers would be put off by this turn. In any case it
> seems that the
> > project launched in RTS (a philosophy FOR science) looks to
> have exploded
> in
> > favour of a philosophy of wisdom, more in commom with Krishnamurti
> > and 'eastern wisdom' than topics discussed by philosophers of science.
> >
> > Maybe I have formulated myself to harsh regarding Bhaskar. But that will
> be a
> > misunderstanding of my position. RTS, PON is to my mind great works that
> would
> > enrich contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science if it became
> more
> > widely known. But that means that CR need to renew itself by
> engaging in
> > contemporary philosophy of science.
> >
> > Mervyn:
> >
> > > I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the positivist
> > > tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering
> critique), and
> > > is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects,
> as are many
> > > who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even
> Ellis, e.g.,
> > > in his reductionism is still operating within it.
> Politically, too, this
> > > kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the
> 'critical' in
> > > critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
> > > accepts Hume on facts and values.
> >
> > I think this is unfair. Ellis seems to be something like a social
> democrat, or
> > at least a critic of neo-classical economics. Maybe he would be
> interested in
> > Lawson's book? Bhaskar's 'withering critique of positivism' would in no
> way
> > hurt Papineau's position. (Interestingly Papineau supervised Psillos
> > dissertation at the LSE, and Psillos as Howard has mentioned is in some
> ways a
> > critical realist). It is correct that Papineau is a naturalist and a
> > reductionist but not a positivist. He defends theoretical
> entities. Some
> > philosophers of this 'tradition' is also committed  to moral realism
> (Richard
> > Boyd, Mario Bunge) but theirs have been a minority position. Most
> philosophers
> > of science, I believe, don't have neither time nor strenght to develop
> > systematically their views on ethics. Bhaskar's 'synoptic vision' is in
> such a
> > perspective highly admirable.
> >
> > Be
>
>
>
>
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