File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2002/bhaskar.0205, message 168


Date: Fri, 17 May 2002 10:31:50 +0100
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science


Marshall,

We seem to be inhabiting different paradigms. Holding up empiricism as
some kind of model or template for locating deficiencies in CR doesn't
cut any ice with me because I accept the CR critique of empiricism. Why?
The same reason as I accept any other critique - I make an assessment of
the arguments in favour of both outlooks and choose.

>what's important is
>the mathematical properties (structure) of light's behavior.

Isn't this precisely the CR view, expressed in examples by Bhaskar over
an again? I.e. what we have is an ontology of causal powers (plus
fundamental structuring principles - the categories); i.e. in the terms
used in the later philosophy, dispositional and categorial realism. When
Bhaskar gives examples from the natural sciences of the former he cites
precisely mathematical formulas for structures.

Nor does (in you previous email) waving asside the theory of alethic
truth - *the* (D)CR theory of truth - on the spurious grounds that it is  

>truth in terms of the world rather than in terms of human knowledge

cut any ice. It is a theory about the human achievement of ontological
truth. Ultimately we can know the world because we are an emergent part
of it and epistemology is contained within ontology - we are not set off
dualistically over against it. We do achieve knowledge of the world and
could not have evolved successfully if that weren't so.

Nor does invoking scientific revolutions as if they demonstrate that the
truth-claims of the predecessor theory were all false cut any ice. CR
has a powerful theory sustaining the rationality of scientific
revolutions - see esp. the Hegel-derived epistemological dialectic of
science in the early part of DPF.

How do we choose between theories of late capitalism and of post-
industrial society? We've been over this territory before. We make an
assessment of their relative explanatory power. (Which theory better
explains the imbecile hucksterism of the moronic Empire? And its
expansionary dynamic? Do we see an end of ideology? Etc etc etc.) There
are no ready made formulae or algorithms that we can apply mechanically
- we make an assessment of the overall arguments in favour of each. On
the Bhaskarian arguments on facts and values etc, all we need at the
outset is commitment to truth (a necessary condition of all discourse,
so we're not importing it into the scientific endeavour - it is an
aspect of our core universal human nature) and everything else follows,
i.e. politics needn't determine our science, it can be the other way
around. 

Mervyn


Marshall Feldman <marsh-AT-uri.edu> writes
>Mervyn,
>
>It's difficult to document an absence like this. Let me do it by comparing
>CR to +ism.
>
>For +ism (and all empiricism) experience is the arbiter of truth. Popper
>turned things around a bit by using experience to reject conjectures rather
>than to confirm truths.
>
>Now we know that experience, or at least our thoughts about experience, are
>theory laden. We also know that given any experience that doesn't square
>with our favorite theory, we can adjust the theoretical apparatus to
>incorporate the new empirical result. We also know about scientific
>revolutions.
>
>Now this leads the philosophers in the book I mentioned to do one of two
>things: 1) become skeptical of claims to know the truth about reality, or
>(2) fall all over themselves trying to figure out a way to make true claims
>in spite of these observations. Some, like van Fraasen, take a pragmatic or
>instrumentalist stand: theories are just calculating tools or conceptual
>frameworks that help us organize empirical findings. Others, like Worrall,
>revise realism to make it less speculative. For instance, Worrall proposes
>that what's real about light is its mathematical structure under certain
>experimental situations; we can be agnostic about whether light really is a
>disturbance of the ether or an electromagnetic wave -- what's important is
>the mathematical properties (structure) of light's behavior. This can be
>observed (or at least not overturned in scientific revolutions).
>
>I'm not aware of anything quite like this in the CR camp (maybe Norris, whom
>I haven't read yet?). We have an elegant demonstration of the world's deep
>ontology. CR also goes a bit further by emphasizing corroboration. Is this
>is what you mean by saying CR provides the best possible grounds for
>believing scientific truth claims?
>
>If so, I still see a void. What are we to make of two competing theories
>that are fully consistent with the evidence and that stress structured
>necessity equally but differently. For instance, how might we compare a
>theory of late capitalism against a theory of post-industrial society?
>
>       Marsh
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>> [mailto:owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu]On Behalf Of Mervyn
>> Hartwig
>> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 4:35 PM
>> To: bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>> Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
>>
>>
>> Hi Marshall,
>>
>> >CR provides no substantial grounds for believing
>> >what that research says to be true?
>>
>> Could you say what you mean by this a little more? I think the exact
>> opposite - that CR provides the best possible grounds for believing
>> scientific truth-claims. Just because CR acknowledges that such claims
>> are made within history and so will one day be superseded (not the same
>> as 'rendered false') (epistemic relativism) and are fallible does *not*
>> entail that it provides no substantial grounds for believing them. When
>> Bhaskar says that 'capitalism is based on a lie' he means that
>> capitalism *is* based on a lie and therefore (other reasons aside)
>> should be changed, cp.
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>>
>> Marshall Feldman <marsh-AT-uri.edu> writes
>> >Hi all,
>> >
>> >Thanks for chiming in Ronny. This is very helpful.
>> >
>> >I'm more interested in engaging some arguments from what I called
>> >"mainstream philosophy of science" than in figuring out why RB
>> has not done
>> >more to further the cause. Here are two comments.
>> >
>> >1. Coincidentally, I came across this quote from Adorno this
>> morning. (It's
>> >in an article about quantitative economic geography, something
>> that's more
>> >of my home turf.) "Genuine refutation must penetrate the power of the
>> >opponent and meet him [sic] on the ground of his strength; the
>> case is not
>> >won by attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not"
>> >(_Against Epistemology_, Blackwell 1982, cited in Plummer and Sheppard,
>> >"Must Emancipatory Economic Geography be Qualitative?" _Antipode_ 2001:
>> >195). One has to wonder about how serious a critique is if it
>> doesn't engage
>> >the enemy seriously. As an outsider it certainly seems much
>> easier for RB or
>> >at least his philosophy students to be taken seriously by
>> Philosophers than
>> >for economic geographers (and other radicals) to be taken seriously by
>> >mainstream economists. At least the philosophers seem to be interested in
>> >the same issues, use some of the same ideas, and refer to the same dead
>> >white men. The economists and economic geographers generally do not share
>> >even this in common, yet we've made them take notice (admittedly because
>> >their aspatial irrealism was and is so out of touch with reality that at
>> >least some of them may have been embarrassed).
>> >
>> >2. Issues in the mainstream seem critical for CR. Take for example "truth
>> >realism." Papineau nicely describes realism as being based on two
>> >propositions: 1) The world exists independent of our knowledge,
>> and 2) It's
>> >possible to have knowledge the world. "Truth realism," as I
>> understand it,
>> >focuses on the second proposition and claims that most
>> scientific knowledge
>> >is true in that it approximates a correct picture of the world.
>> CR, on the
>> >other hand, seems to side-step the issue by using the epistemic
>> fallacy to
>> >deflect much discussion about how true scientific theories are. As we all
>> >know, "knowledge" in the transient dimension is fallible. This
>> claim, which
>> >I accept, often seems to license avoiding serious discussion of truth and
>> >knowledge. Yet how can CR claim to be emancipatory if we have no strong
>> >concept of truth (alethic truth aside, which as I understand it
>> is truth in
>> >terms of the world rather than in terms of human knowledge)? On
>> what grounds
>> >would we, for instance, justify any difficult political action
>> by light of
>> >scientific research when CR provides no substantial grounds for believing
>> >what that research says to be true?
>> >
>> >BTW, whatever Papineau's own leanings, the particular collection
>> I'm reading
>> >does seem to have authors of various points of view. The two things I've
>> >seen that they have in common are: (1) virtually all their examples come
>> >from physics or, at best, chemistry, and (2) they all seem to suffer from
>> >what Bernstein calls "the Cartesian Anxiety" in that the fate of realism
>> >hinges on the philosopher's ability to provide a good, logical
>> argument for
>> >believing science to be true.
>> >
>> >       Regard,
>> >
>> >       Marsh Feldman
>>


     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005