Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2002 2:43:3 -0400



Ronny,

Thanks so much for your informative post and bibliography.  A quick note
and then I hope I can get back to your post more fully.  

> I have not read Geert Reuten and barely looked at Tony Smith, So I have
not 
> anything interesting to add on their reading of Hegel. How do they reject 
> ontological stratification? At least Hegel's distinction between the
Logic of 
> Being and the Logic of Essence in WdL seem to be committed to ontological 
> stratification.

The answer to the question you ask, how they reject OS, is this:  "essence
must appear."
I think that's an accurate report.  I wonder if both Aristotle and Hegel
aren't ambiguous on this score.  What are clear examples, preBhaskar, of
ontological stratification in the philosophical tradition?

Howard 





> [Original Message]
> From: <rsmyhre-AT-frisurf.no>
> To: <rsmyhre-AT-frisurf.no>; <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> Cc: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>; Mervyn Hartwig
<mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
 > Date: 5/27/2002 7:40:14 AM
> Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
>
> Howard, Ruth, and others
> 
> Howard wrote:
> 
> >The Harre and Madden book is not that widely engaged in establishment
> >literature either, is it?
> 
> Harre and Madden critically engages with existing literature. Mackie, 
> Achinstein, Ernest Nagel, Davidson, Kim are all engaged with in Causal
Powers. 
> Such detailed critical engagements is systematically lacking in RTS.
> 
> >Tell me this, based on your review of the materials referenced, does
anyone
> >else develop the idea of ontological stratification?  Does Aristotle or
the
> >aristotelian tradition?  Hegel?  
> 
> The concept of ontological stratification is certainly present in what I 
> termed the 'underground Aristotelian tradition.' The best (to my
knowledge) 
> are these
> 
> William A. Wallace [1996] The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science
and 
> Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis (Washington DC: Catholic University
Press of 
> America)
> 
> James Cahalan [1985] Causal Realism: An Essay in Philosophical Method and
the 
> Foundations of Knowledge (Lanham: University Press of America)
> 
> Cahalan, like Bhaskar, insists on the mere actual status of events as
distinct 
> from the metaphysical real status of objects (substances). Wallace is not
as 
> interested in the distinction between the real and the actual as
developing a 
> robust theory of emergence. Both accounts are a lot more detailed than
Bhaskar.
> 
> I think Aristotle himself developed a stratified ontology. The
Metaphysics 7-9 
> and the Physics 1-3, 8, together with the biological works are the most 
> important with regard to this. Unfortunately Aristotle is quite difficult
to 
> read. (the arabian philosopher Avicienna said that he had read the
Metaphysics 
> forty times without understanding it). Crucial to Aristotle's thinking is
that 
> some entities are what he terms Primary Beings in the sense that all
other 
> entities are dependent on them for their existence. This may sound as 
> reductionism, but it is totally out of question for Aristotle that the 
> dependent entities may be reduced to the primary beings. The
philosophical 
> tradition after Aristotle followed Plato in thinking that the primary
beings 
> (if there were any) must be ontological simples. Plato thought that 
> transendent forms were simple and ontological basic. Complex entities
were 
> understood as derivative entities in that they were constructed out of
their 
> simple parts. Aristotle thought different. For him it the basic entities
were 
> entities that were endowed with irreducible causal powers. These entities 
> (called natures) had an internal principle of change and stability. This
meant 
> that what change that is possible for a object depended on the nature of
that 
> object or individual. Events, actions, processes in addition to
properties 
> were therefore regarded as dependent entities, in that they presupposed
the 
> existence of a substance (we might call substances powerful particulars)
for 
> their existence. In Metaphysics 9 Aristotle criticises the 'actualists'
of 
> Antiquity (the Megarians) in that they thought that what was possible for
a 
> thing to do was what the thing actually did. If Tom the Builder do not
build 
> then it is not possible for him to build. If he builds then it is not
possible 
> for him not to build. In short Aristotle drove a wedge between what a
thing 
> were capable of doing and what it actually does.
> 
> On Aristotle:
> 
> The best place to start, I think is the following anthology:
> 
> Theodore Scaltsas; David Charles; Mary Louise Gill (eds) [1994] Unity, 
> Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon
Press)
> 
> especially the essays by Scaltsas, Kosman, Moravcsik, Fine, and Lewis.
Avoid 
> the essay by Charlton.
> 
> All those who have read Ellis should also cf.:
> 
> Sheldon M. Cohen [1996] Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance 
> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
> 
> Sheldon uses the term 'disposition essentialism' to characterize
Aristotle's 
> position. It is quite like Ellis' position. Cohen uses 'dispositional 
> essentialism' independently of Ellis.
> 
> Other interesting works on Aristotle:
> 
> Alexander Mourelatos [1967] "Aristotle's Powers and Modern Empiricism"
Ratio 
> IX (1967)
> 
> Sarah Waterlow [1982] Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics 
> (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
> 
> Last, I want to commend the following work:
> 
> Dennis Des Chene [1996] Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late
Aristotelian 
> and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
> 
> Des Chene set out in considerable detail how Descartes constructed his 
> passivist and actualist worldview in opposition to the causal realism of
the 
> renaissance Aristotelians.
> 
> On Hegel:
> 
> I find much of the english-language literature on Hegel nearly a waste of 
> time. As I have not worked on Hegel since 1999 some new works that have 
> appeared may have changed the picture. Some quite interesting work have 
> appeared however. I am mostly interested in the Logic of Essence (from 
> Wissenschaft der Logik) and Chapter 3 from the Phenomenology. It seems to
me 
> that this may be read as implying ontological stratification.
> 
> I can only recommend the following:
> 
> Kenneth Westphal [1989] Hegel's Epistemological Realism (Dordrecht:
Reidel)
> 
> Crawford L. Elder [1980] Appropriating Hegel (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University 
> Press)
> 
> Avoid the works of the overrated Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard as they
are 
> stuck in the Kantian anti-metaphysical transcendental philosophy of
language 
> reading.
> 
> >The New Dialectics and Value Form theory
> >people for example specifically rely on Hegel for not taking that up. 
(For
> >example, and there is no need to take up this thread, in Value Form
Theory
> >and the State, Geert and Williams acknowledge the significance of
Bhaskar,
> >but, if not there, then otherwise, reject ontological stratification by
> >appeal to Hegel).  But actually, rather than the history of philosophy
> >stuff, I'm more immediately interested in your impression of contemporary
> >philosophers of science in their engagement with causal realism.  Why has
> >so little been made of the issue of ontological stratification?  My guess
> >is because mainstream realisms have emerged from the soil of Quine and
> >Putnam.  Another way of asking this is how central has the critique of
Hume
> >been to the mainstream evolution of scientific realism?  (Back to Harre
and
> >Madden again.)  In other words, it has not been the underground tradition
> >of aristotelian realism that has driven the mainstream.  Though even
there
> >is ontological stratification to be found?  By the way Erin McMullin has
a
> >wonderful small, readable set of lectures called something like "The
> >Inference that Made Science" that traces a realist thread from Aristotle
to
> >contemporary scientific realism.  He's after what Peirce called abductive
> >reasoning, though curiously he doesn't make that much of Pierce as I
> >recall.  
> 


> I am wholly in agreement with your diagnosis regarding the philosophical 
> tradition. Scientific Realism is fully compatible with light Humeanism. I 
> think that Ellis belief that it is passivism in general that lead to
Humeanism 
> as one of the possible varieties of passivism is more true to the history
of 
> philosophy than merely stating that the epistemic fallacy lead to
actualism. 
> Actualism is implicit in Descartes and Malebranche but neither of the 
> committed the epistemic fallacy in the same way that Hume did.
Traditional 
> Empiricism could not accept theoretical entities but most philosophers do
so 
> today, they embrace some sort of scientific realism. But this realism is
not 
> committed to any sort of break with Actualism, Actually, I think
Actualism is 
> in some ways more entrenched today than ever. Just look at some of the
newest 
> vogues - Four-Dimensionalism. Therefore I think it is wrong to believe
that 
> scientific realism is some sort of allies to Critical Realism (Bhaskar)
or the 
> New Essentialism (Ellis). Some of the staunchest actualists of today
accept 
> both scientific realism and metaphysical realism (I am thinking of David 
> Armstrong).
> 
> >I'm interested onlist or off on anything more you could  say about the
> >underground aristotelian tradition.
> 
> See above.
> 
> I agree with your appraisal of RTS and PON.  Without in any way intending
> divisive evaluations of Bhaskar's later work, for those of us interested
in
> a CR scientific realism, these are foundational.  Some want to qualify
them
> in terms of later developments.  Fine.  But they are there as a common
> language for us.
> 
> I do think that DPF and Plato has some merits too. Even FEW was in some
ways 
> informative.
> 
> I think it would be great to do some common reading of some of the
> references you mention.  This would take up the task of engagement you
> establish as necessary.  We could  do this with Ellis or Psillos, but
> perhaps it makes most sense to start with the Papineau collection since we
> have Marshall to get us going.  Moreover the Papineau collection is a
group
> of separate shorter essays so we wouldn't get bogged down as we always
do. 
> We could read one and move on, or not, or get bogged down anyway.  Also it
> is readily accessible and inexpensive.   Psillos or Ellis are harder to
> come by and take a considerably more sustained effort than is likely to be
> resonant with our common energies.  But I do think Psillos would be great
> to work through and actually it is readily available through Amazon etc.
> 
> I would not recommend the Papineau anthology. Some of the essays are
worth 
> reading (the ones by Boyd (which I don't have read) and Cartwright is
quite 
> good I think). Most of the pieces seem to be centered around some
fashionable 
> contributions that either questions scientific realism (Bas van Fraassen)
or 
> seeks to elaborate something that can do the work without being comitted
to 
> the entities that science postulates (Fine, Putnam). As most, if not all, 
> members to this list is already committed to a strong version of realism
I 
> don't think we would find it as helpful as we hoped (In fact I think it
will 
> lead to more dismissiveness of contemporary philosophy of science).
Psillos, I 
> think is difficult. Ellis is not as heavy as Psillos, but as you said his
book 
> is not particulary common and is expensive. A better choice, maybe would
be 
> reading an introduction to philosophy of science that emphases the issue
of 
> realism. James Ladyman's Understanding Philosophy of Science (London: 
> Routledge, 2002) or Alex Rosenberg's Philosophy of Science: A
Contemporary 
> Introduction (London: Routledge, 2001) is both good introductions to 
> philosophy of science with chapters on realism/anti-realism. The best I
think 
> would be if we agreed on what we will discuss. In any case I don't think
the 
> Papineau piece would suit us. On the other hand, I don't think I will
mange to 
> contribute to this discussion before August. So maybe you should go for
the 
> Papineau piece anyway.
> 
> The whole issue of moral realism is completely mysterious to me.  You'd
> think you could go to moral realism and more or less readily find stuff
you
> could relate to from a critical realist perspective.  But I'm inclined to
> think they are off on a different tack.  Here Marx needs to be present in
> the debate, but instead there seem to be concern with the reality of moral
> entities that doesn't seem to make much realist sense to me at all. 
> Perhaps I'm wrong.  I don't know this material and so will reserve
judgment
> until I get a better idea of what is going on.
> 
> Bhaskar for one seems to be committed to moral realism. 
> 
> Best Regards,
> 
> Ronny
> 
> PS. Someone, I think it was Marsh, asked for some literature on
positivism. On 
> of the biggest problems of course is how we are to define positivism. The 
> Positivism of Comte is different from the posit




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