Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 12:14:07 +0100
Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science


Hi Howard (and Ronny), 

>The answer to the question you ask, how they reject OS, is this:  "essence
>must appear."

Can I chip in and ask why this is held to defeat ontological
stratification? On Bhaskarian premises there is a sense in which essence
must appear, because it ultimately accounts for everything and once
activated necessarily has an effect (i.e. concepts of natural necessity
and 'ubiquity determinism' are sustained). Cf PE 164: "the generative
mechanisms of nature ... [are] the true world of [Platonic] forms, which
account in all their complex, manifold and mediated determinations for
all the phenomena of what identity theorists are pleased to call the
sensate ... and non-sensate world." 

In an open world of conjunctural determination, this is quite compatible
with OS. Imo the necessity for essence to appear only defeats OS if you
assume a constant conjunction between the two, and then you've got some
kind of closed system.

Mervyn




howard Engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.org> writes
>
>Ronny,
>
>Thanks so much for your informative post and bibliography.  A quick note
>and then I hope I can get back to your post more fully.  
>
>> I have not read Geert Reuten and barely looked at Tony Smith, So I have
>not 
>> anything interesting to add on their reading of Hegel. How do they reject 
>> ontological stratification? At least Hegel's distinction between the
>Logic of 
>> Being and the Logic of Essence in WdL seem to be committed to ontological 
>> stratification.
>
>The answer to the question you ask, how they reject OS, is this:  "essence
>must appear."
>I think that's an accurate report.  I wonder if both Aristotle and Hegel
>aren't ambiguous on this score.  What are clear examples, preBhaskar, of
>ontological stratification in the philosophical tradition?
>
>Howard 
>
>
>
>
>
>> [Original Message]
>> From: <rsmyhre-AT-frisurf.no>
>> To: <rsmyhre-AT-frisurf.no>; <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>> Cc: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>; Mervyn Hartwig
><mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> > Date: 5/27/2002 7:40:14 AM
>> Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
>>
>> Howard, Ruth, and others
>> 
>> Howard wrote:
>> 
>> >The Harre and Madden book is not that widely engaged in establishment
>> >literature either, is it?
>> 
>> Harre and Madden critically engages with existing literature. Mackie, 
>> Achinstein, Ernest Nagel, Davidson, Kim are all engaged with in Causal
>Powers. 
>> Such detailed critical engagements is systematically lacking in RTS.
>> 
>> >Tell me this, based on your review of the materials referenced, does
>anyone
>> >else develop the idea of ontological stratification?  Does Aristotle or
>the
>> >aristotelian tradition?  Hegel?  
>> 
>> The concept of ontological stratification is certainly present in what I 
>> termed the 'underground Aristotelian tradition.' The best (to my
>knowledge) 
>> are these
>> 
>> William A. Wallace [1996] The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science
>and 
>> Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis (Washington DC: Catholic University
>Press of 
>> America)
>> 
>> James Cahalan [1985] Causal Realism: An Essay in Philosophical Method and
>the 
>> Foundations of Knowledge (Lanham: University Press of America)
>> 
>> Cahalan, like Bhaskar, insists on the mere actual status of events as
>distinct 
>> from the metaphysical real status of objects (substances). Wallace is not
>as 
>> interested in the distinction between the real and the actual as
>developing a 
>> robust theory of emergence. Both accounts are a lot more detailed than
>Bhaskar.
>> 
>> I think Aristotle himself developed a stratified ontology. The
>Metaphysics 7-9 
>> and the Physics 1-3, 8, together with the biological works are the most 
>> important with regard to this. Unfortunately Aristotle is quite difficult
>to 
>> read. (the arabian philosopher Avicienna said that he had read the
>Metaphysics 
>> forty times without understanding it). Crucial to Aristotle's thinking is
>that 
>> some entities are what he terms Primary Beings in the sense that all
>other 
>> entities are dependent on them for their existence. This may sound as 
>> reductionism, but it is totally out of question for Aristotle that the 
>> dependent entities may be reduced to the primary beings. The
>philosophical 
>> tradition after Aristotle followed Plato in thinking that the primary
>beings 
>> (if there were any) must be ontological simples. Plato thought that 
>> transendent forms were simple and ontological basic. Complex entities
>were 
>> understood as derivative entities in that they were constructed out of
>their 
>> simple parts. Aristotle thought different. For him it the basic entities
>were 
>> entities that were endowed with irreducible causal powers. These entities 
>> (called natures) had an internal principle of change and stability. This
>meant 
>> that what change that is possible for a object depended on the nature of
>that 
>> object or individual. Events, actions, processes in addition to
>properties 
>> were therefore regarded as dependent entities, in that they presupposed
>the 
>> existence of a substance (we might call substances powerful particulars)
>for 
>> their existence. In Metaphysics 9 Aristotle criticises the 'actualists'
>of 
>> Antiquity (the Megarians) in that they thought that what was possible for
>a 
>> thing to do was what the thing actually did. If Tom the Builder do not
>build 
>> then it is not possible for him to build. If he builds then it is not
>possible 
>> for him not to build. In short Aristotle drove a wedge between what a
>thing 
>> were capable of doing and what it actually does.
>> 
>> On Aristotle:
>> 
>> The best place to start, I think is the following anthology:
>> 
>> Theodore Scaltsas; David Charles; Mary Louise Gill (eds) [1994] Unity, 
>> Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon
>Press)
>> 
>> especially the essays by Scaltsas, Kosman, Moravcsik, Fine, and Lewis.
>Avoid 
>> the essay by Charlton.
>> 
>> All those who have read Ellis should also cf.:
>> 
>> Sheldon M. Cohen [1996] Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance 
>> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
>> 
>> Sheldon uses the term 'disposition essentialism' to characterize
>Aristotle's 
>> position. It is quite like Ellis' position. Cohen uses 'dispositional 
>> essentialism' independently of Ellis.
>> 
>> Other interesting works on Aristotle:
>> 
>> Alexander Mourelatos [1967] "Aristotle's Powers and Modern Empiricism"
>Ratio 
>> IX (1967)
>> 
>> Sarah Waterlow [1982] Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics 
>> (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
>> 
>> Last, I want to commend the following work:
>> 
>> Dennis Des Chene [1996] Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late
>Aristotelian 
>> and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
>> 
>> Des Chene set out in considerable detail how Descartes constructed his 
>> passivist and actualist worldview in opposition to the causal realism of
>the 
>> renaissance Aristotelians.
>> 
>> On Hegel:
>> 
>> I find much of the english-language literature on Hegel nearly a waste of 
>> time. As I have not worked on Hegel since 1999 some new works that have 
>> appeared may have changed the picture. Some quite interesting work have 
>> appeared however. I am mostly interested in the Logic of Essence (from 
>> Wissenschaft der Logik) and Chapter 3 from the Phenomenology. It seems to
>me 
>> that this may be read as implying ontological stratification.
>> 
>> I can only recommend the following:
>> 
>> Kenneth Westphal [1989] Hegel's Epistemological Realism (Dordrecht:
>Reidel)
>> 
>> Crawford L. Elder [1980] Appropriating Hegel (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
>University 
>> Press)
>> 
>> Avoid the works of the overrated Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard as they
>are 
>> stuck in the Kantian anti-metaphysical transcendental philosophy of
>language 
>> reading.
>> 
>> >The New Dialectics and Value Form theory
>> >people for example specifically rely on Hegel for not taking that up. 
>(For
>> >example, and there is no need to take up this thread, in Value Form
>Theory
>> >and the State, Geert and Williams acknowledge the significance of
>Bhaskar,
>> >but, if not there, then otherwise, reject ontological stratification by
>> >appeal to Hegel).  But actually, rather than the history of philosophy
>> >stuff, I'm more immediately interested in your impression of contemporary
>> >philosophers of science in their engagement with causal realism.  Why has
>> >so little been made of the issue of ontological stratification?  My guess
>> >is because mainstream realisms have emerged from the soil of Quine and
>> >Putnam.  Another way of asking this is how central has the critique of
>Hume
>> >been to the mainstream evolution of scientific realism?  (Back to Harre
>and
>> >Madden again.)  In other words, it has not been the underground tradition
>> >of aristotelian realism that has driven the mainstream.  Though even
>there
>> >is ontological stratification to be found?  By the way Erin McMullin has
>a
>> >wonderful small, readable set of lectures called something like "The
>> >Inference that Made Science" that traces a realist thread from Aristotle
>to
>> >contemporary scientific realism.  He's after what Peirce called abductive
>> >reasoning, though curiously he doesn't make that much of Pierce as I
>> >recall.  
>> 
>
>
>> I am wholly in agreement with your diagnosis regarding the philosophical 
>> tradition. Scientific Realism is fully compatible with light Humeanism. I 
>> think that Ellis belief that it is passivism in general that lead to
>Humeanism 
>> as one of the possible varieties of passivism is more true to the history
>of 
>> philosophy than merely stating that the epistemic fallacy lead to
>actualism. 
>> Actualism is implicit in Descartes and Malebranche but neither of the 
>> committed the epistemic fallacy in the same way that Hume did.
>Traditional 
>> Empiricism could not accept theoretical entities but most philosophers do
>so 
>> today, they embrace some sort of scientific realism. But this realism is
>not 
>> committed to any sort of break with Actualism, Actually, I think
>Actualism is 
>> in some ways more entrenched today than ever. Just look at some of the
>newest 
>> vogues - Four-Dimensionalism. Therefore I think it is wrong to believe
>that 
>> scientific realism is some sort of allies to Critical Realism (Bhaskar)
>or the 
>> New Essentialism (Ellis). Some of the staunchest actualists of today
>accept 
>> both scientific realism and metaphysical realism (I am thinking of David 
>> Armstrong).
>> 
>> >I'm interested onlist or off on anything more you could  say about the
>> >underground aristotelian tradition.
>> 
>> See above.
>> 
>> I agree with your appraisal of RTS and PON.  Without in any way intending
>> divisive evaluations of Bhaskar's later work, for those of us interested
>in
>> a CR scientific realism, these are foundational.  Some want to qualify
>them
>> in terms of later developments.  Fine.  But they are there as a common
>> language for us.
>> 
>> I do think that DPF and Plato has some merits too. Even FEW was in some
>ways 
>> informative.
>> 
>> I think it would be great to do some common reading of some of the
>> references you mention.  This would take up the task of engagement you
>> establish as necessary.  We could  do this with Ellis or Psillos, but
>> perhaps it makes most sense to start with the Papineau collection since we
>> have Marshall to get us going.  Moreover the Papineau collection is a
>group
>> of separate shorter essays so we wouldn't get bogged down as we always
>do. 
>> We could read one and move on, or not, or get bogged down anyway.  Also it
>> is readily accessible and inexpensive.   Psillos or Ellis are harder to
>> come by and take a considerably more sustained effort than is likely to be
>> resonant with our common energies.  But I do think Psillos would be great
>> to work through and actually it is readily available through Amazon etc.
>> 
>> I would not recommend the Papineau anthology. Some of the essays are
>worth 
>> reading (the ones by Boyd (which I don't have read) and Cartwright is
>quite 
>> good I think). Most of the pieces seem to be centered around some
>fashionable 
>> contributions that either questions scientific realism (Bas van Fraassen)
>or 
>> seeks to elaborate something that can do the work without being comitted
>to 
>> the entities that science postulates (Fine, Putnam). As most, if not all, 
>> members to this list is already committed to a strong version of realism
>I 
>> don't think we would find it as helpful as we hoped (In fact I think it
>will 
>> lead to more dismissiveness of contemporary philosophy of science).
>Psillos, I 
>> think is difficult. Ellis is not as heavy as Psillos, but as you said his
>book 
>> is not particulary common and is expensive. A better choice, maybe would
>be 
>> reading an introduction to philosophy of science that emphases the issue
>of 
>> realism. James Ladyman's Understanding Philosophy of Science (London: 
>> Routledge, 2002) or Alex Rosenberg's Philosophy of Science: A
>Contemporary 
>> Introduction (London: Routledge, 2001) is both good introductions to 
>> philosophy of science with chapters on realism/anti-realism. The best I
>think 
>> would be if we agreed on what we will discuss. In any case I don't think
>the 
>> Papineau piece would suit us. On the other hand, I don't think I will
>mange to 
>> contribute to this discussion before August. So maybe you should go for
>the 
>> Papineau piece anyway.
>> 
>> The whole issue of moral realism is completely mysterious to me.  You'd
>> think you could go to moral realism and more or less readily find stuff
>you
>> could relate to from a critical realist perspective.  But I'm inclined to
>> think they are off on a different tack.  Here Marx needs to be present in
>> the debate, but instead there seem to be concern with the reality of moral
>> entities that doesn't seem to make much realist sense to me at all. 
>> Perhaps I'm wrong.  I don't know this material and so will reserve
>judgment
>> until I get a better idea of what is going on.
>> 
>> Bhaskar for one seems to be committed to moral realism. 
>> 
>> Best Regards,
>> 
>> Ronny
>> 
>> PS. Someone, I think it was Marsh, asked for some literature on
>positivism. On 
>> of the biggest problems of course is how we are to define positivism. The 
>> Positivism of Comte is different from the posit
>
>
>
>
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