Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 22:39:00 +0100
Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science


Hi Dick

>It is one thing to say that there are essences which ultimately account for 
>all that occurs, quite another to say that every possible essence must 
>ultimately "appear."  Isn't this equvalent to saying that all possible 
>worlds (universes, pluriverses) will ultimately be actual?

I think it would be, but I didn't say it - rather, that whatever appears
is caused (by 'essence') (ubiquity determinism).

Best,

Mervyn


Richard Moodey <moodey001-AT-mail1.gannon.edu> writes
>Hi Mervyn,
>
>At 12:14 PM 06/04/2002 +0100, you wrote:
>>Hi Howard (and Ronny),
>>
>> >The answer to the question you ask, how they reject OS, is this:  "essence
>> >must appear."
>>
>>Can I chip in and ask why this is held to defeat ontological
>>stratification? On Bhaskarian premises there is a sense in which essence
>>must appear, because it ultimately accounts for everything and once
>>activated necessarily has an effect (i.e. concepts of natural necessity
>>and 'ubiquity determinism' are sustained). Cf PE 164: "the generative
>>mechanisms of nature ... [are] the true world of [Platonic] forms, which
>>account in all their complex, manifold and mediated determinations for
>>all the phenomena of what identity theorists are pleased to call the
>>sensate ... and non-sensate world."
>>
>>In an open world of conjunctural determination, this is quite compatible
>>with OS. Imo the necessity for essence to appear only defeats OS if you
>>assume a constant conjunction between the two, and then you've got some
>>kind of closed system.
>>
>>Mervyn
>
>It seems useful to me to distinguish between the essence of something 
>actual and an essence of something that remains  potential.  When the 
>probability of an event is 1, the generative mechanisms -- essences -- 
>producing that event "appear" in the occurrence of the event.   Is it 
>legitimate to ask the question in terms of the probability of events?  Do 
>the generative mechanisms for events with low probabilities also have low 
>probabilities of appearing?
>
>It is one thing to say that there are essences which ultimately account for 
>all that occurs, quite another to say that every possible essence must 
>ultimately "appear."  Isn't this equvalent to saying that all possible 
>worlds (universes, pluriverses) will ultimately be actual?
>
>Regards,
>
>Dick
>
>
>
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-- 
Mervyn Hartwig
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