Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2002 21:57:37 +0100
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: BHA: CR, Marxian Histories and Religion


Hi Viren, Hans,

>For example in FEW he says
>that "man's intrinsic nature or dharma is to realise God . . ."  I think
>this goes beyond what most Marxists, reductionist or not, would
>affirm.  

Roy's latest work largely drops discourse about God, especially with a
capital 'G', and espouses a 'spirituality within the limits of
secularism, consistent with all faiths and no faith'.

I'd love to comment further on your interesting discussion, but I'm off
on hols for a bit.

Mervyn


viren viven murthy <vvmurthy-AT-midway.uchicago.edu> writes
>Hi Hans,
>
>Your remarks are extremely helpful.  I have ordered C. Hill's book and so
>I will be able to continue our discussion in a more informed manner in a
>couple of weeks.
>
>With respect to spirituality and Marxism, I wouldn't say that they are
>mutually exclusive.  However, when it comes to religion, I think that
>Marxists and the new Bhaskar would part ways.  Of course, Bhaskar would
>probably say that he is also talking about spirituality, but certain
>passages seem to imply religious concepts.  For example in FEW he says
>that "man's intrinsic nature or dharma is to realise God . . ."  I think
>this goes beyond what most Marxists, reductionist or not, would
>affirm.  
>
>You point out the humanist Marx has much in common with the the new
>Bhaskar.  Again, I suspect this is true up to a point.  As N. Geras shows,
>Marx clearly works with a concept of human nature, but it seems more
>Aristotelean than religious/spiritual.  In particular, it does not seem to
>entail a notion of the divine.  
>
>Hill's book brings up an important issue, namely the relationship
>between pre-modern ideologies/religious sensibilities and our vision
>of a socialist society.  This is in line with James Daly's main point
>about linking the Thomist tradition with Marxism.  I guess the key
>question for me comes down to: What does Thomist Marxism add to
>Aristotelean Marxism (one that used human nature as a normative category,
>but does not invoke divinity) and are they both equally spiritual?  If one
>claims that Thomist Marxism is more spiritual, is this because these
>Marsists explicitly invoke God?  This gets to a central distinction
>between DCR and TDCR.  DCR is clearly Aristotelean but there is no mention
>of the divine, except for comments like "God has given ontological proofs
>a bad name."
>
>I am also interested in whether Hill actually endorses the contend of
>puritan ideology or whether he just envisions  reproducing the rhythms of
>that society in a modern world.  If the latter, then we must ask to what
>extend "those rhythms" (and here some general description of them will be
>crucial) can be de-linked from Medieval religious theories. 
>
>Best,
>
>Viren
>
>On Tue, 27 Aug 2002 HDespain-AT-aol.com wrote:
>
>> Hi Viren,
>> 
>> It may be wrong, but I detect in your initial post, and also in your response 
>> to me, that somehow you understand Marxism and Spirituality as excluding the 
>> other.  This to me seem to be a grave error.  First, in that there are 
>> traditions within Marxism itself (i.e. Marxian Humanists), and secondly the 
>> current crisis is very much (in part) a moral and spiritual crisis, a lack of 
>> human connectedness, and absence of a higher meaning, i.e. alienation on many 
>> dimensions of human life.
>> 
>> You are correct that many Marxists are not "sympathetic to religion or 
>> spirituality."  Of course this tradition goes back to Marx himself, and his 
>> critique of Feuerbach's "new religion."  Humanist Marxists have keep the 
>> notion of human spirituality alive as a tradition in Marxism, and have always 
>> been a very important pulse in Western Marxism (especially since 1956).  I 
>> agree with Bhaskar when he suggests that the absence of (a significant) 
>> spiritual side of human life has impeded the development of emancipatory 
>> societies (and allowed for an alienated form of the social to stumble 
>> historically forward).  Of course, this spiritual impoverishment is not 
>> merely a function of Marx, nor simply a lack on the part of a secular based 
>> theory.  It is a function of modernism.  It is in this sense that I see C 
>> Hill's book as quite important.  That spirituality gave feudalism a different 
>> rhythm, meaning and relation to the earth; a rhythm, meaning and relation 
>> that has not yet been fully understand by the moden(ist) mind.
>>  
>> Bhaskar is far from the first to attempt to fill the spiritual void for the 
>> improvement of society, but it is nonetheless an extermely important side of 
>> human existence that has failed to receive serious *philosophical* 
>> consideration, especially on the left.  And it is important that the Left 
>> reclaim the politicals of spirituality, not to mention ethics, back from the 
>> dogmatism of the Right, and the impoverished 'ethical' forms they defend.  
>> 
>> What is rather unique in Bhaskarian meta-Reality is that not only is it very 
>> serious philosophically, it is also quite politically self-conscious and 
>> practical (and secular) in its orientation.
>> 
>> Also, in that Bhaskar has not offered and sort of development theory of 
>> religion, I am not at all sure what you mean when you suggest that TDCR would 
>> necessarily view any theory differently.  It seems that the importance of 
>> spirituality is more at issue here.  In this context I did not mean to imply, 
>> as you seemed to interpret me, that values do not influence (social) 
>> historical writing.  Moreover, the tendency of modernism and technology 
>> devalue the 'material' importance of spirituality, and makes religion and 
>> spirituality seems naive, and a waste of time for life, living and above all 
>> for making money etc.  Consequently spirituality has often been neglected and 
>> degraded as a political priority.
>> 
>> Moreover, it can be argued that Marxist tendencies to devalue the importance 
>> of spirituality is also matched by a general neglect of the role of culture 
>> etc.  But just as the neglect of culture in general, race, gender etc. have 
>> proven to be shortcomings for both Marxism as a social scientific project and 
>> in creating emancipatory society, so too has the neglect of spirituality.
>> 
>> Now with respect to  history.  
>> 
>> It seems to me that Technological Determinism has been the dominate 
>> historical interpretation of Marx/Engels since Marx's death (Marx was not a 
>> technological determinist, thus it starts with his death).  Just as this 
>> tradition was beginning to fade, Cohen published his important work, and if 
>> it is not the dominant theory today, every alternative interpretation must 
>> face the defense of technological determinism as articulated by Cohen.
>> 
>> Of course Cohen book was in response to Althusserian Marxism.  Althusserian 
>> historical materialism has a dual existence, that expressed by Althusser and 
>> that expressed by Baliber.  Regardless of that ... there are many 
>> epistemological elements Althusser shares with CR.  The main element that 
>> differentiates Althusserianism from CR is the notion that drives the former, 
>> namely over-determination.  It is this term that informs us that 
>> Althusserianism is unwilling/unable to defend an ontology.  This means of 
>> course that they must be presupposing one, and it is that articulated by 
>> Marx.  But, as such Marxian categories are reified, and history is treated in 
>> a very rigid and dogmatic fashion.  I think this is an important point that 
>> Thompson attempted to make against Anderson (although Thompson does trace the 
>> problem back to ontology, but he does harp on about categorial dogmatism).
>> 
>> It is difficult to say who of the theorists you list are more consisent with 
>> critical realism.  The easy answer is to say none of them are CRs.  However, 
>> has you point out "writing of history itself involves certain ontological 
>> assumptions in line with CR."  With respect to Thompson, he (in MEWC) 
>> certainly is implictly attempting to overcome the same dualities as Bhaskar 
>> is explicitly attacking in PON.  Nonetheless, I am less convinced by Thompson 
>> in his debate with Anderson, and Anderson all of a sudden appears to be more 
>> CR.
>> 
>> Thompson is of the Dobbian tradition, but in *The Poverty of Theory* is 
>> unable to defend any notion of structure (among other ontological mistakes, I 
>> detect Thompson committing the epistemic fallacy several different times, 
>> which Anderson is always rightly quick to exploit).  However, I am struck by 
>> how structualist driven is Part two of MEWC.  For example chapter six on 
>> Exploitation.  Although in part two of MEWC Thompson says he is concerned not 
>> with the actual historical outcomes (such as whether the wage-level 
>> increased, decreased or stayed constant) but with how individual English 
>> working-class "felt" about their historical circumstances.  These "feeling" 
>> presuppose the "laws of motion" and mechanisms at work in the system in which 
>> these individuals were living.  Although in their the debate Thompson (and 
>> Anderson) invoke the authority of Dobb as his methodological mentor, he is 
>> unable to articulate the relationship between structure and agency as 
>> successfully.  Dobb's advantage here seems his deep(er) understanding  of the 
>> issues involved in volume  two of Captital (and/or part VII of volume one).  
>> 
>> Of this tradition in general Dobb, Rodney Hilton, and Robert Brenner are 
>> sometimes overly structuralist, and agency not treated as careful as others.  
>> Whereas Thompson and HIl, sometimes over emphasize agency (Hobsbawm is much 
>> more eclectic, in his labor history and history of bandits, agency dominates, 
>> while in his history of industrial England and modern history structure is 
>> the emphasis).  The importance of this tradition is that they are consciously 
>> struggling with, and (at least) attempting to overcome the dualities of 
>> social life in their actual work.  This very much seems to be in the spirit 
>> of CR, and that of Marx himself.
>> 
>> The other thing that strikes me here is that their commentary often 
>> presupposes moral realism and ethical naturalism, this is what truely 
>> differentiate them from other irrealist and nilistic tradition (I do not know 
>> of any published work on this aspect of writing history, at least not 
>> concerning these historians).  This seems of special importance with respect 
>> to philosophical differences influencing the writing of history.
>> 
>> all the best,
>> 
>> Hans D.
>> 
>> 
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>> 
>
>
>
>
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-- 
Mervyn Hartwig
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London SE24 ONS
United Kingdom
Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>

There is another world, but it is in this one.
Paul Eluard



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