From: HDespain-AT-aol.com
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2002 22:23:55 EDT
Subject: Re: BHA: CR, Marxian Histories and  Religion


Hi Viren,

It may be wrong, but I detect in your initial post, and also in your response 
to me, that somehow you understand Marxism and Spirituality as excluding the 
other.  This to me seem to be a grave error.  First, in that there are 
traditions within Marxism itself (i.e. Marxian Humanists), and secondly the 
current crisis is very much (in part) a moral and spiritual crisis, a lack of 
human connectedness, and absence of a higher meaning, i.e. alienation on many 
dimensions of human life.

You are correct that many Marxists are not "sympathetic to religion or 
spirituality."  Of course this tradition goes back to Marx himself, and his 
critique of Feuerbach's "new religion."  Humanist Marxists have keep the 
notion of human spirituality alive as a tradition in Marxism, and have always 
been a very important pulse in Western Marxism (especially since 1956).  I 
agree with Bhaskar when he suggests that the absence of (a significant) 
spiritual side of human life has impeded the development of emancipatory 
societies (and allowed for an alienated form of the social to stumble 
historically forward).  Of course, this spiritual impoverishment is not 
merely a function of Marx, nor simply a lack on the part of a secular based 
theory.  It is a function of modernism.  It is in this sense that I see C 
Hill's book as quite important.  That spirituality gave feudalism a different 
rhythm, meaning and relation to the earth; a rhythm, meaning and relation 
that has not yet been fully understand by the moden(ist) mind.
 
Bhaskar is far from the first to attempt to fill the spiritual void for the 
improvement of society, but it is nonetheless an extermely important side of 
human existence that has failed to receive serious *philosophical* 
consideration, especially on the left.  And it is important that the Left 
reclaim the politicals of spirituality, not to mention ethics, back from the 
dogmatism of the Right, and the impoverished 'ethical' forms they defend.  

What is rather unique in Bhaskarian meta-Reality is that not only is it very 
serious philosophically, it is also quite politically self-conscious and 
practical (and secular) in its orientation.

Also, in that Bhaskar has not offered and sort of development theory of 
religion, I am not at all sure what you mean when you suggest that TDCR would 
necessarily view any theory differently.  It seems that the importance of 
spirituality is more at issue here.  In this context I did not mean to imply, 
as you seemed to interpret me, that values do not influence (social) 
historical writing.  Moreover, the tendency of modernism and technology 
devalue the 'material' importance of spirituality, and makes religion and 
spirituality seems naive, and a waste of time for life, living and above all 
for making money etc.  Consequently spirituality has often been neglected and 
degraded as a political priority.

Moreover, it can be argued that Marxist tendencies to devalue the importance 
of spirituality is also matched by a general neglect of the role of culture 
etc.  But just as the neglect of culture in general, race, gender etc. have 
proven to be shortcomings for both Marxism as a social scientific project and 
in creating emancipatory society, so too has the neglect of spirituality.

Now with respect to  history.  

It seems to me that Technological Determinism has been the dominate 
historical interpretation of Marx/Engels since Marx's death (Marx was not a 
technological determinist, thus it starts with his death).  Just as this 
tradition was beginning to fade, Cohen published his important work, and if 
it is not the dominant theory today, every alternative interpretation must 
face the defense of technological determinism as articulated by Cohen.

Of course Cohen book was in response to Althusserian Marxism.  Althusserian 
historical materialism has a dual existence, that expressed by Althusser and 
that expressed by Baliber.  Regardless of that ... there are many 
epistemological elements Althusser shares with CR.  The main element that 
differentiates Althusserianism from CR is the notion that drives the former, 
namely over-determination.  It is this term that informs us that 
Althusserianism is unwilling/unable to defend an ontology.  This means of 
course that they must be presupposing one, and it is that articulated by 
Marx.  But, as such Marxian categories are reified, and history is treated in 
a very rigid and dogmatic fashion.  I think this is an important point that 
Thompson attempted to make against Anderson (although Thompson does trace the 
problem back to ontology, but he does harp on about categorial dogmatism).

It is difficult to say who of the theorists you list are more consisent with 
critical realism.  The easy answer is to say none of them are CRs.  However, 
has you point out "writing of history itself involves certain ontological 
assumptions in line with CR."  With respect to Thompson, he (in MEWC) 
certainly is implictly attempting to overcome the same dualities as Bhaskar 
is explicitly attacking in PON.  Nonetheless, I am less convinced by Thompson 
in his debate with Anderson, and Anderson all of a sudden appears to be more 
CR.

Thompson is of the Dobbian tradition, but in *The Poverty of Theory* is 
unable to defend any notion of structure (among other ontological mistakes, I 
detect Thompson committing the epistemic fallacy several different times, 
which Anderson is always rightly quick to exploit).  However, I am struck by 
how structualist driven is Part two of MEWC.  For example chapter six on 
Exploitation.  Although in part two of MEWC Thompson says he is concerned not 
with the actual historical outcomes (such as whether the wage-level 
increased, decreased or stayed constant) but with how individual English 
working-class "felt" about their historical circumstances.  These "feeling" 
presuppose the "laws of motion" and mechanisms at work in the system in which 
these individuals were living.  Although in their the debate Thompson (and 
Anderson) invoke the authority of Dobb as his methodological mentor, he is 
unable to articulate the relationship between structure and agency as 
successfully.  Dobb's advantage here seems his deep(er) understanding  of the 
issues involved in volume  two of Captital (and/or part VII of volume one).  

Of this tradition in general Dobb, Rodney Hilton, and Robert Brenner are 
sometimes overly structuralist, and agency not treated as careful as others.  
Whereas Thompson and HIl, sometimes over emphasize agency (Hobsbawm is much 
more eclectic, in his labor history and history of bandits, agency dominates, 
while in his history of industrial England and modern history structure is 
the emphasis).  The importance of this tradition is that they are consciously 
struggling with, and (at least) attempting to overcome the dualities of 
social life in their actual work.  This very much seems to be in the spirit 
of CR, and that of Marx himself.

The other thing that strikes me here is that their commentary often 
presupposes moral realism and ethical naturalism, this is what truely 
differentiate them from other irrealist and nilistic tradition (I do not know 
of any published work on this aspect of writing history, at least not 
concerning these historians).  This seems of special importance with respect 
to philosophical differences influencing the writing of history.

all the best,

Hans D.


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