File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2002/bhaskar.0209, message 24


Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 12:18:25 -0500 (CDT)
From: viren viven murthy <vvmurthy-AT-midway.uchicago.edu>
Subject: Re: BHA: Culture as structure


Hi Doug,

Thanks for your detailed response.

I will get back to you once I have read your papers, but here I will just
mention one issue, namely the difference between relations, schemata and
resources.

I would agree that structures would not reduce to schemata, but I would
add that they are not simply relations.  In other words, all relations are
not structures. I think that Sewell brings in schemata and resources to
distinguish between relations that are structures and those that are not.
This is why although he is making a critical realist turn, he does not
think that his 1992 article, in which he elaborates on Giddens' position,
goes against CR.  In particular, he believes that he can maintain the
ontological hiatus between structure and agency, which Archer and others
stress.  In any case, Sewell clearly links structure to relations:

the notion of structure does denominate, however problematically,
something very important about social relations:  the tendency of patterns
of relations to be reproduced, even when actors engaging in the relations
are unaware of the patterns or do not desire their reproduction.(3)

So it appears that we are back to the question of whether culture is a
social relation and this depends on our definitions of " the social and
culture."  Sewell's present project is clearly to rework a definition of
culture a la Geertz or Sahlins into a CR framework.  In this case, culture
is an "ensemble of symbols and practices" and "practices" that mutually
sustain each other to make a whole.  Hence, culture is a combination of
system and practice.  The social, on the other hand is an ensemble of
structures, including cultural, economic and political structures.

I think new cultural historians (like Sewell) would agree that
in some sense class relations can exist even when people are not conscious
of them.  However, he would argue that the same is true of cultural
structures.  On the other hand, I would say that workers need some
understanding of the rules of capitalist society, before they go out on
the market.  This is why, the Chinese media is filled with examples of the
"good worker", who does not get upset when laid-off, but becomes a
rich businessman.  More fundamentally, peasants who come to the city to
find work must know something about the wage-contract.  Obviously, unlike
many aspects of what we generally mean by culture, the wage contract is
similar in most capitalist countries.  However, Sewell would just say
that, at a certain level of abstraction, the cultural structures essential
to capitalism (which is itself an ensemble of structures and hence not
reducible to culture) must be same in all capitalist countries.

By the way, I will be going to China in the next few days, so I will be
back on the list again, when I get my e-mail set up there (probably a
couple of weeks).

Best,

Viren



On Sat, 7 Sep 2002, Doug Porpora wrote:

> Hi everyone,
> 
> As my previous message was the first I've sent the list in a long 
> time, I was flabbergasted to receive tons of messages telling me not 
> only who had received my message but also who had read it and who had 
> had the nerve just to delete my wisdom unread.  Realizing now that I 
> have done the same when way behind, I apologize to all who have 
> received such reports of my behavior.  But is not this level of 
> surveillance not a bit spooky?
> 
> Anyway, to the issues:
> 
> 1.  Viren, I will send you separately the pieces I still have on file.
> 
> 2.  Unlike, I guess Carrol, I have no problem with culture defined as 
> intersubjective or shared norms, values, and beliefs.
> 
> 3.  As such, yes, cultural elements are generative mechanisms too.
> 
> 4.  In social science, I would decline to call cultural elements 
> "structures," although, as Tobin points out, each -- like a text -- 
> might have a structure.
> 
> 5.  Viren to get to your point directly, I don't think we need to go 
> to natural relations among resources to find what does not reduce to 
> rules or schemas.  No relation reduces to rules, resources, or 
> schemas.  Not even a discursive relation within a text is a rule, a 
> schema, or a resource.  Relations are just a separate, irreducible 
> category that Sewell, following Giddens, has simply ignored.
> 
> 6.  Again, Viren, I am quite happy to concede that relations may 
> arise from rules.  The constitutive rules of property ownership give 
> rise to quite definite property (or class) relations.  So, yes, a 
> nonreductive materialism can admit that rules have even logical 
> priority in many cases.
> 
> 7.  Yet, nevertheless, class relations are not the same as the rules 
> of property ownership that give rise to them.  Nor is the power 
> relation between worker and boss (or between dept head and provost) 
> the same as the rules that create that this power relation.
> 
> 8.  Once created by the rules, class relations or power relations can 
> exist without anyone's knowing about them.  They are what I call 
> "emergently material."  In any case, however much they arise from 
> cultural intersubjectivity, they are not themselves either cultural 
> or intersubjective.  They are ontologically objective.
> 
> 9.  To ignore such objective or (emergently) material relations is to 
> do away with political economy.  It is to pursue what amounts to 
> cultural reductionism.  Although no one listens to us anymore, such 
> reductionism amounts to what we Marxists call idealism.  Idealist is 
> what I consider the Giddens-Sewell trajectory to be.  (Mervyn, 
> wouldn't Rachel like this hard Marxist talk from one who is soft on 
> God.)
> 
> 10.  Viren, Sewell's new piece on going beyond the cultural turn 
> sounds salutary. Can you send the reference; I would be very 
> interested to read it.
> 
> 11.  Dick, I don't like Skocpol's definition of structure since 
> anything social can be changed by people.  I do basically agree with 
> your own definition of structure as patterns, insisting, however, 
> that patterns are composed of relations.
> 
> Now, be on notice that I will be looking very carefully to see who 
> among you just deletes my message unread.  And my computer will even 
> tell me in advance whether your subjective reaction is appropriate.
> 
> doug
> 
> 
> >Hi Doug, Tobin, Carrol, Dick and other listers,
> >
> >I would definitely like to read the articles in which you deal with
> >Sewell.
> >
> >From Tobin's last post (which I found helpful as usual), I was beginning
> >to conclude that Sewell's position was actually quite close to CR, but
> >you now you bring up another complex issue, namely the definition of
> >structure. 
> >
> >In a number of places, Bhaskar and Archer claim that structures are real
> >generative mechanisms.  Giddens, on the other hand, calls them rules and
> >resources.  Sewell  follows Giddens by calling them "schemes and
> >resources."  He argues that the idea of "rules" are
> >too formalistic and does not account for tacit schemes.
> >
> >Archer criticizes this conception of structure and tries to give examples
> >of "rule-rule" structures and "resource-resource" structures.  This is the
> >logical way to proceed in criticizing Sewell, since he basically argues
> >that all social generative mechanisms can redescribed as schemes and
> >resources.
> >
> >When I first read this definition, I thought that Sewell's definition
> >would run into problems when dealing with culture.  However, the key is
> >to note that for Giddens/Sewell resources are "anything that can serve as
> >a source of power in social relations."  He then separates resources into
> >"authoritative" and "allocative" (Sewell uses human and non-human).  Hence
> >it
> >seems that one way of separating cultural from non-cultural social
> >structures would be to distinguish between the types of resources
> >involved.
> >
> >But coming back to Archer's criticisms, she gives some examples of
> >of resource relations that I found quite compelling.  For example, she
> >claimed that a famine was a resource-resource structure.  It seems to me
> >that insofar as famines are a natural occurrence, I would conclude that
> >schemas are required to recognize them, but they are not an essential part
> >of their
> >structure.  I think that there are two responses available to Sewell and
> >Giddens.  First, they could claim that if one conceives of famines as
> >natural occurrences, they  fall outside of the scope of social
> >theory.  Then
> >they could conclude that, while all structures are generative mechanisms,
> >only social structures can be described as schemas and resources.  On the
> >other hand, if one follows Amartya Sen and stresses the human component in
> >emergence of famines, then famines are an emergent property of a
> >conjuncture of structures, some of which are social, and hence can be
> >described as schemes and resources, and some of which are natural.
> >
> >In the end, I think that Sewell ( I am not sure about Giddens ) would
> >agree with Tobin that all social structures have semiotic
> >components, but in cultural structures, the weight of meaning is more
> >significant.
> >
> >I think it is interesting to compare Sewell and Bhaskar, since both of
> >them appear to be groping for a similar position.  In PON, Bhaskar tried
> >to avoid the pitfalls of positivism and relativism.  Sewell has followed
> >the same path with respect to the practice of social history.  Given that
> >he was a social historians writing in the late 70s and early 80s, he
> >actively embraced the linguistic turn and the criticism of Marxist
> >positivism.   Hence he was part of the "cultural history" movement and his
> >most famous work is a cultural analysis of French workers during the
> >Revolution.  However, in the late 80s and early 90s, he has begun to find
> >that cultural history has avoided positivism only to lapse into
> >relativism.  Consequently, Sewell has been searching in Bhaskar for a path
> >that can synthesize aspects of cultural and social history.
> >
> >However, in the late 70s, Bhaskar partially saw himself as providing the
> >epistemological foundations for Marxism, but he doesn't get into any
> >detailed discussion of Marxist histories.  Hans' comments about the
> >Dobbian Marxism being in line with CR was helpful, and hence I wonder
> >about the relationship between that Marxism and the new cultural
> >historians that want to take non-cultural structures more seriously.
> >
> >Best,
> >
> >Viren   
> >
> >On Thu, 5 Sep 2002, Douglas Porpora wrote:
> >
> >>  Hi Viren, Dick, Carrol, Tobin,
> >>
> >>  Your discussion has aroused me from lurkerdom.  As it happens, I have
> >>  written on Sewell's position a number of times in passing.  My views
> >>  are close, I think, to Tobin's.
> >>
> >>  For me the crux is that Sewell defines structure as rules and
> >>  schemas.  So essentially, he has just taken Giddens's definition and
> >>  added schemas.  Rules and Schemas are both cultural elements.  So
> >>  culture now swallows up structure entirely.
> >>
> >>  The problem is what happens to social relations -- what used to be
> >>  covered by the term structure?  Power relations, inequality,
> >>  exploitation, dependency  -- none of these is either a rule or a
> >>  cultural schema.  So by Sewell's definition, now widely accepted by
> >>  cultural sociologists, these are not structure.
> >>
> >>  Instead, now structure too belongs to culture.  Thus, we no longer
> >>  even have the words to even identify the sides in what used to be the
> >  > "culture of poverty" debate.  Instead, the debate has been legislated
> >>  out of existence by definition.
> >>
> >>  This is what I object to, and I think Tobin is correct that it falls
> >>  under Archer's description of conflation.  I am fairly certain Archer
> >>  would agree.
> >>
> >>  Well, back to exciting, university politics in which I am fighting
> >>  the powers and principalities of this world.
> >>
> >>  doug
> >>
> >>
> >>  --
> >>  doug porpora, head
> >>  Department of Culture and Communication
> >>  Drexel University
> >>  Phila PA
> >>  (215) 895-2404
> >>
> >>  porporad-AT-drexel.edu
> >>
> >>
> >>       --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> 
> -- 
> doug porpora
> dept of culture and communication
> drexel university
> phila pa 19104
> USA
> 
> porporad-AT-drexel.edu
> 
> 
>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> 




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