File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2002/bhaskar.0209, message 33


From: "Jamie Morgan" <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Are we dialectical materialist realists or empiricist realists?
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 14:02:29 +0100


Phil, do you read any philosophy of science beside that contained in Marx &
Engels - do you read any science? That philosophy can debate possible
accounts of ontology is important - but science will not collapse without
philosophy because science operates with a variety of unexplored assumptions
(which of course entail positions in ontology but do not demand
philosophical expertise in order for science to avoid collapse - your
position ironically implies causal philosphy i.e. causal ideas). Put as you
do that the universe is matter in motion there is little to quibble with
because the point is incomplete and trivial. What is matter what binds
matter and what is between matter - the role of nothingness itself which is
after all vital since the relative portions of matter to vacuum dictate
whether the universe is cyclical or unilinearly expansionary  (and by matter
are you including other quanta which also entail forms of energy or forms of
quasi matter based on vibrational forms of energy quanta - i.e. strings?)
These are key questions for astrophysics. I'm afraid Engels genius though he
was is not much help here.

Jamie

PS Imissed the start of this discussion what is the heart of the contention
anyway?
----- Original Message -----
From: "Phil Walden" <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2002 10:53 PM
Subject: RE: BHA: Are we dialectical materialist realists or empiricist
realists?


> Jamie,
>
> So are we to take it that you agree with the philosophical stance of
> Marx/Engels in ANTI-DUHRING that the best ontology of the universe that we
> have is: matter in motion?  Or if you do not agree with this, can you
supply
> a more viable ontology?  I would be surprised.  It is necessary to insist
on
> this philosophical point, because without it science will collapse from
the
> influence of idealism.
>
> Phil
> >
> >
> > Mervyn,
> >
> > in addition to your response, whether ideas are material (perhaps I've
got
> > the wrong end of ths tick but):
> >
> > Flowing from the long tradition of philosophy of the mind - qualia etc.
> > whether ideas are in some sense not just intangible materially effective
> > superveneienct aspects of being i.e. entailing some form of
non-reductive
> > physical/biological process - is an area of philosophical speculation
that
> > is parasitic on the very processes it speculates upon - but is no
> > more than
> > that - the fact that neurons firing in certain areas of the brain
> > correspond
> > to ideas may not imply that the concept of yellow is that firing anymore
> > than transport by train is the passengers but this in itself does
> > not settle
> > whether ideas have an additional materiality that is as yet undiscovered
> > (this has always bveen a problem with the concept of consciousness for
> > physics in terms of the causality of the immaterial on the material). At
> > this level of argument the ultimate recourse is the way the world
> > is and the
> > evidence that we can accumulate for it - Engels science is woefully
> > inadequate/anachronsitic as it must be, given his historical location,
> > whatever one thinks of his dialectics. It may be that we will
> > find some form
> > of energy signature, fundamental subatomic mechanism, over and above the
> > terminology of SEPM (which itself is no more than pointing us in the
> > direction of an explanation of possibility), which improves our
> > understanding of  consciousness etc. At the moment the
> > materiality of ideas
> > debate is one about the coherence of concepts not the veracity of
> > concepts.
> > We can eliminate forms of argument that cannot sustain their own
> > possibility
> > but we lack the tools to move beyond that postition.
> >
> > Jamie
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> > To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> > Cc: "Rachel Sharp" <rssharp-AT-btinternet.com>
> > Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 7:04 PM
> > Subject: Re: BHA: Are we dialectical materialist realists or empiricist
> > realists?
> >
> >
> > > Hi Phil,
> > >
> > > I'm not trying to get away with anything (!), just saying what I
> > > provisionally think, I hope with some supporting argument.
> > >
> > > I don't accept that ideas *are* matter (scientifically or
> > > philosophically). While they depend on a material substrate for their
> > > articulation (brain states, books, computer technology etc) they seem
to
> > > me, like relations, patently immaterial (what is 'material' about
Marx's
> > > concept of a 'yellow logarithm' for example? Your position looks like
> > > reductionism, which as you know Marx and Engels opposed, arguing that
> > > mental phenomena are irreducible to, but emergent from, matter. I
don't
> > > know Dietzgen or Adorno well enough to argue the toss with you about
> > > them. Certainly, Adorno saw himself as a philosophical materialist,
but
> > > I doubt very much that he espoused your kind of apparent identity
> > > thinking.
> > >
> > > On the other hand, it could be that our difference is largely
semantic.
> > > You want to defend 'dialectical materialism' which you see as
providing
> > > answers to the 'spiritual' question of the meaning of life. DM as I
> > > understand it holds that 'matter' is radically, even infinitely,
> > > creative and transformative, dialectically leaping over itself, as it
> > > were, to produce the stratified, differentiated and changing world
that
> > > we know. When you add to this your (philosophical) notion that 'ideas
> > > [are] a material part of reality', is this so very different
> > > (terminology aside) from the position Bhaskar currently espouses, i.e.
> > > that ideas (mind) are enfolded qua possibility within matter? I can't
> > > see how the latter is an 'empiricist realist' position. It is arrived
at
> > > by transcendental argument. Nor does it reduce everything to
> > > intentionality. The ontology is still imo one of open possibility.
> > >
> > > Bhaskar claims in his latest books that materialism is a very
> > > underanalysed concept and wants to discuss what it is with Marxists at
> > > the Centre for Critical Realism seminar in London in November. I don't
> > > know how far he's developed his own analysis. There's a brief critique
> > > of the reductive materialism characteristic of modernity in
> > > *Reflections* which I believe is developed more fully in one of the
> > > still unpublished volumes of *Meta-Reality*. It's early days in the
> > > reception and assessment of his latest position.
> > >
> > > Opponents (for want of a better word) of the spiritual turn keep
asking
> > > me what's the point, aren't there better things to do? I'm sure you'll
> > > agree with me that the struggle for a better world must proceed at
every
> > > level, including philosophy. As I very broadly see it, Bhaskar is
trying
> > > to help undermine the philosophical props of the status quo, to show
> > > that a better world is possible and to help forge a worldview fitting
> > > for such. This doesn't preclude, but calls for and hopes to inform and
> > > encourage, more substantive contributions at other levels.
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Phil Walden <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk> writes
> > > >Hi Mervyn, all,
> > > >
> > > >Mervyn you write that you hold "with Bhaskar that mind *as
possibility*
> > is
> > > >enfolded in matter from the outset both qua causal power and
'implicate
> > > >order' or the potential stratification of being.".
> > > >
> > > >You then go on to say that relations cannot be material in a
> > metaphysical
> > > >sense because "they are just an irreducible category: the
> > universe is so
> > > >constituted that relations are causal".
> > > >
> > > >Question: are ideas *philosophically* matter?  My PhD thesis
> > argued that
> > > >indeed they are, and that this means much more than the obvious view
> > (which
> > > >Bhaskar holds) that ideas are *scientifically* matter.  When Adorno
> > writes
> > > >about contradiction and about ideas changing into their opposite he
has
> > done
> > > >this on the basis of a laborious case he has made for the view
> > that ideas
> > > >are *philosophically* matter.  So I'm sorry Mervyn but I can't let
you
> > (or
> > > >Bhaskar etc) get away with your reduction of materialism to realism.
> > > >
> > > >You say "the only sense in which [relations] can be material is in
the
> > > >Aristotelian sense of 'material cause': that which pre-exists
> > and enables
> > > >and constrains and is in turn shaped by activity.".  No Mervyn, even
if
> > it
> > > >is a very popular view.  Relations are *dialectically* material in
that
> > > >there is a constant struggle of conflicting ideas, all those
> > ideas being
> > a
> > > >material part of reality.  Or is reality to be reduced to what merely
> > > >*appears* to us?  It is in this sense that consciousness has come to
be
> > the
> > > >dominant ontological element of (material) reality, not in the
> > sense that
> > > >Bhaskar has recently been outlining because (as far as I can
> > make out) he
> > > >has now reduced everything to intentionality.  What Bhaskar
> > and you lack
> > is
> > > >a conception of the *philosophical* materiality of ideas and what
that
> > means
> > > >in terms of human relations within material reality.  You will find
the
> > > >beginnings of a theory of this in the work of Adorno and (more
> > digestibly)
> > > >in the work of Joseph Dietzgen entitled  THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF
> > PHILOSOPHY.
> > > >
> > > >So the problem is not one of historical materialism versus historical
> > > >idealism (and your dialectical supersession of these
> > alternatives, as you
> > > >pose it) but it is really, much as you may dislike this, a
> > philosophical
> > > >problem about the defence of dialectical materialism.  For it
> > is not just
> > a
> > > >question of how we view history (although it is that) but it is also
a
> > > >'spiritual' (or how we invest meaning) question about how we view the
> > > >meaning of human life.  I don't think realism can directly help us
with
> > that
> > > >(though it clearly can help us with building up a more
> > accurate ontology
> > of
> > > >the universe, which seems to me to be the basic role of realism).
> > > >
> > > >Phil Walden
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> > >
> > > --
> > > Mervyn Hartwig
> > > 13 Spenser Road
> > > Herne Hill
> > > London SE24 ONS
> > > United Kingdom
> > > Tel: 020 7 737 2892
> > > Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> > >
> > > There is another world, but it is in this one.
> > > Paul Eluard
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >
>
>
>
>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>



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