From: "Phil Walden" <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk>
Subject: RE: BHA: Are we dialectical materialist realists or empiricist realists?
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 10:46:56 +0100


Jamie, it is a shame I know but I do not have time to read popular science
books.  I agree with you that there is probably a lot more for me to learn
in them than there is in philosophy of science books, it's just that I find
whether I like it or not philosophy occupies all of my reading time.  Yes,
you are right I am interested in the results of science to the extent that
they set ontological limits for philosophy, but you are wrong in that you
seem to believe that science could refute dialectical materialism.  The only
thing that could refute dialectical materialism is a truer philosophy.  I
have nothing against commensuration, dialogue, synthesis, if I have
understood your use of these terms correctly, except that if these do not
take place within the right political context what they produce are a
deepening of error.  You don't seem to understand the importance of matter
in motion, which has represented a massive ontological and epistemological
breakthrough.  The fact that science has since come up with non-matter and
new forms of matter (defined scientifically rather than philosophically) is
a problem-field within science, and does not touch the philosophical theory
of the universe as matter in motion.  What would topple matter in motion is
a philosophical theory about the history of philosophy which refuted the
view that the primary division within philosophy is that between idealism
and materialism.  But I do not believe such a philosophical theory can be
written (Bhaskar has had a go, and in my view has failed, albeit in a
fruitful way).  I don't think you are right in saying that "science has
operated with an implicit empiricist ontology for hundreds of years".  Take
Galileo - as I understand it he had to make a leap of reason in order to
cognize the reality that the earth moves around the sun, it was not just a
quantity into quality thing in terms of the build-up of empirical evidence,
rather Galileo had to learn to think against himself - which is not just a
quantity into quality process.  So perhaps you can now see why I don't rate
the bulk of philosophy of science very highly.  Also you don't seem to
recognize that science is taking up a grossly over-inflated position in
contemporary society, and that philosophy has been all but squeezed out.  If
this persists we will see massive regression in society, because one of the
crucial functions of philosophy is to open up a space for discussions.  If
the skill of thinking against oneself does not become much more widespread
then we will see the domination of the transcendental ego by the Freudian
ego which in all likelihood will end not just science but humanity.  Anyway,
thanks for the suggestions.

Phil
>
>
> Phil, yes I read other philosophy including Althusser. I
> apologise since I'm
> not sure you understood the point I wanted to make. You make claims about
> the ontology of the universe but seem to be keen to ignore what
> science has
> to say on the matter and whether it conforms to your philosophical
> predispositions, this seems a rather disturbing position for a materialist
> and, hopefully, empirical materialist (and by no  means am I endorsing
> scientistic hegemony merely commensuration, dialogue, synthesis
> etc. that a
> dialecticician ought to be interested in). I repeat again, minus the
> illustrations from quanta etc, matter in motion is a highly general point,
> acceptable as a partial description of some aspects of reality.
> In terms of
> astrophysics non-matter, and things that Engels was in no position to
> apprehend as matter since they had not been discovered, are also important
> to the dynamics of reality. This is not idealism or immaterialism, it is
> empirical complexity (even matter in motion would be impossible if there
> were no spaces to move into). Again, the point on science as an
> enterprise,
> since science has operated with an implicit empiricist ideology
> for hundreds
> of years and yet functioned, it seems apparent that science is in no
> imminent danger from its own philosophical inadequacies - which is not to
> say science couldn't do with better accounts of ontology
> (particularly from
> an ecological positon where depth realism has a lot to offer) - but surely
> you can't be saying that materialism/idealism is a genuine threat to the
> survival of the natural scientific community - do you know of any
> scientists
> disappearing down a rabbit hole of judgemental and ontological relativism?
> If you think philosophy of science is, what was the word, 'balderdash'
> perhaps you should read popular science and bypass them - I recommend The
> Elegant Universe by Brian Greene.
>
> Jamie
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Phil Walden" <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk>
> To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2002 11:45 PM
> Subject: RE: BHA: Are we dialectical materialist realists or empiricist
> realists?
>
>
> > Jamie, do you read any philosophy besides philosophy of science?  I have
> no
> > doubt that you have read more philosophy of science than I have, but the
> > question I asked you was a basic (the most fundamental) philosophical
> point.
> > I did not ask you about quanta, strings, astro-physics, gamma
> death rays,
> or
> > any of that sort of thing that has become so much more prevalent on
> > University Challenge.  I asked you whether you think Marx/Engels were
> > correct when they affirmed that the ontology of the universe is
> matter in
> > motion.  I believe you have answered in the affirmative, though I am not
> > sure.  If you don't understand why the question of
> materialism/idealism is
> > crucial to the viability of any scientific enterprise, then I
> suggest you
> > could start by reading Althusser's PHILOSOPHY AND THE SPONTANEOUS
> PHILOSOPHY
> > OF THE SCIENTISTS.  For my part, I do not have time at present to devote
> to
> > the reading of philosophy of science, and that could have
> something to do
> > with the fact that most of the philosophy of science I have read I have
> > found to be balderdash.
> >
> > Phil
> > >
> > >
> > > Phil, do you read any philosophy of science beside that contained
> > > in Marx &
> > > Engels - do you read any science? That philosophy can debate possible
> > > accounts of ontology is important - but science will not collapse
> without
> > > philosophy because science operates with a variety of unexplored
> > > assumptions
> > > (which of course entail positions in ontology but do not demand
> > > philosophical expertise in order for science to avoid collapse - your
> > > position ironically implies causal philosphy i.e. causal ideas).
> > > Put as you
> > > do that the universe is matter in motion there is little to
> quibble with
> > > because the point is incomplete and trivial. What is matter what binds
> > > matter and what is between matter - the role of nothingness
> > > itself which is
> > > after all vital since the relative portions of matter to
> vacuum dictate
> > > whether the universe is cyclical or unilinearly expansionary
> > > (and by matter
> > > are you including other quanta which also entail forms of energy
> > > or forms of
> > > quasi matter based on vibrational forms of energy quanta - i.e.
> strings?)
> > > These are key questions for astrophysics. I'm afraid Engels
> > > genius though he
> > > was is not much help here.
> > >
> > > Jamie
> > >
> > > PS Imissed the start of this discussion what is the heart of the
> > > contention
> > > anyway?
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Phil Walden" <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk>
> > > To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> > > Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2002 10:53 PM
> > > Subject: RE: BHA: Are we dialectical materialist realists or
> empiricist
> > > realists?
> > >
> > >
> > > > Jamie,
> > > >
> > > > So are we to take it that you agree with the philosophical stance of
> > > > Marx/Engels in ANTI-DUHRING that the best ontology of the
> > > universe that we
> > > > have is: matter in motion?  Or if you do not agree with
> this, can you
> > > supply
> > > > a more viable ontology?  I would be surprised.  It is necessary
> > > to insist
> > > on
> > > > this philosophical point, because without it science will collapse
> from
> > > the
> > > > influence of idealism.
> > > >
> > > > Phil
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Mervyn,
> > > > >
> > > > > in addition to your response, whether ideas are material (perhaps
> I've
> > > got
> > > > > the wrong end of ths tick but):
> > > > >
> > > > > Flowing from the long tradition of philosophy of the mind -
> > > qualia etc.
> > > > > whether ideas are in some sense not just intangible
> > > materially effective
> > > > > superveneienct aspects of being i.e. entailing some form of
> > > non-reductive
> > > > > physical/biological process - is an area of philosophical
> speculation
> > > that
> > > > > is parasitic on the very processes it speculates upon - but is no
> > > > > more than
> > > > > that - the fact that neurons firing in certain areas of the brain
> > > > > correspond
> > > > > to ideas may not imply that the concept of yellow is that
> > > firing anymore
> > > > > than transport by train is the passengers but this in itself does
> > > > > not settle
> > > > > whether ideas have an additional materiality that is as yet
> > > undiscovered
> > > > > (this has always bveen a problem with the concept of consciousness
> for
> > > > > physics in terms of the causality of the immaterial on the
> > > material). At
> > > > > this level of argument the ultimate recourse is the way the world
> > > > > is and the
> > > > > evidence that we can accumulate for it - Engels science
> is woefully
> > > > > inadequate/anachronsitic as it must be, given his historical
> location,
> > > > > whatever one thinks of his dialectics. It may be that we will
> > > > > find some form
> > > > > of energy signature, fundamental subatomic mechanism, over
> > > and above the
> > > > > terminology of SEPM (which itself is no more than
> pointing us in the
> > > > > direction of an explanation of possibility), which improves our
> > > > > understanding of  consciousness etc. At the moment the
> > > > > materiality of ideas
> > > > > debate is one about the coherence of concepts not the veracity of
> > > > > concepts.
> > > > > We can eliminate forms of argument that cannot sustain their own
> > > > > possibility
> > > > > but we lack the tools to move beyond that postition.
> > > > >
> > > > > Jamie
> > > > >
> > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> > > > > To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> > > > > Cc: "Rachel Sharp" <rssharp-AT-btinternet.com>
> > > > > Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 7:04 PM
> > > > > Subject: Re: BHA: Are we dialectical materialist realists or
> > > empiricist
> > > > > realists?
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > Hi Phil,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I'm not trying to get away with anything (!), just saying what I
> > > > > > provisionally think, I hope with some supporting argument.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I don't accept that ideas *are* matter (scientifically or
> > > > > > philosophically). While they depend on a material substrate
> > > for their
> > > > > > articulation (brain states, books, computer technology etc)
> > > they seem
> > > to
> > > > > > me, like relations, patently immaterial (what is
> 'material' about
> > > Marx's
> > > > > > concept of a 'yellow logarithm' for example? Your position
> > > looks like
> > > > > > reductionism, which as you know Marx and Engels opposed,
> > > arguing that
> > > > > > mental phenomena are irreducible to, but emergent from,
> matter. I
> > > don't
> > > > > > know Dietzgen or Adorno well enough to argue the toss with you
> about
> > > > > > them. Certainly, Adorno saw himself as a philosophical
> materialist,
> > > but
> > > > > > I doubt very much that he espoused your kind of
> apparent identity
> > > > > > thinking.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On the other hand, it could be that our difference is largely
> > > semantic.
> > > > > > You want to defend 'dialectical materialism' which you see as
> > > providing
> > > > > > answers to the 'spiritual' question of the meaning of
> life. DM as
> I
> > > > > > understand it holds that 'matter' is radically, even infinitely,
> > > > > > creative and transformative, dialectically leaping over
> > > itself, as it
> > > > > > were, to produce the stratified, differentiated and
> changing world
> > > that
> > > > > > we know. When you add to this your (philosophical) notion
> > > that 'ideas
> > > > > > [are] a material part of reality', is this so very different
> > > > > > (terminology aside) from the position Bhaskar currently
> > > espouses, i.e.
> > > > > > that ideas (mind) are enfolded qua possibility within
> > > matter? I can't
> > > > > > see how the latter is an 'empiricist realist' position. It
> > > is arrived
> > > at
> > > > > > by transcendental argument. Nor does it reduce everything to
> > > > > > intentionality. The ontology is still imo one of open
> possibility.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Bhaskar claims in his latest books that materialism is a very
> > > > > > underanalysed concept and wants to discuss what it is with
> > > Marxists at
> > > > > > the Centre for Critical Realism seminar in London in
> > > November. I don't
> > > > > > know how far he's developed his own analysis. There's a
> > > brief critique
> > > > > > of the reductive materialism characteristic of modernity in
> > > > > > *Reflections* which I believe is developed more fully in one of
> the
> > > > > > still unpublished volumes of *Meta-Reality*. It's early days in
> the
> > > > > > reception and assessment of his latest position.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Opponents (for want of a better word) of the spiritual turn keep
> > > asking
> > > > > > me what's the point, aren't there better things to do? I'm
> > > sure you'll
> > > > > > agree with me that the struggle for a better world must
> proceed at
> > > every
> > > > > > level, including philosophy. As I very broadly see it,
> Bhaskar is
> > > trying
> > > > > > to help undermine the philosophical props of the status quo, to
> show
> > > > > > that a better world is possible and to help forge a
> > > worldview fitting
> > > > > > for such. This doesn't preclude, but calls for and hopes to
> > > inform and
> > > > > > encourage, more substantive contributions at other levels.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Mervyn
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Phil Walden <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk> writes
> > > > > > >Hi Mervyn, all,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >Mervyn you write that you hold "with Bhaskar that mind *as
> > > possibility*
> > > > > is
> > > > > > >enfolded in matter from the outset both qua causal power and
> > > 'implicate
> > > > > > >order' or the potential stratification of being.".
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >You then go on to say that relations cannot be material in a
> > > > > metaphysical
> > > > > > >sense because "they are just an irreducible category: the
> > > > > universe is so
> > > > > > >constituted that relations are causal".
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >Question: are ideas *philosophically* matter?  My PhD thesis
> > > > > argued that
> > > > > > >indeed they are, and that this means much more than the
> > > obvious view
> > > > > (which
> > > > > > >Bhaskar holds) that ideas are *scientifically* matter.  When
> Adorno
> > > > > writes
> > > > > > >about contradiction and about ideas changing into
> their opposite
> he
> > > has
> > > > > done
> > > > > > >this on the basis of a laborious case he has made for the view
> > > > > that ideas
> > > > > > >are *philosophically* matter.  So I'm sorry Mervyn but I can't
> let
> > > you
> > > > > (or
> > > > > > >Bhaskar etc) get away with your reduction of materialism
> > > to realism.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >You say "the only sense in which [relations] can be material is
> in
> > > the
> > > > > > >Aristotelian sense of 'material cause': that which pre-exists
> > > > > and enables
> > > > > > >and constrains and is in turn shaped by activity.".  No
> > > Mervyn, even
> > > if
> > > > > it
> > > > > > >is a very popular view.  Relations are *dialectically* material
> in
> > > that
> > > > > > >there is a constant struggle of conflicting ideas, all those
> > > > > ideas being
> > > > > a
> > > > > > >material part of reality.  Or is reality to be reduced to
> > > what merely
> > > > > > >*appears* to us?  It is in this sense that consciousness
> > > has come to
> > > be
> > > > > the
> > > > > > >dominant ontological element of (material) reality, not in the
> > > > > sense that
> > > > > > >Bhaskar has recently been outlining because (as far as I can
> > > > > make out) he
> > > > > > >has now reduced everything to intentionality.  What Bhaskar
> > > > > and you lack
> > > > > is
> > > > > > >a conception of the *philosophical* materiality of
> ideas and what
> > > that
> > > > > means
> > > > > > >in terms of human relations within material reality.  You will
> find
> > > the
> > > > > > >beginnings of a theory of this in the work of Adorno and (more
> > > > > digestibly)
> > > > > > >in the work of Joseph Dietzgen entitled  THE POSITIVE
> OUTCOME OF
> > > > > PHILOSOPHY.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >So the problem is not one of historical materialism versus
> > > historical
> > > > > > >idealism (and your dialectical supersession of these
> > > > > alternatives, as you
> > > > > > >pose it) but it is really, much as you may dislike this, a
> > > > > philosophical
> > > > > > >problem about the defence of dialectical materialism.  For it
> > > > > is not just
> > > > > a
> > > > > > >question of how we view history (although it is that) but
> > > it is also
> > > a
> > > > > > >'spiritual' (or how we invest meaning) question about how
> > > we view the
> > > > > > >meaning of human life.  I don't think realism can directly help
> us
> > > with
> > > > > that
> > > > > > >(though it clearly can help us with building up a more
> > > > > accurate ontology
> > > > > of
> > > > > > >the universe, which seems to me to be the basic role
> of realism).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >Phil Walden
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> > > > > >
> > > > > > --
> > > > > > Mervyn Hartwig
> > > > > > 13 Spenser Road
> > > > > > Herne Hill
> > > > > > London SE24 ONS
> > > > > > United Kingdom
> > > > > > Tel: 020 7 737 2892
> > > > > > Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> > > > > >
> > > > > > There is another world, but it is in this one.
> > > > > > Paul Eluard
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >
>
>
>
>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>



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