From: "Phil Walden" <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk>
Subject: BHA: prompted thoughts
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 07:53:25 +0100


Hi Ruth, Wendy, Jamie, all,

Ruth, good to know you're still on the list.  In DPF alethic truth is
defined as "The truth of, or real reason(s) for, or dialectical ground of,
things, as distinct from propositions, possible in virtue of the ontological
stratification of the world and attainable in virtue of the dynamic
character of science.".  One sees immediately here the extrusion of
philosophy from the process of coming to the truth and its pallid
substitution by "the dynamic character of science".  I see no reason why the
same could not be said about a view that the truth is a matter of
Aristotelean real essence.  You could try having a look at what Hegel says
about essence and appearance.  One problem with Aristotelean real essence is
that it assumes that the primary way in which humans cognise the world is
through sense data.  Concepts don't really get a look in, and of course that
is why there is no understanding of contradiction in Aristotle.  You could
also think about what Adorno says about how ideas change into their
opposite, for example how the Second International went from its own
self-understanding as "for the international working class" to its true
essence as complicit in the international slaughter of the international
working class.

On commensurability.  I feel at something of a disadvantage here because I
am not mathematical, and commensurability is a distinctly mathematically
sounding metaphor.  Anyway, Jamie's enthusiasm for Habermas and the
Habermasian non-class notion of reasoned dialogue seems to me to smack of
the Second International.  Part of the antidote for this Habermasian notion
of reasoned dialogue, abstracted from all class relations, is possibly
Adorno's anti-rationalist way of constructing his argument and his unashamed
identification with the interests of the world working class.  I have
frequently heard the view that Adorno is not to be taken seriously because
he does not construct formal arguments.  It's true he doesn't, but that is
because he is constantly thinking against himself, and that is a mark of a
real philosopher rather than a theory-monger.

Phil



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